

**THE NATIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 134**



**TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHER APPOINTMENTS  
IN THE SIMBU PROVINCE**



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**Teachers' Perceptions of Teacher Appointments in the Simbu Province**

**by**

**Arnold Kukari, Patricia Paraide, Kapa Kelep-Malpo, Sebastian Mugup,  
and Wilson Pes**

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First published in October 2012

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NRI Discussion Paper No. 134

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ISBN 9980 75 209 2  
National Library Service of Papua New Guinea

ABCDE 20165432

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## ACRONYMS

BoG	Board of Governors
BoM	Board of Management
DEA	District Education Administration
MOMASE	Morobe, Madang, and Sepik Provinces
NEB	National Education Board
NDoE	National Department of Education
NRI	National Research Institute
PARS	Payroll and Related Services
PEB	Provincial Education Board
PED	Provincial Education Division
PEO	Provincial Education Officers
PNG	Papua New Guinea
RoDSS	Resumption of Duty Summary Sheets
SDA	Seventh Day Adventist
TSC	Teaching Service Commission

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The authors would like to acknowledge the Department of Education for its permission for the study to be carried out in the selected provinces. The Provincial Education Adviser's approval and support for the study to be carried out in the province is acknowledged. We would like to especially thank the community and primary school teachers and the head teachers who completed and returned the survey instruments, and participated in the focused group interviews.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Background to the Study**

The process of appointing teachers to teaching positions is outlined in the *Teaching Service Act, 1995* (Consolidated to No. 20 of 1995), *Education Act, 1983* (Consolidated to No. 13 of 1995), and the *Teaching Service Commission Human Resource Information and Operations Manual*. The Teaching Service Commission (TSC) and the Provincial Education Board (PEB) are expected to comply with the relevant provisions of these laws and related policies when appointing teachers to teaching positions. Yet, not all PEBs comply with these laws and policies when appointing teachers to teaching positions. Some of them comply with only some provisions while systematically flouting others in their appointment of teachers. Anecdotal evidence and teacher appointment data from TSC indicated that there were serious problems underlying the teacher appointment-process and practice at different levels of Papua New Guinea's education system.

Simbu Province was identified as one of only a few provinces that demonstrated a good reputation in teacher appointments. Because of this, it was included in the study to allow for its teacher appointment process and practice to be examined. This study was intended to isolate the factors that contributed to Simbu's good performance so that these factors could be ascertained and reported for the benefit of other provinces. Of particular interest are those provinces which exhibited poor teacher appointment reputations, so that they can learn from Simbu's experiences. In addition, weaknesses could also be identified to enable appropriate interventions to be developed and implemented to improve and further strengthen the system.

### **Purposes of the Study**

The purposes of the study were to:

- understand the perceptions and experiences of teachers and head teachers of the teacher appointment process and practice in the province;
- identify and describe the factors that contribute to effective teacher appointment;
- identify the problems and understand their causes, and
- recommend appropriate strategies to improve and strengthen teacher appointment in the province.

### **Methodology of the Study**

Eight out of the 20 provinces were selected to participate in the study. Of these eight provinces, two were from the Southern Region, two from the Momase Region, two from the Highlands Region, and two from the Islands Region. The provinces were selected based on their reputation in teacher appointments. Of the two provinces selected from each region, one was selected because of its good track record while the other was selected because of its poor track record in managing teacher appointments. Simbu and Western

Highlands Provinces were selected from the Highlands Region to participate in the study. Simbu Province had a relatively good reputation in teacher appointment. Conversely, Western Highlands Province had a history of poor teacher appointment practices.

All community and primary school teachers and head teachers in the Simbu Province participated in the study. The reason for including all teachers and head teachers was to enable an understanding of how they perceived teacher appointment in the province and its impact on different categories of teachers, including how it impacted on male and female teachers, rural and urban teachers, married and single teachers, and local and non local teachers.

Data was collected using a teacher and head teacher survey, and focused group interviews. The purpose of the surveys was to get teachers and head teachers perceptions and experiences of the teacher appointment process and practice in the province. Focused group interviews focused on a sample consisting teachers and head teachers in four schools — two urban and two rural. This approach was used to enable teachers to express their views and share their experiences concerning teacher appointment and how it affected them individually and the school system, as a whole.

### **Lessons Learnt**

The method used in delivering the surveys to schools did not yield the desired results. Although surveys were delivered easily to schools that were accessible by road, it was difficult to deliver surveys to schools in very remote areas where there were no roads. Surveys for remote schools were left with the respective PEOs to distribute, collect and send to NRI. This was not done according to plan and as a result many survey results were not received. In addition, many teachers simply did not bother to complete and return their surveys, which is a reflection of teachers' poor attitude towards research.

### **Key Findings**

#### ***1 Characteristics of Teachers and Head Teachers***

- 1.1 Eighty-five percent of the teachers surveyed were from the Simbu Province. A large proportion (57.7 percent) of teachers were between 20 and 40 years; 99.9 percent were teaching in rural schools; with the majority (51 percent) teaching in government schools. More than half (79.9 percent) of the teachers had between 11 and 30 years of teaching experience, and 62 percent of the teachers have been teaching in their current schools for between one and three years. There were more younger teachers than older teachers teaching in the province.
- 1.2 It was found that 92.5 percent of the head teachers assessed were from the Simbu Province. There were more head teachers (68 percent) in the age bracket of 20–40 years than there were in the age bracket of 41–50 years and 19 years and below put together, which indicated that community and primary schools were headed by younger, but experienced teachers. The majority (73.9 percent) was heading non-

government schools and 95 percent were heading rural schools. More than half (75 percent) of the head teachers had between 11 and 30 years of teaching experience.

- 1.3 In general, it was found that a teacher was more likely to be appointed to a teaching position if he or she comes from the Simbu Province, is between 20 and 40 years of age and has between 11 and 30 years teaching experience. In addition, a teacher is also more likely to be appointed to a head teacher's position if the teacher is a male, comes from the Simbu Province, is between 20 and 40 years of age and has between 11 and 30 years teaching experience.

## **2 Appointment of Teachers to Teaching and Head teacher Positions**

- 2.1 The majority of the teachers and head teachers were of the view that teachers were appointed to teaching and head teacher positions through the Special Education Gazette. They also recognised that the PEB is the appointing authority in the province, yet the data revealed that appointments were also done through nepotism and bribery.
- 2.2 Data on the appointment of teachers seemed to suggest that the province was complying with the relevant provisions of the *Teaching Service Act, 1995* (Consolidated to No. 20 of 1995). However, there is a worrying trend of teachers being appointed to teaching positions outside of the required provisions of the *TSC Act*, which has contributed to the infiltration of corruption into the appointment process and practice.
- 2.3 Both the teachers and the head teachers perceived teacher appointments in the province as corrupt. Lack of transparency and accountability in the appointment of teachers, poor handling of teachers' appeals, forcing of teachers to take up teaching positions they had not applied for, the placing of teachers in the pool and teachers staying in one position for too long were symptomatic of a corrupt teacher appointment system.
- 2.4 Teachers and head teachers were in agreement that teachers have always been notified of their appointments very late. This situation is often the main contributing factor towards teachers resuming late for duties.
- 2.5 Teachers find out about their appointments only when they actively enquire at the provincial headquarters, through the local radio or through other informal means. Rarely do they receive notifications of their postings through written correspondence.
- 2.6 Teachers' interests and welfare were either not considered, or were considered some of the time only, when decisions about teacher appointments are made. Not only is this considered as a significant factor which is responsible for the increased levels in protests by teachers over PEB decisions; but also leads to teachers

resuming late for teaching duties, refusal by teachers to take up their appointments and, in the worst case scenario, teachers resigning from the teaching profession.

### **3 *Acceptance of Teaching and Head Teacher Appointments***

- 3.1 Teachers were more likely to be refused their appointments than the head teachers. Pressure on teachers to take up positions they had not applied for, lack of an effective appeals process, nepotism and bribery in the appointment of teachers, lack of consideration of teachers' interests and welfare, and the late notification of teachers about their postings has a bearing on teachers' and head teachers' decisions on whether or not they should take up their respective teaching and head teacher positions being offered to them.
- 3.2 Appointments made against teachers' preferences, family and personal reasons, and the location of schools were the main contributing factors to teachers' and head teachers' refusal to take up their teaching appointments. These factors were intertwined and connected to reasons of lack of security, lack of basic services, eligibility and tenure issues.
- 3.3 The majority (61.1 percent) of the teachers and 60 percent of the head teachers expressed that they would challenge their appointments if they were not satisfied with their appointments. However, because the appeals process was dysfunctional, the appellants normally waited in vain in anticipation for the outcome of their appeals. When this happens, they either settle for teaching positions in other schools in fear of losing their pay, or quit teaching.
- 3.4 A small percentage of discontented teachers chose to take up the positions offered to them after the PEB issued threats to place them in the 'pool', which effectively means that they would be put off the payroll.
- 3.5 The PEB demonstrated insensitivity when addressing teachers' refusal of taking up teaching appointments through the use of the formal appeal process as stipulated under the *TSC Act*. Instead it seemed to favour the use of punitive measures.

### **4 *Teachers Resumption of Duties***

- 4.1 Late resumption of duties by teachers and head teachers is a major problem affecting the resumption of duty process.
- 4.2 Apart from poor transport infrastructure, security concerns and tribal fights, the rest of the contributing factors to teachers resuming duties late were caused by the failure of the TSC and PEB to effectively and prudently carry out their mandated teacher appointment functions.

- 4.3 Logistics and costs of getting to schools, discontentment with teaching positions offered, personal and family reasons, late appointments, late notification of appointments, and an ineffective teacher appeals process were the main reasons given by teachers for resuming late for their duties.
- 4.4 Weather and defective road conditions, lack of accommodation at respective schools, tribal conflicts, and poor security, although mentioned, were not considered as the main reasons for teachers resuming late for duties.
- 4.5 Improvements in the logistics of getting to schools, early appointment and notification of teachers, and fair consideration of teachers' welfare and greater sensitivity in the appointment of teachers were the most common recommendations made by the teachers and the head teachers for improving the current poor state of teachers' resumption of duties.
- 4.6 There is a strong relationship between the late arrival of the Special Education Gazette in the province and late appointment and notification of teachers of their appointments, late resumption of duties by teachers, and late submission on RoDSS (Resumption of Duty Summary Sheets) to PARS (Payroll and Related Services Branch).

## **5 *Strengths and Weaknesses of the Teacher Appointment Process***

- 5.1 A number of strengths in the appointment of teachers were also identified. These included (a) serving teachers were given priority in the appointment process (b) logistical support provided to teachers (c) teachers were able to fight for their rights (d) some teachers were appointed on merit (e) most schools in all locations were fully staffed and (f) applications were made through the District Education Office. This reflected the uneven impact of the teacher appointment process and practice on individual teachers and different categories of teachers.
- 5.2 Despite these strengths, teacher appointment in the province was generally weak. In general, there were four main contributing factors and these were intertwined. These were: (a) failure by TSC to print and distribute the Special Education Gazette to the province in a timely manner; (b) lack of compliance with the provisions of teacher appointments in the *TSC Act* and related policies; (c) lack of an effective and efficient appeals mechanism; and (d) poor management and coordination of logistics for teachers getting to their schools on time.
- 5.3 The most common changes proposed by teachers and head teachers were: (a) financing of teachers' transfer costs to schools; (b) consideration of teachers' rights and interests in appointments; (c) elimination of corrupt practices; and (d) provision of incentives for remote school teachers.

## **Recommendations**

### **1. Printing and Distribution of the Special Education Gazette**

#### ***Recommendation 1.1***

That PEB initiates and fosters a dialogue with the TSC for a time-bound **Action Plan** to be developed and implemented to ensure that the Special Education Gazette is printed and distributed to the provinces by the end of June each year.

### **2. Appointment of Teachers to Teaching and Head Teacher Positions**

#### ***Recommendation 2.1***

That PEB and TSC develop and implement a time-bound **Teacher Appointment Action Plan** with clear deliverables for every calendar year.

#### ***Recommendation 2.2***

That PEB must comply with all the relevant provisions of the *TSC Act, 1995* in the appointment of teachers to teaching positions in the province.

#### ***Recommendation 2.3***

That TSC and PEB eliminates nepotism and corruption in the appointment of teachers by ensuring that all appointments are made based on merit and through a duly constituted PEB meeting.

#### ***Recommendation 2.4***

That PEB effectively addresses nepotism and corruption by taking disciplinary action against officers who engage in such activities and fail to comply with the relevant provisions of the *TSC Act, 1995* and who fail to perform their responsibilities as described in the **Teacher Appointment and Logistics Action Plans**.

#### ***Recommendation 2.5***

That PEB put in place a confidential and a non punitive process for teachers, head teachers, BoM, PEB members, and parents and citizens to report cases of nepotism or corruption in the process and practice of teacher appointments.

#### ***Recommendation 2.6***

That PEB develops and communicates to all teachers, school agencies, BoM, parents and citizens, standard officers, district education advisers, church education secretaries, and local leaders, a criteria for appointing teachers to teaching and head teacher positions.

***Recommendation 2.7***

That PEB ensures that teachers and head teachers are appointed to teaching positions and administrative positions with due consideration for their personal welfare and interests, eligibility to promotional positions, tenure rights, and potential risks to themselves and their families.

***Recommendation 2.8***

That PEB, in collaboration with TSC, develops and maintains an up-to-date **Database** of all teaching positions in the province, teachers occupying each position and their particulars, vacant positions, and the movement of positions from one school to another.

***Recommendation 2.9***

That PEB considers all recommendations for teacher appointments from the Church agency personnel, standard officers, and BoM, based on merit.

***Recommendation 2.10***

That TSC provides increased financial incentives for teachers teaching in remote schools and that these are paid on a fortnightly basis.

***Recommendation 2.11***

That PEB prepares and presents an **Annual Teacher Appointment Report** to TSC and NEB by March every year.

**2 Teachers' Acceptance of Teaching and Head Teacher Appointments**

***Recommendation 3.1***

That PEB develops and implements an effective, transparent, and time-bound **Appeals Process and an Action Plan**, if there is currently none in place.

***Recommendation 3.2***

That PEB establishes an **Appeals Board** comprising members other than PEB members together with clear roles and responsibilities.

***Recommendation 3.3***

That PEB develops and implements a clear, time-bound **Appeals Process** that states clearly when the appeals will be received, how long the appeals will be heard, and when the outcomes will be communicated to the appellants.

***Recommendation 3.4***

That PEB and TSC abolish the teachers' 'pool'.

**4. Resumption of Teaching Duties**

***Recommendation 4.1***

That PEB develops and puts in place a time-bound **Logistics Action Plan** that will include all required activities including, travel costs and arrangements for teachers transferring to new positions, monitoring of teachers resumption of duty in schools, filling in and submission of the Resumption of Duty Forms and RoDSS, and reporting on the resumption of duty by teachers to PEB. The person(s) responsible for executing each activity and the required timeframe for its completion must be clearly identified for monitoring and accountability purposes.

***Recommendation 4.2***

That PEB budgets for teachers' travel costs yearly and mobilise all resources necessary to effectively implement the Logistics Action Plan. All funds must be *acquitted* and reported in the **Annual Teacher Appointment Report**, which must be submitted to TSC and PEB for ratification by March every year.

**5. Amend the *Teaching Service Act, 1995* and the *Education Act, 1995***

***Recommendation 5.1***

That TSC and PEB amend the *TSC Act, 1995* and the *Education Act, 1995* to include provisions that will make it mandatory for PEB to develop and implement time-bound Teacher Appointment, Logistics, and Appeals Action Plans, and to produce a Teacher Appointments Annual Report for TSC and PEB by March every year.

***Recommendation 5.2***

That TSC amends the *TSC Act, 1995* to include provisions that will allow for implementing officers to be held accountable by the PEB if they fail to carry out their responsibilities stipulated in Teacher Appointments, Logistics, and the Appeals Action Plans.

## **6 Respect and Strengthen Church/Government Partnerships**

### ***Recommendation 6.1***

That the roles and responsibilities of church agencies in the appointment of teachers to teaching and head teacher positions must be clearly described and communicated to all teachers, BoM, Parents and Citizen's Associations, PEB members, and all PEOs.

### ***Recommendation 6.2***

That PEB must give due consideration to the recommendations of church agencies and take into serious consideration their views on teacher appointments.



# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background to the Study

The process of appointing teachers to teaching positions is outlined in the *Teaching Service Act, 1995* (Consolidated to No. 20 of 1995), *Education Act, 1983* (Consolidated to No. 13 of 1995), and the *Teaching Service Commission Human Resource Information and Operations Manual*. The TSC and the PEB are expected to comply with the relevant provisions of these laws and related policies when appointing teachers to teaching positions. In so doing, TSC will prepare, print and dispatch the Special Education Gazette, which contains vacant teaching positions in all educational institutions under the NDoE mandate, to the provinces and all educational institutions in a timely manner. Teachers will apply for teaching positions and the PEB, in consultation with the head teachers, BoM and BoG, and church agencies, will process and notify teachers of the outcome of their applications before the teachers take their recreational leave. The PEB will effectively manage the movement of teachers to their selected schools to ensure that they resume their duties on time, and that their Resumption of Duty Summary Sheets (RoDSS) will be submitted in time to allow for them to be continuously paid their salaries. Yet, these expectations have not been met by the TSC and some PEBs over the years resulting in the creation and perpetuation of a multitude of problems. These problems continue to have a negative impact on teachers' motivation and commitment to their teaching duties, the quality of students' learning, and children's access to, and participation in schooling. This was highlighted by the Public Sector Reform Management Team in its audit of the administration of Eastern Highlands, Morobe, West New Britain and Milne Bay Provinces in 2008. The team found, amongst other findings, a lack of compliance by some provinces with the *TSC Act* and related policies in the appointment of teachers to teaching and administrative positions (Arek, 2008:2).

The non compliance of the TSC and Education Acts, and related policies in the appointment of teachers is a common practice amongst the PEBs and, to some extent, the TSC. This is a major contributing factor to the host of problems experienced in the appointment of teachers to teaching and head teacher positions. These problems are caused by delays (delay factors), late resumption of duties (resumption factors), and corruption (corruption factors). Teacher appointment problems are caused by the failure of TSC over the years to print and deliver the Special Education Gazette to the provinces in a timely manner. The Gazette is printed and sent to the provinces in September or October each year and provinces are expected to administer and complete their teacher appointments by November. The provinces often fail to appoint their teachers by November and delay the process until December. Teacher appointments are often finalised by December or, in many cases, just before the commencement of the school year. Delays in teacher appointments are also caused by interference in the appointment of teachers by education agencies. (Arek, 2008:2) in her report on the audit of four provinces noted that the Public Sector Audit Team found that "most education agencies were interfering in teachers' postings and appointments". Politicians were also causing delays in getting teachers to schools by meddling with the work of PEBs in the appointment of teachers. Korugl, (2008a) reported that four secondary schools in the Western Highlands Province faced closure due to

## 2 *Teachers' Perceptions of Teacher Appointments in the Simbu Province*

political interference in the appointment of teachers, particularly the head teachers' positions. In addition, communities were also increasingly becoming involved in the appointment of teachers. This was the case in the appointment of the principal of Dregerhafen Technical and Grace Memorial Secondary Schools in the Morobe Province, and Hagen Park Secondary School in the Western Highlands Province. Gumuno (2008b) reported that locals welded the Mt. Hagen Secondary School gates preventing the teachers from gaining entry to begin the school year. They wanted the substantive school principal to remain at the school and requested the PEB to rescind its decision to transfer him to another school.

Delay in teachers taking up their positions is also caused by an absence of an effective and efficient teacher appeals process. Teachers often challenge the decisions of the PEB if they perceive or felt that their appointments were not done following the correct procedures, on merit or according to their interests. For example Lari (2008:4), reported that about 600 teachers in the Enga Province were not happy with their postings because they believed that "their postings had been muddled up and not done according to the teachers' requests and choices". However, in most provinces teachers' appeals were often delayed for long periods of time before teachers were notified of the outcome. In other cases teachers waited in vain, and, as a result, many decided to quit teaching or look for teaching positions in other provinces. If they received a positive outcome, they often started their school year very late. When serving teachers decided to leave, schools where these teachers were supposed to teach end up having no or a less number of teachers. In such cases, provinces resorted to appointing unqualified teachers (Muri, 2008:14), or recruit teachers from other provinces to fill in the vacancies (Gumar, 2011:6; Kivia, 2011:5).

Moreover, the failure of TSC and PEB to ensure that teacher appointments are done in an effective and efficient manner, and in a transparent and accountable way, has contributed to perceptions that the entire teacher appointment process and practice is corrupt (Philemon 2010:4; Tiamu, 2010:6) reported that "the Morobe Provincial Education Board has been accused of "foul play", irregularities and abnormalities "in the appointment of teachers...". Furthermore, Philemon reported that the Regional Secretary of the Papua New Guinea Teachers Association, Mr. Mathew Pobaya, claimed that "the Provincial Education Board had overlooked the tenure appointment of teachers, the reclassification of their positions, the substantive position holders and used appointments as a form of punishment. The TSC was concerned about this situation and, according to Tiamu (2010:6), wrote to the Provincial Education Adviser and in the letter stated:

"...you have totally ignored the legitimate processes and procedures and failed to give clear advice to the Provincial Education Board on teachers' appointments under the Teaching Service Act and the Education Act".

The above factors contribute directly to the late notification of teachers of their teaching appointments and late resumption of teaching duties by teachers. The other contributing factors responsible for teachers' late resumption of duties include: poor school infrastructure, including teachers' housing, poor water and sanitation (Anis, 2008:3; Gumar, 2008:5) and disputes over land in which the schools are situated.

The problems highlighted here have been the norm over the last decade or so and permeate the whole teacher appointment and deployment process and practice. These problems, according to Kukari, *et al.*, (2011), are exacerbated by a lack of clarity, duplication and division in the TSC and the NEB's teacher appointment roles and functions stipulated under the *Teaching Service Act, 1995* and the *Education Act, 1995*. This situation creates not only confusion amongst the teachers, but also a main contributing factor to the teacher appointment problems experienced every school year.

Although Simbu Province was identified as one of only a few provinces that had a fairly good reputation in teacher appointments, there are still ongoing problems that it needs to address in order to ensure that teacher appointments are effectively and efficiently implemented and managed. These include the appointment and support for teachers to get to hard-to-reach schools located in the remote and geographically isolated parts of the province. This problem came to light when Korugl (2008a) reported on the plight of 200 students in the Karamui-Nomane District who had their primary school education disrupted when teachers appointed to teach in the schools in the district refused to take up their teaching positions. The teachers refused to take up their positions due to the remoteness of the schools and poor government services. The only form of transport to and from Karamui-Nomane District was by air, which teachers cannot afford, given their poor salaries.

## **1.2 Purposes of the Study**

The purposes of the study were to:

- understand the perceptions and experiences of teachers and head teachers of the teacher appointment-process and practice in the Simbu Province;
- identify and describe the factors that contribute to effective teacher appointments;
- identify the problems and understand their causes, and
- recommend appropriate strategies to improve and strengthen teacher appointments in the province.

## **1.3 Methodology of the Study**

The methodology used in the study was informed by the purpose of the study, which determined the types of data needed, where it will be collected, how it will be analysed, and how it will be reported.

### ***Research Approach***

The case study design was used to plan and collect the data for the study. This design was used to gain an in-depth understanding of the teacher appointment process and practice, and what it meant for community and primary school teachers, and head teachers in the province. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to collect the required data. This triangulation of methods helped to enhance the reliability and the validity of the data.

***Sample***

In order to make sense of teachers and head teachers' lived experiences and perceptions of teacher appointments in the province, all community and primary school teachers and head teachers were surveyed. However, the response rate of both the teachers and the head teachers was poor. The teachers' response rate was 19 percent and the head teachers' response rate was 27 percent. Most of the questionnaires were not responded to because it was difficult to deliver them to the schools due to the remoteness of many schools and transportation problems, particularly to districts such as Karimui-Nomane. Law and order problems in Gumine and SinaSina-Yonggamugl Districts at the time of the study prevented the surveys from being delivered to the schools. Table 1 shows the samples of community and primary school teachers and head teachers surveyed in relation to their respective provincial populations. In addition, teachers and head teachers in two urban and two rural schools were interviewed to get their views on teacher appointments in the Province and its impact on them individually and on other teachers.

**Table 1: Teacher and head teacher population and sample**

<b>Community and Primary School Teachers</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Sample</b>	
	N	N	%
Teachers	970	182	19
Head teachers	138	37	27

***Data collection***

Data for the study was collected using a teacher and head teacher survey and focused group interviews. Surveys were administered to all community and primary school teachers and head teachers teaching or administering a school at the time of the study. The purpose of the survey was to get teachers and head teachers' opinions and perceptions of the teacher appointment process and practice in the province and their impact on each of them and as members of different categories of teachers. Focused group interviews were conducted with teachers and head teachers in two urban and two rural schools. The purpose of these interviews was to understand teachers' and head teachers' lived experiences and emic perspectives of teacher appointments in the Province, and what it meant to each of them and as members of different categories of teachers.

***Data analysis***

Data for the study was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Scientist (SPSS) software. Because the data collected from the survey was mostly qualitative, the first step was to categorise the data into meaningful themes. The questionnaires were then coded using a prepared code book, which contained the themes and a code for each theme. Once coding was completed, data was then entered and analysed using SPSS. From this,

frequencies for each question and variable were generated and used to prepare tables for use in the interpretation of the data.

#### **1.4 Lessons Learnt**

The method of delivering surveys to schools did not yield the desired results. Although surveys were delivered to schools that were accessible by road, it was difficult to deliver surveys to very remote and hard-to-reach schools. Surveys for remote schools were left with the PEO officers to distribute, collect and send to NRI. This was not done and many surveys were not received by the targeted subjects. In addition, many teachers simply did not bother to complete and return their surveys, which is a reflection of teachers' poor attitude towards research.

#### **1.5 Organization of the Report**

The report comprises six main parts. An executive summary is presented upfront to provide the reader with a synopsis of the background, objectives, methodology, and the purpose of the study, lessons learnt, key findings and the resulting recommendations. This is followed by the introduction. In the introduction the background to the study and the methodology are elaborated to contextualise the study and describe the research methods that were used in the study. A provincial profile is presented next to provide a provincial and district context for the study to help enhance understanding of teacher appointments in the Province. The major part of the report is devoted to the discussion of the findings of the study relating to the process and practice of teacher appointments in the Province. This is followed by the conclusion and the recommendations for action by the different actors.

## **2 PROVINCIAL PROFILE**

### **2.1 Background to the Province**

Simbu Province is one of five highlands provinces that make up the Highlands Region of PNG. It is located between the Eastern Highlands and the Western Highlands Provinces. Its physical geography comprises of mountains, including Mt. Wilhelm (the tallest mountain in PNG), limestone, savannah grassland, and, apart from the Karamui-Nomane District, mainly of infertile land. Its imposing physical geography has, to a large extent, contributed to its struggles for development. The lack of mineral resources and province wide opportunities to engage its people in productive income earning ventures continue to impede its economic, social, and political progress. Realising that the land does not have much to offer in terms of economic development and the improvement of livelihoods, the Simbus and their leaders made a conscious shift towards the development of human capital as a pathway to economic and social development, and prosperity (*Post-Courier*, 14 March, 2011). This shift is manifested in the parents' commitment towards their children's education, and the Provincial Government's education policies and plans targeted at providing all school-aged children access to quality education. By making education as the focal point of economic and human development, the Provincial Government has committed substantial financial resources to ensure that the desired outcomes are achieved.

The province has established elementary schools, community and primary schools, high and secondary schools, vocational centres, and flexible and open distance education centres to provide increased access to its people to education at all levels of the education system, particularly at the basic education level. As of 2008, the province has established 286 elementary schools, 36 community schools, 105 primary schools, 13 provincial high schools, three secondary schools, and nine vocational centres. The University of Papua New Guinea and the University of Technology Open Campuses have also been established in the province to provide access to university education for the Simbu people (NRI, 2010).

### **2.2 Districts**

Simbu Province has six districts. These are Kerowagi, SinaSina-Yonggamugl, Gumine, Kundiawa-Gembogl, Chuave, and Karamui-Nomane. Except for Kundiawa, the other districts are fairly backward in terms of development. These districts have poor basic services. This is due to law and order problems and lack of transparency and accountability by elected leaders in delivering basic services. Many of these districts are inaccessible by roads due to rugged terrain and poor road infrastructure. Karimui-Nomane District is only accessible by air. But then air services are unreliable. Public servants', including teachers', decisions to work in the districts are often influenced by these factors.

### **2.3 Number of Community and Primary Schools**

The province has 36 community schools and 105 primary schools. Table 2 shows the number of community and primary schools by district, location, and agency. Out of the total of 131 schools, Kundiawa-Gembogl District has the highest number of schools (30), followed closely by Kerowagi (26), Karamui (23), and Chuave (21). Gumine and SinaSina-Yonggamugl have less number of schools compared to other districts. As expected, more community and primary schools are owned by the government while the rest are owned and operated by different church denominations. This indicates a growing partnership between the churches and the government in providing community

and primary school education, which should also include consultation in the appointment of teachers to teaching positions. Only five out of 131 community and primary schools are urban schools and the other 126 are rural schools. Classification of schools into rural and urban schools is defined by NDoE. The disparity between the number of rural and urban schools reflects this classification. This data implies that over 90 percent of teachers in the Simbu Province teach in rural schools. This presents a challenge for the PEB when appointing teachers to teaching positions, particularly teaching positions in very remote, hard-to-reach schools.

**Table 2: Number of community and primary schools by district, location, and agency**

District	No. of govt. schools	No. of church agency schools	No. of urban schools	No. of rural schools
Kundiawa	14	16	5	25
Gumine	11	4	-	15
Karamui	14	9	-	23
SinaSina	12	4	-	16
Kerowagi	16	10	-	26
Chuave	13	8	-	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>126</b>

**Note:** Six schools were not classified under any of the districts

### 3. TEACHER APPOINTMENT

#### 3.1 Characteristics of Teachers and Head Teachers

##### 3.1.1 *Teachers and head teachers' sample*

The teachers' sample of 182 teachers comprised 141 males and 41 females. On the other hand, the head teachers' sample comprised 31 males and seven females. The disparity in the number of males and females respondents is due to the poor response by teachers and head teachers than the sampling method. The remoteness of many primary schools, law and order problems, and a low level of support from PEOs were the main contributing factors. Table 3 shows the total number of teacher and head teacher respondents and their sex.

**Table 3: Teacher and head teacher respondents by sex**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Sex	N	%	Sex	N	%
Male	141	77.5	Male	31	81.6
Female	41	22.5	Female	7	18.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>100</b>

##### 3.1.2 *Teachers and head teachers' teaching locations*

Teachers and head teachers were asked to indicate the name of their school and its location, whether it is an urban or a rural school. The purpose of asking for this information is to understand how teacher appointment practices in the Province impacted on urban and rural teachers, and on each individual teacher. From Table 4 it can be seen that 183 teachers and 38 head teachers indicated that they were teaching in a rural school whilst one head teacher and one teacher pointed out that they were teaching in an urban school. This data reflected that 96 percent of community and primary schools in the province were classified as rural schools and only four percent of the schools were urban schools (see Table 2). Yet, it does, to an extent, show that rural teachers and head teachers took the time to respond and return their questionnaires despite the many challenges they face compared to their urban colleagues. It may also indicate that the issue of teacher appointment is of particular concern to rural teachers than urban teachers, and the questionnaire provided them an opportunity to communicate how they perceived teacher appointments in the province and its impact on them.

**Table 4: Teachers' and head teachers' teaching locations**

	Location	N	%
<b>Teachers</b>	Urban	1	0.5
	Rural	183	99.9
<b>Total</b>		<b>184</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Head teachers</b>	Urban	2	5
	Rural	38	95
<b>Total</b>		<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.1.3 Agency of community and primary schools in which teachers taught

Different school agencies play an important role in the appointment of teachers. The level of involvement of each agency in the appointment of teachers to teaching and head teacher positions is critical to the success of the teacher appointment process. It can be seen from Table 5 that of the 180 teachers who responded, 51 percent indicated that they were teaching in a government school while the other 49 percent were teaching in a church agency school. Head teachers' responses were in direct contrast to those of the teachers. A small percentage (26.1 percent) of the head teachers specified that they were in charge of government schools while 73.9 percent indicated that they were heading church agency schools. The inconsistency between the teachers' and the head teachers' responses is due to differences in the number of teachers and head teachers who responded to the question from the government and church agency schools. The composition of teachers' responses is more accurate than that of head teachers. This is because the 2008 School Census Data carried out by NDoE shows the Catholic Church owned and operated 63 percent of the community and primary schools, the Lutheran Church 27 percent, and the rest of the churches operated only 10 percent of the schools. However, the government is still the main provider of basic education in the Simbu Province with over 50 percent of the schools (NDoE, 2008).

**Table 5: Agency of community and primary schools in which teachers and head teachers taught**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Agency	N	%	Agency	N	%
Government	91	51	Government	11	26.1
Catholic	58	32	Catholic	16	38
Lutheran/Evangelical	20	11	Lutheran/Evangelical	9	21.4
United Church	2	1.1	United Church	0	0
SDA	1	.5	SDA	2	5
AoG	4	2.2	AoG	0	0
Anglican	0	0	Anglican	1	2.4
Other	4	2.2	Other	3	7.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.1.4 Age of teachers and head teachers

The ages of teachers may influence their decisions on the teaching positions they apply for and whether or not they accept or decline positions offered to them. From the data presented in Table 6 it can be seen that 16.1 percent of the teachers were 19 years old or younger located at the lower end of the spectrum, and at the highest end of the spectrum, 28.3 percent of the teachers were between the ages of 41–50 years old. The majority of the teachers (55.6 %) were between the ages of 20–40 years. The data set indicates that there were more younger than older teachers teaching in community and primary schools in the Simbu Province. What is also implied from the data is that, given their ages, many of the teachers were more likely to be married with children, which is a major consideration in teachers' decisions when applying for positions, and in accepting and rejecting positions given to them. On the other hand, the data shows that there were more head teachers (57.6 percent) in the age cohort of 20–40 years of age than the 41–50 and 19 years of age or less put together. This indicates that community and primary schools were headed mainly by younger teachers. The data does imply that these head teachers, due to their ages, were more likely to be married with children, which as in the case of teachers may have a bearing on their decisions when applying for positions and accepting or rejecting their appointments. In sum, the data shows that in general both the teaching and head teacher positions were occupied by younger teachers. This may reflect the practice of appointing teachers to teaching and head teacher positions in the

province where younger, experienced teachers are given preference for appointment to head teacher positions. More importantly, it can be deduced from the data presented in Tables 6 and 9 that these teachers are normally male, between 20-40 years of age, married, and are from the Simbu Province.

**Table 6: Age of teachers and head teachers**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Age Group	N	%	Age Group	N	%
19 or less	29	16.1	19 or less	1	3
20-25	22	12.2	20-25	2	5
26-30	27	15	26-30	4	10.5
31-35	26	14.4	31-35	5	13.1
36-40	25	14	36-40	11	29
41-45	22	12.2	41-45	7	18.4
46-50	29	16.1	46-50	8	21
Over 50	-	-	Over 50	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>100</b>

### *3.1.5 Teachers' and head teachers' teaching experience*

The survey also captured the teachers' and the head teachers' teaching experience in terms of the number of years they have been teaching. Going from less experienced to most experienced, the data shows that 19 percent of the teachers had between five years or less, to 10 years of teaching experience and a small proportion (9.1 percent) of teachers had a teaching experience of between 31 and over 35 years. The rest of the teachers (71.9 percent) had between 11 and 30 years of teaching experience. Head teachers' data show a similar pattern. A relatively small percentage of head teachers (17.5 percent) had between five years or less, to 10 years teaching experience and even a small percentage of head teachers (7.5 percent) had between 31 and 35 years of teaching experience. The rest of the head teachers (75 percent) had between 11 and 30 years teaching experience. The data seems to suggest that both teachers and head teachers are appointed to teaching positions based on the number of years they have had teaching in primary schools and their age. The more the number of teaching years and age of 20-30 years the more likely a teacher gets appointed to a teaching position in the province.

**Table 7: Teachers' and head teachers' teaching experience**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
No of Years	N	%	No of Years	N	%
5 yrs or less	7	4	5 yrs or less	1	2.5
6-10	27	15	6-10	6	15
11-15	32	17.5	11-15	3	7.5
16-20	19	10.4	16-20	7	17.5
21-25	26	14	21-25	12	30
26-30	54	30	26-30	8	20
31-35	13	7.1	31-35	3	7.5
Over 35	4	2	Over 35	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### *3.1.6 Number of years teachers and head teachers taught in their current schools*

How many years a teacher teaches in a school is a good indicator of teacher appointments, specifically as it relates to tenure positions and turnover of teaching staff. In this regard, teachers

and head teachers were asked to indicate how many years they have been teaching in their current schools. Data from Table 8 shows that 62 percent of the teachers and 67 percent of the head teachers indicated that they have been teaching in their current schools for between one and three years. The other 38 percent of the teachers and 33 percent of the head teachers pointed out that they had been teaching in their current school for more than three years. The data suggest that while the province may be complying with the tenure provisions in the *TSC Act, 1995*, it was also willing to keep some teachers beyond three years in the same school. This apparent contradiction and lack of consistency in the application of tenure regulations is also a contributing factor to teachers' perceptions of the teacher appointment process as being corrupt and lacking accountability.

**Table 8: Number of years teachers and head teachers taught in their current schools**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
No of Years	N	%	No of Years	N	%
Less than 1 year	6	3.3	Less than 1 year	1	2.5
1-3	113	62	1-3	26	67
4-6	30	16	4-6	9	23
7-9	21	11.4	7-9	2	5
10-12	7	4	10-12	1	2.5
13-15	2	1.1	-	-	-
19-21	2	1.1	-	-	-
More than 21	2	1.1	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.1.7 Teachers' and head teachers' home province

Teachers and head teachers were asked to specify their home provinces to not only ascertain where they came from, but most importantly, the composition of community and primary school teachers and head teachers teaching in the Simbu Province. Furthermore, responses from both the teachers and the head teachers will help to make sense of the teacher appointment mindset and practice in the province. Data from Table 9 clearly shows that 85 percent of the teachers and 92.5 percent of the head teachers were from the Simbu Province. The other 15 percent of the teachers and 7.5 percent of the head teachers were from the other provinces. The data does indicate that teachers who get appointed to teaching and head teacher positions in community and primary schools were mainly from the province. This does demonstrate that preference is given to teachers from the Simbu Province when it comes to teacher and head teacher appointments. Teachers from other provinces may find Simbu Province unattractive to teach in. This is due to security concerns, lack of basic services in most districts, and rugged mountainous terrain. Another possible explanation is that it is cheaper logistically for the provincial education administration to recruit teachers who come from the province.

**Table 9: Teachers' and head teachers' home province**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Home Province	N	%	Home Province	N	%
Simbu	155	85	Simbu	37	92.5
Western Highlands	9	5	Eastern Highlands	1	2.5
Eastern Highlands	6	3	Madang	1	2.5
Southern Highlands	2	1.1	Oro	1	2.5
Enga	2	1.1	-	-	-
Morobe	2	1.1	-	-	-

**Table 9 (cont'd)**

Madang	2	1.1	-	-	-
East Sepik	1	.5	-	-	-
West Sepik	1	.5	-	-	-
Gulf	1	.5	-	-	-
Western	1	.5	-	-	-
New Ireland	1	.5	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.2 Appointment of Teachers to Teaching and Head Teacher Positions

#### 3.2.1 *How Teachers are appointed to teaching and head teacher positions*

Primary school teachers were asked to describe in their own words how teachers are appointed to teaching positions. Approximately 57 percent of the teachers and 60 percent of head teachers were of the view that teachers were appointed through the Special Education Gazette. This is the first part of the teacher appointment-process. The second part of the process requires the BoM to consider the applications and make appropriate recommendations to the PEB for teachers to be appointed to positions in their individual schools. This is alluded to in the following response from one of the head teachers when asked about how teachers are appointed to teaching positions.

...“the BoM recommends to PEB the type of teachers we need but PEB makes the final decision”...

Data from the interviews with the teachers and the head teachers revealed that they were aware that the PEB is the appointing authority in the province and that the decisions it makes are final. This data is supported by the data from the surveys. Approximately 34 percent of teachers and 32.5 percent of head teachers indicated that teachers are appointed by the PEB.

Data on the appointment of teachers to teaching positions seemed to suggest that the province is in compliance with the existing policy for making teacher appointments. Yet, the process was not totally transparent and accountable. Data from Table 10 reveals an underlying problem with the appointment process. About five percent of the teachers and two percent of the head teachers perceived the appointment process as corrupt. They revealed that the appointment of teachers to teaching and head teacher positions was done through nepotism and bribery. As a result, teachers were not appointed to the positions they applied for and consequently they refused to take up the positions forced upon them by the PEB. This is highlighted by the following comment from one of the teachers interviewed:

...“the PEB members appoint their relatives, *wantoks* and friends to schools of their choice ... some teachers are friendly with the appointment officers so they are sent to the schools of their choice, the rest of us are forced to fill vacant positions elsewhere... the appointment officer demanded cash from my nephew so that he could give him a teaching position ... a lady made a complaint to me that sexual favours were demanded from her before she could be given a

teaching position... some of them ask for beer in order to give favourable appointments... they are beer faces”...

**Table 10: Teachers’ and head teachers’ perceptions of how teachers are appointed to teaching and head teacher positions**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	No	%	Responses	N	%
Through the Vacancy Education Gazette	105	57.1	Through the Vacancy Education Gazette	24	60
By PEB	62	33.7	By PEB	13	32.5
Through Nepotism/bribery/corrupt practices	10	5.4	Through Nepotism/bribery/corrupt practices	2	5
Forced to take up Positions	4	2.2	-	-	-
BOM recommendations	-	-	BOM recommendations	1	2.5
Other	3	1.6	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.2.2 When, teachers are advised of their postings

The efficiency of teacher appointments and notification of teachers of their postings for the following school year is critical to teachers’ resumption of duties. Early notification of teachers will enable them to commence their teaching and head teacher duties on time. Conversely, late notification of their postings will inevitably lead to their late resumption duties. The participants were asked about when teachers were informed of their postings. From Table 11 it can be seen that 31.4 percent of the teachers and 35 percent of the head teachers pointed out that teachers were notified of their appointments between the months of November and December. This is the earliest teachers can get advised of their postings in order for them to resume their duties on time in the new school year. However, an aggregate of 68.6 percent of the teachers and 65 percent of head teachers specified that teachers were often notified of their appointments very late. Data presented elsewhere in this section, clearly shows that the late notification of teachers of their appointments was due to the late arrival of the Special Education Gazette in the province, lack of transparency and accountability in the appointment of teachers, and late appointment of teachers.

**Table 11: Teachers’ and head teachers’ perceptions of the timing of teacher appointment notifications**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Late November/December	56	31.4	Late November/December	13	35
January/beginning of school year	46	26	January/beginning of school year	10	27
During Christmas vocations	31	17.4	During Christmas vocations	7	19
A few weeks before resumption week	22	12.3	At resumption/first week of school	4	11
Always very late	21	11.8	Always very late	3	8
At resumption/first week of school	2	1.1	A few weeks before resumption week	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.2.3 *How teachers are notified of their postings*

Teachers and head teachers were asked about how they were advised of their postings. Data from Table 12 indicates that teachers and head teachers came to know about their postings via informal means. A big percentage of teachers (89.4 percent) and 90 percent of head teachers specified that they were informed of their teaching appointments when they enquired at the Provincial Education Office. In addition, there were teachers who learned about their postings from secondary sources about their postings (2.8 percent) and others from fellow teachers (2.2 percent). Only a very small percentage of teachers (5.6 percent) and head teachers (7.5 percent) revealed that they learned about their postings through an official means; that is, through the radio and written notification. The use of informal rather than formal mechanisms to advise teachers and head teachers of their postings was caused by the late arrival of the Special Education Gazette, lack of effectiveness and efficiency in the appointment of teachers, poor handling of teacher appeals, and a lack of transparency and accountability in the appointment process and practice. This practice breeds and perpetuates corruption, denies teachers natural justice in appealing their appointments, and is counter productive to good teacher appointment management practices.

**Table 12: How teachers and head teachers are notified of their appointments**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Through enquires at PHQ	161	89.4	Through enquires at PHQ	36	90
Through the radio	5	2.8	Written notification	2	5
Written notification	5	2.8	Through the radio	1	2.5
By those who hear about it	5	2.8	By those who hear about it	-	-
By fellow teachers	4	2.2	By fellow teachers	-	-
Other	-	-	Other	1	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.2.4 *Consideration of teacher' and head teachers' interests in teacher appointments*

A section in the teacher appointment application form encourages teachers to state their preferences to guide decisions on their appointments. Some teachers write additional supporting letters. Seventeen percent of the teachers and 23 percent of the head teachers pointed out that these were considered when decisions were made on the appointment of teachers. On the contrary, the majority of teachers (57.4 percent) and head teachers (59 percent) specified that these were not considered by the PEB. Eighteen percent of the head teachers and 25.6 percent of the teachers indicated that teachers' interests were sometimes considered when appointments were made. Data from Table 13 suggests that teachers' interests were not considered or considered some of the time when teacher appointments were made. This was due to the appointment of teachers and head teachers through nepotism and bribery and the use of other informal means, and the ineffectiveness of PEB to prudently carry out its mandated teacher appointment roles and responsibilities, including the vetting of all teacher appointments. The inconsistency in the consideration of teachers' interests in the appointment of teachers and head teachers to teaching and head teachers' positions has and will continue to contribute to increased protests by teachers over their postings, refusal to take up the

positions given them, late resumption of duty, and, in the worst case scenario, teachers quitting the teaching profession.

**Table 13: Teachers and head teachers' perceptions of the consideration of teachers' interests during teacher appointments**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Yes	30	17	Yes	9	23
No	101	57.4	No	23	59
Sometimes	45	25.6	Sometimes	7	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.3 Teachers' Acceptance of Teaching and Head Teacher Appointments

#### 3.3.1 Refusal of appointments by teachers and head teachers

It is always the case that not all teachers will accept the positions they are offered. To ascertain if teachers and head teachers had refused their appointments at some point in their careers, they were asked to indicate if they had ever refused to take up their teaching appointments. Data from Table 14 shows that 38 percent of teachers and 65 percent of head teachers indicated that they have never refused their teaching appointments. On the other hand, 62 percent of teachers and 35 percent of head teachers have refused their teaching appointment at some point in their teaching career. Data seems to imply that teachers were more likely to refuse their appointments than the head teachers. This is due to the multitude of problems besieging the appointment process, including inconsistency in the consideration of teachers' interests and welfare, teachers' appointment preferences, and use of corrupt practices in the appointment of teachers.

**Table 14: Teachers and head teachers' refusal of their appointments**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Yes	109	62	Yes	13	35
No	68	38	No	24	65
<b>Total</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>100</b>

#### 3.3.2 Teachers' and head teachers' reasons for refusing their appointments

Teachers and head teachers who at some time in their teaching career refused to take up their teaching appointments were asked to give the reasons for their refusal. A large percentage of teachers (36.7 percent) and head teachers (50 percent) refused to take up their teaching appointments on the grounds that the appointments were not according to their choice. This was emphasized during interviews with the teachers and the head teachers. One of the teachers recalled why he refused his appointment:

I refused the position given to me because I was trained in a SDA institution and when the postings were given I learned that I was posted to a government school, and I refused to take up the position. I wanted to teach in a SDA primary school in the province (Male teacher).

The other 24.7 percent of the teachers and 14.3 percent of head teachers indicated that they refused their appointments because their family and personal problems were not taken into account in the appointment process. This is what one of the teachers said during the interviews with teachers and head teachers.

I refused the position I was posted to because I want my kids to continue to next grade because the school I applied for had a good library. However, when the postings came out I found that I was given a position in a school that did not have a good library. This will affect my children's learning so I refused to take up the position" (Female teacher).

Location of school was given by 13 percent of the teachers as the reason for refusing their appointment whilst only 7.1 percent of the head teachers indicated that this was a contributing factor to their decision not to take up their appointments. Location of the school is closely linked to security concerns, lack of government or other services, and undesirable living conditions. In total, 24 percent of the teachers and 7.1 percent of the head teachers revealed that these were the reasons for refusing their appointments. These were also points of discussion during the interviews with teachers and head teachers. This is what one female teacher said when explaining why she refused her appointment.

I refused to the position because I was posted to a very remote school at the base of the mountains where there was no access to cars and trucks, and also my security is not guaranteed (Female teacher).

Only a very small percentage of teachers (8 percent) refused their appointments due either to eligibility and tenure issues or late appointments. For the head teachers, the issue of eligibility and tenure for teachers is equal second in terms of the reasons for teachers' refusal of their appointment. This is due to the fact that administrative positions are desired by teachers because of the prestige and the privileges attached to these positions. Aspiring head teachers would want to be confirmed on these positions for the purposes of job security.

Data presented here indicate that there are three main contributing factors to teachers' refusal of teaching appointments — appointments not consistent with their choices, family and personal issues, and the location of schools. These factors are intertwined and connected to reasons of lack of security, lack of basic services, and eligibility and tenure issues. These issues often come into play when teachers apply for teaching and head teacher positions. Yet, these issues are not normally acknowledged and adequately addressed during the appointment process.

**Table 15: Teachers' and head teachers' reasons for refusing their appointments**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Appointment not teachers' choice	43	36.7	Appointment not teachers' choice	7	50
Family/personal problems	29	24.7	Family/personal problems	2	14.3
Location of schools	15	13	Eligibility & tenure issues	2	14.3
Security concerns	14	12	Location of schools	1	7.1

**Table 15 (cont'd)**

Undesirable living conditions	7	6	Lack of government & other services	1	7.1
Lack of government/other services	7	6	Late appointment	1	7.1
Eligibility & tenure issues	1	.8	Security concerns	-	-
Late appointment	1	.8	Undesirable living conditions	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100</b>

### ***3.3.3 Actions taken by teachers and head teachers when appointments are not made according to their choices***

Teachers and head teachers were asked to give the kinds of actions they would take if the appointments were not made according to their choice. Sixty percent of the head teachers and 61.1 percent of the teachers specified that they would challenge their appointments. This normally means that they will appeal against the decision of the PEB. However, as pointed out in earlier discussions, appeals were normally not heard by the PEB and appellants consequently end up not getting an outcome from their appeals. Because of this, teachers and head teachers refuse to take up the positions given to them by the PEB. This was indicated by 26.1 percent of the teachers and 25 percent of the head teachers as a course of action they would take if the appointments were not made according to their choice. On the contrary, 10.6 percent of the teachers and 15 percent of the head teachers pointed out that they will still take up the position. This action is often taken because teachers and head teachers do not want to be put in the 'pool' which means that they will be suspended from the payroll. This is amplified by the following narrative from one of the teachers:

...we are placed in the pool when we refuse to take up teaching appointments...when teachers are placed in the pool they are suspended from the pay roll...we need the salary to support our families...we need to pay for our children's school fees and food...that's why we are working ...undisciplined teachers often leave school and roam around...others are doing a good job...some of us just teach even though we are unhappy...

These data show that many teachers and head teachers were following the correct procedures to challenge the appointing authorities' decisions if they viewed their appointment to be unjust or unfair. However, a small percentage was willing to take matters into their own hands by simply refusing to take up the positions. This was what one of the teachers said when teachers were asked about what they would do if the appointment is not made according to their choice:

I will refuse the position and I will just fill in the resumption of duty form to a school where I want to be and perform my teaching duties in that school (Male teacher).

This is because there was no point in appealing the decisions of PEB when the appeal process is non-existent in the province. More teachers will resort to taking this action in the future if the appeal process is not restored and is not functioning to serve the interest of teachers. The data also shows that some respondents were more likely to still accept their postings even if they were forced

appointments. This is because they fear the repercussion of being placed in the pool, which will result in the loss of income. Teachers are concerned about losing a secured income that their families depend on. Forced appointments can lead to non performance and lack of commitment by the teachers and head teachers affected, and lack of motivation. The consequences on the management of schools and pupil learning were likely to be severe in this circumstance.

**Table 16: Actions taken by teachers and head teachers when appointments are not made according to their choices**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Challenge the appointment	110	61.1	Challenge the appointment	24	60
Refuse to take up position	47	26.1	Refuse to take up position	10	25
Still take up position	19	10.6	Still take up position	6	15
Other	4	2.2	Other	—	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### *3.3.4 Other teachers' reasons for refusing their appointments*

Teachers and head teachers were asked about other teachers' reasons for refusing their appointments. Data from Table 17 show that the most common reason for teachers refusing the appointments offered by the PEB was dissatisfaction with the appointment. Twenty-eight percent of the teachers and 45 percent of the head teachers indicated that teachers refused their appointments because they were unhappy with the appointments. As alluded to earlier, this was because appointments were not done with fair and due consideration of teachers' choice of schools and teaching positions. However, they differ on the second most common reason for teachers refusing their appointments. For the teachers, they were more likely to refuse their appointments based on family and personal reasons (19.percent) and security concerns (18 percent) than the location of the school (17.percent). On the contrary, for head teachers, teachers' refusal of appointment was more likely due to the location of the school (25 percent) than family and personal problems (12.5 percent) and security reasons (7.5 percent). Despite this difference of opinion, teachers' choice of appointment and refusal of appointment if this choice is not considered is often informed by all these factors, particularly family and personal interests. This suggests that teachers were more likely to take up their appointments if they were made according to their choices and refused if the appointments were not consistent with their choices. Logistics of getting to school was the other reason given by teachers for refusing their appointments. Seven percent of the teachers and five percent of the head teachers revealed that this was a contributing factor. Interviews with the teachers and the head teachers revealed that this was indeed a contributing factor to teachers' decisions in accepting or rejecting their appointments. One of them said:

Many teachers refuse their postings because they find it hard to get to the schools. Transport cost is very high, example air fares and even paying bus fares is very expensive (Male teacher).

This does imply that some teachers were not refusing the teaching positions offered by the PEB. However, the difficulty of getting to the schools in which they are appointed may contribute to their decision not to take up their teaching positions. They will take up their teaching positions if they are

assisted with logistics. This is despite the lack of services and accommodation which only a small proportion of teachers gave as reasons for refusing their appointments.

**Table 17: Other teachers' reasons for refusing their appointments**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Unhappy with appointment	50	28	Unhappy with appointment	18	45
Family and personal reasons/issues	34	19	Location of school	10	25
Security Concerns	33	18	Family and personal reasons/issues	5	12.5
Location of School	30	17	Security concerns	3	7.5
Logistics and costs of getting to the school	13	7	Logistics and costs of getting to the school	2	5
Lack of services	12	7	Lack of accommodation	2	5
Lack of Accommodation	8	4	Lack of services	–	–
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### ***3.3.5 Actions taken by other teachers when appointments are not made according to their choices***

Teachers and head teachers were asked to give the kinds of actions other teachers take when appointments they were offered were not according to the teaching positions they applied for. As can be seen from Table 18, teachers and head teachers were in agreement that the most common actions teachers took were to challenge their appointment by way of an appeal and by refusing to take up their appointments. Teachers' and head teachers' responses from the interviews also revealed that teachers would normally challenge the decision of the PEB. For instance one of them said:

It is a common practice that teachers personally go to the education office and talk it over with the Appointment Officer to get a real chance of going to the school they applied for with so called “give and take” so at least they will be posted to the schools of their choice (Female teacher).

It was found from the interviews that teachers would also refuse their appointments because of frustration.

Sometimes teachers get frustrated and leave the school, and stay at home or go elsewhere, but they are still on the payroll (Male teacher).

The latter action is often taken by teachers when they have no confidence in the appeal process of giving a fair consideration of their appeals. According to 15 percent of the head teachers, teachers would take up their appointments despite their dissatisfaction with the positions offered. This is

often due to fear of losing their salary if they refused their appointments. However, according to the teachers, teachers were more likely to resume work late (12 percent) or leave teaching (10 percent) than take up their appointments (seven percent). Only a small percentage of teachers (two percent) sought advice from the TSC or swapped with another teacher (one percent). The data seemed to suggest that about 50 percent of the teachers were using the formal appeal process to challenge their appointments to positions they had not applied for. The other 50 percent of the teachers were resorting to informal processes to protest the PEB decisions, which should be a concern for the TSC and the PEB. Furthermore, the data does imply that teachers' lack of confidence in the formal appeals process and, at the same time, PEB's preference of using informal methods in dealing with teachers' dissatisfaction over their appointments, which if not addressed, may lead to a total breakdown of the teacher appointment-process.

**Table 18: Actions taken by other teachers when appointments are not made according to their choices**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Challenge appointment	85	48	Challenge appointment	24	60
Refuse to take up appointment	35	20	Refuse to take up appointment	10	25
Resume work late	22	12	Take up appointment	6	15
Leave teaching	18	10	Resume work Late	-	-
Take up appointment	13	7	Leave teaching	-	-
Seek advice from TSC	4	2	Seek advice from TSC	-	-
Swap with another teacher	1	1	Swap with another teacher	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### ***3.3.6 Actions the appointing authority takes against teachers who refused their appointments***

It is often the case that when teachers refuse appointments the PEB reacts by taking various actions against them to compel them to take up the positions. Issuing of threats of putting teachers off the payroll is often the first action taken by the PEB and when teachers do not respond and remain defiant, the PEB follows up on its threats by placing these teachers in the pool. This is what one of the teachers said when asked about the kinds of actions taken by PEB against teachers who refused their appointments.

At times threats are made against the teachers when they refuse to take up the positions they did not apply for because the PEB is always biased in its decisions on postings and qualified officers who applied for the positions are not considered (Male teacher).

Data presented in Table 19 shows that 41 percent of the teachers and 35 percent of the head teachers specified that the most common action taken by the PEB against teachers who refused to take up their appointments is to issue threats of placing these teachers off the payroll. This happens

when teachers are placed in the pool, an action according to 29 percent of the teachers and 30 percent of the head teachers, that the PEB resorted to, to penalise teachers who defy its decisions. The other course of action often taken by the PEB is to place teachers who are unhappy with their appointments in other teaching positions, which are either agreed to or forced upon them, swapping of positions by teachers based on mutual agreement or, as indicated by three percent of the teachers, send teachers to remote schools. Teachers pointed out during interviews that PEB often forces teachers to take up teaching positions they had not applied for. One of them said:

PEB often forces teachers to take up teaching positions they had not applied for. It does not consider the reasons for teachers refusing to take up the positions they did not apply for (Female teacher).

The decision to send teachers to remote schools is often viewed by teachers as a form of punishment rather than providing an opportunity for teachers to teach in a different location, school or position. What was not mentioned is the resolving of teachers’ discontentment with teaching positions offered through a properly constituted appeals process. Data presented here strongly suggest that PEB was less concerned with addressing teachers’ refusal of taking up teaching appointments through the use of the formal appeal process as stipulated under the *TSC Act* than the use of punitive measures.

**Table 19: Actions taken by PEB against teachers who refused their appointments**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Issue threat/put teachers off payroll	73	41	Issue threat/put teachers off payroll	14	35
Place teachers in the pool	51	29	Place teachers in the pool	12	30
Place teachers in other positions	44	25	Place teachers in other positions	11	27.5
Send teachers to remote schools	5	3	Force teachers to take up appointments	1	2.5
Force teachers to take up appointment	-	-	Give acting appointment elsewhere	1	2.5
Give acting appointment elsewhere	-	-	Ignore teachers’ appeal	1	2.5
Ignore teachers’ appeal	-	-	Send teachers to remote schools	-	-
Other	3	2	Other	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### **3.4 Teachers' Resumption of Duties**

#### ***3.4.1 Problems associated with the resumption of duty process***

Late resumption of duties by teachers is a problem that is very much embedded in the whole teacher appointment process with 34.5 percent of the teachers and 29 percent of the head teachers identifying it as the most common problem associated with the resumption of duty process. The data seemed to suggest that this is caused by inadequate logistical support, poor organisation of appointments, late notification of appointments, lack of monitoring of teachers' resumption of duties, lack of accommodation, two or more teachers appointed to the same position, and poor communication. These factors were also pointed out by the teachers when asked about the problems associated with the resumption of duty process. For example one of them said:

The main problem that exists with the resumption of duty process is the late commencement of duties by teachers. The distance of travelling to the school, road conditions, transport problems, housing condition or even teachers waiting to be posted to schools cause many teachers to go to their schools very late (Female teacher).

Moreover, teachers who were dissatisfied with their postings often delayed their arrival at the schools which they were posted, or in some cases, they do not turn up at all but still get paid against the position they were appointed to. This is what one teacher said about this group of teachers:

Many teachers are reluctant to take up their appointments because they are forced and some only fill in the resumption of duty form to be restored on the payroll. After resumption they leave school (Male teacher).

The other persistent problem is the late submission of the RoDSS to PARS to enable teachers to continuously receive their pays without any disruptions. This what one female teacher said:

The problem that exists with the resumption of duty process is that when a teacher fails to fill in the resumption of duty form or if there are mistakes, it totally affects his or her pay. When this happens he or she is put off the payroll until he or she goes and talk it over with the people in the Provincial Education Office (Female teacher).

Except for lack of accommodation, all the other problems associated with the resumption of duty process are triggered by the late arrival of the Special Education Gazette, which contains teaching vacancies, and lack of transparency and accountability in the appointment process. There is a strong relationship between the late arrival of the Special Education Gazette, lack of transparency and accountability in the appointment process, and teachers' resuming their duties late. Improvement in the teachers' resumption of duty and the submission of Resumption of Duty Summary Sheets (RoDSS) to the Payroll and Related Services Branch (PARS) will depend very much on how effectively the causal factors are addressed by the PEB and TSC.

**Table 20: Teachers' and head teachers' perceptions of the problems associated with the resumption of duty process**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Late resumption of duties	60	34.5	Late resumption of duties	10	29
Inadequate logistical & financial support travel to schools	37	21.2	Inadequate logistical & financial support travel to schools	8	23
Poor organisation of appointments	29	17	Late notification of appointments	7	20
Late notification of appointments	21	12	Late submission of RoDSS	3	8
Late submission of RoDSS	14	8	Inadequate monitoring of teachers' resumption of duties	3	8
Lack of accommodation	11	6.3	Lack of accommodation	2	6
Two or more teachers resume on same position	1	.5	Two or more teachers resume on same position	1	3
Poor communication	1	.5	Poor organisation of appointments	1	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.4.2 Teachers' and head teachers' reasons for resuming their duties late

Late resumption of teaching duties is a recurring problem. Teachers and head teachers were asked to identify the factors that would contribute to their late resumption of teaching duties. The most common contributing factor identified by 54 percent of the teachers and 42.5 percent of the head teachers is the logistics and the costs of getting to the schools in which they were appointed to teach. This is caused, to a greater extent, by the PEB's failure to comply with the relevant provisions of the *TSC Act* relating to teachers' travel costs. PEB often expects teachers to meet their own travel costs. The fact is that teachers are unable to meet the costs of traveling to their schools given their low salary levels. This is what one of the teachers said when teachers were asked about their reasons for resuming duties late.

If I am sent to a disadvantage area I need transport to go there. Many times there is no transport so I have to wait until I find transport to take me there. I also do not have enough money to move my household goods to the new location. It normally takes about three to three weeks before I get to the school (Male teacher).

Family and personal reasons were identified by 12 percent of the teachers and 10 percent of the head teachers as a major contributing factor to their late resumption of duties. Teachers often struggle to deal with these issues when they learn that their preferences for appointment, which

were always made with these issues in mind, have been declined by PEB. As a result, they resume their teaching duties late. When interviewed many of the teachers alluded to their children's education as an issue they had to deal with when the postings given were not made according to their choices. For example one of them said:

When I decide to apply for a position in a school I always think about my children's education. What grades they will do before I apply. But when I find out that I am given a position that I did not apply for I go back to the office and talk it over with them. When they refuse to listen to me I hang around until I can be sent to a school where my children can enroll. Because of this, I arrive late at the school (Female teacher).

The other contributing factors relate to the appointment process itself. A combined total of 22.8 percent of the teachers and 16 percent of head teachers indicated that teachers resumed duties late because of late appointment and late notification of teachers of their appointments and, if teachers are unhappy with their appointments, they often challenged their appointments. Often they wait around to receive the outcome of their appeals, which often takes weeks to be heard and, as a consequence, resume their duties very late. Road and whether conditions were identified by 5.1 percent of the teachers and 7.5 percent of the head teachers as contributing factors to late resumption of duties by teachers. This is expected given the fact that the majority of the primary schools are located in rural and very remote locations which are often difficult to reach due to poor transport infrastructure. Tribal conflicts, no accommodation and security issues were identified by teachers as the other contributing factors to late resumption of duties. Apart from poor transport infrastructure, security concerns and tribal fights, the rest of the contributing factors to teachers resuming duties late are caused by the failure of PEB to effectively and prudently carry out its mandated teacher appointment roles and responsibilities.

**Table 21: Teachers' and head teachers' reasons for resuming their duties late**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Logistics & cost of getting to school	96	54	Logistics & cost of getting to school	17	42.5
Family and personal reasons	22	12	Family and personal reasons	4	10
Late/no notification of appointment	19	11	Late appointment	7	17.5
Unhappy with appointment	13	7.3	Late/no notification of appointment	5	12.5
Weather and road conditions	9	5.1	Unhappy with appointment	4	10
Late appointment	8	4.5	Weather and road conditions	3	7.5
No accommodation in school	6	3.4	No accommodation in school	-	-
Tribal conflicts	3	1.7	Tribal conflicts	-	-
Security issues	1	.5	Security issues	-	-
Other	1	.5	Other	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.4.3. Other teachers' reasons for resuming their duties late

Teachers and head teachers were asked to give their views on why other teachers resumed their teaching duties late. Table 21 shows that 47 percent of the teachers indicated that the most common reason for teachers resuming their duties late is logistics and costs of getting to their schools whilst 20 percent attributed teachers' late resumption of duties to family and personal reasons. These reasons were highlighted during interviews with the teachers. For example a male teacher said:

When teachers are given postings, especially in rural areas of the province, the Education Division of the province does not provide transport for teachers to go to their schools. Teachers often get stranded and remain in town or their villages and go to their schools when they get their first pay and pay for transport (Male teacher).

On the contrary, discontentment with positions offered by PEB and logistics and costs of getting to their schools were the two most common causes for teachers resuming their teaching duties late identified by 35 percent teachers and 30 percent of head teachers. This is what one of the teachers said when teachers were asked about the reasons for teachers resuming duties late:

Some teachers do not resume duties on time because they are posted to schools they had not applied for. They appeal the PEB decision and wait around for the result of their appeals and because of that they go late to their schools (Female teacher).

Apart from the weather and road conditions, which one percent of the head teachers identified as a contributing factor and, to some extent, lack of accommodation at the school, which 2.2 percent of the teachers identified as a causal factor, the rest of the causal factors are a manifestation of the failure by the PEB to effectively and prudently carry out its mandated teacher appointment functions. It seems obvious that both teachers and head teachers indirectly attributed the failure of teachers resuming their duties on time to the failure of PEB in playing its teacher appointment roles and responsibilities. Logistics and costs of traveling to schools, discontentment with teaching positions, and personal and family reasons are intertwined with teacher appointment processes and practice at the provincial level. When PEB fails to effectively and prudently carry out one of its roles and responsibilities it triggers a whole lot of other actions by teachers, including late resumption of duties. To avoid this from happening, PEB must be transparent, accountable and fair in its handling of teachers' appointments.

**Table 22: Teachers' and head teachers' perceptions of other teachers' reasons for resuming their duties late**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Logistics & cost of getting to school	84	47	Unhappy with appointment	14	35
Family and personal reasons	36	20	Logistics & costs of getting to school	12	30
Unhappy with appointment	29	16	Family and personal reasons	5	12.5
Late/no notification of appointment	11	6	Late appointment	4	10

**Table 22 (cont'd)**

Late appointment	8	4.4	Late/no notification of appointment	3	7.5
No accommodation in school	4	2.2	Weather/road conditions	1	2.5
Weather/road conditions	-	-	No accommodation in school	-	-
Other	8	4.4	Other	1	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

#### ***3.4.4 Strategies recommended by teachers and head teachers to ensure that teachers resumed their duties on time***

Teachers and head teachers were asked to recommend strategies that would contribute towards teachers resuming their duties on time. From the data presented in Table 23, it can be seen that 47 percent of the teachers and 45 percent of the head teachers believed that the problem of teachers resuming duties late can be addressed if logistical support is provided by the PEB and TSC. Logistical support in this case refers to both financial and in-kind support. This was also a strategy recommended by the teachers when interviewed. One of them said:

Deploy teachers to their school of interest. Pay them enough money or provide transport so that they can easily move from one school to the other. This can be done one week in advance before school commences (Female teacher).

A further 33 percent of teachers and 30 percent of head teachers recommended that teachers should be notified of their teacher appointments early to enable them to travel to their schools in time. This is what one of the teachers said in support of this recommendation:

Advertise positions as early as possible, make appointments, and inform teachers of their postings before the new year. First pay must be made available so teachers can get themselves ready in terms of providing their food, clothes, and transport. Make transport available to transport teachers to schools promptly (Male teacher).

An additional nine percent of teachers and 17.5 percent of head teachers recommended that teachers' personal issues and interests should be considered in the appointment process, which include the posting of married teachers to the same school, which 2.5 percent of the head teachers recommended as a strategy for ensuring that teachers start their teaching duties on time. This will eliminate the need for teachers to challenge their appointments and having to wait around to receive the outcome, which always leads to teachers resuming duties late. Apart from the provision of appropriate accommodation by schools, which three percent of the teachers and 2.5 percent of the head teachers recommended as ways of addressing the late resumption of duties by teachers, the rest of the recommendations made by the head teachers and teachers concerned the appointment process and practice.

**Table 23: Strategies recommended by teachers and head teachers to ensure that teachers resumed their duties on time**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
PEB/TSC provide logistical support	85	47	PEB/TSC provide logistical support	18	45
Early notification of appointment	60	33	Early notification of appointment	12	30
PEB/TSC consider teachers' personal issues and interests during appointments	17	9	PEB/TSC consider teachers' personal issues and interests during appointments	7	17.5
Avoid/minimise late appointments	14	8	Avoid/minimise late appointments	1	2.5
Schools provide appropriate accommodation for teachers	6	3	Schools provide appropriate accommodation for teachers	1	2.5
Teacher couples should not be separated during appointments	-	-	Teacher couples should not be separated during appointments	1	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of Teacher Appointments

#### 3.5.1 Strengths of the teacher appointment process

Teachers and head teachers were asked to identify the strengths of the teacher appointment process in the province. Thirty-seven percent of the teachers saw no strength in the teacher appointment process and practice in the province with only 6 percent of the head teachers saying that this was the case. Teachers see no strength in teacher appointments because they were either victims of the system or are discontented with the entire teacher appointment process. However, on the contrary, 47 percent of the head teachers perceived priority given to serving teachers in the appointment of teachers to teaching positions in primary schools as a major strength of teacher appointments in the province which 23.3 percent of the teachers also agreed that this was a strong point. This assessment is reflected in the composition of the primary school teacher population where the majority of the teachers were from the Simbu Province and a very small number was from the other provinces. This issue was also pointed out during interviews with the teachers. One of them explained it this way:

There are some strengths of the appointment system in the province. The main strength is that serving teachers are always given priority when appointments are made. This is good because teachers won't be left out. They will have a teaching position (Female teacher).

Although logistical support had been alluded to as a major problem underpinning teacher appointment and deployment in the province, 10 percent of the teachers and head teachers viewed this as a strength of teacher appointments in the province. However, despite this, the findings of this study point to the fact that logistical support for teachers is a major problem. Teachers' resumption of teaching duties depends very much on how effectively logistics are handled by the PEO. The other strength that teachers identified relates to the provision of a space to enable teachers to fight for their rights, including opportunities to challenge their appointments if they were unhappy. While head teachers did not see this as a strong point, eight percent of the teachers viewed it as a strength of teacher appointments in the province. A relatively small percentage of teachers (seven percent) and head teachers (six percent) noted that some teachers were appointed on merit however; many more teachers were not appointed on merit, which does support the earlier findings that the teacher appointment process lacks transparency and accountability. Although very few teachers and head teachers viewed that schools will be fully staffed; applications made through the DEO, newly screened graduates are screened, and some teachers who are willing to teach in remote schools are considered as strengths. These factors are major problems confronting teacher appointments in the province. The data presented here suggest that, in general, both the teachers and the head teachers have very little confidence and are dissatisfied with the teacher appointment process in the province.

**Table 24: Teachers' and head teachers' perceptions of the strengths of the teacher appointment process**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
None	64	37	Serving teachers given priority	15	47
Serving teachers given priority	40	23.3	None	6	19
Logistical support for teacher deployment	17	10	Logistical support for teacher deployment	5	16
Teachers able to fight for rights	13	8	Some teachers appointed on merit	2	6
Some teachers appointed on merit	12	7	Most schools in all locations are fully staffed	1	3
Most schools in all locations are fully staffed	11	6.4	Application through DEO	1	3
Application through DEO	4	2.3	New graduates are screened	1	3

**Table 24 (cont'd)**

New graduates are screened	2	1	Some teachers willing to teach in remote schools	1	3
Some teachers willing to teach in remote schools	-	-	Teachers able to fight for their rights	-	-
Other	8	5	Other	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3.5.2 Weaknesses of the teacher appointment process

There is a general feeling of discontentment amongst teachers with the way teachers in the province are appointed to teaching and head teacher positions. The participants were asked to identify the weaknesses of the current teacher appointment process and practice. Handling of teachers' appeals by the PEB, forcing of teachers to take up positions they had not applied for, lack of transparency in the appointment of teachers, and the placement of teachers in the pool were given by the teachers as the major weaknesses of the teacher appointment process and practice employed by the province. This is what one of the teachers said about the appeals process:

The appeals process does not seem to be working. When a teacher appeals the decision of the PEB to appoint him or her to a teaching position, the appeal falls on deaf ears because the PEB does not entertain appeals (Male teacher).

The head teachers however viewed corruption as a major problem with teacher appointments. One of the head teachers interviewed explained:

Appointment of teachers is politically motivated. Those who are in power appoint their own clansman or supporters to higher positions in schools. As far as I know a lot of *wantok* system is applied in appointing teachers to teaching positions (Male teacher).

The practice of PEB forcing teachers to take up positions they had not applied, lack of consideration of teachers' interests and welfare in the appointment of teachers, and disorganisation of teacher appointments were also given by the head teachers as amongst the top four weaknesses of teacher appointments in the province. The other weaknesses identified by the teachers and the head teachers include late resumption of duty, late arrival of the Special Education Gazette, vacant positions not advertised, teachers tenure, teachers staying in one position for too long, and teachers not being appointed on merit. The teacher appointment weaknesses mentioned by both the teachers and the head teachers are caused by the failure of the TSC to ensure that the Special Education Gazette was printed and distributed to provinces on time to ensure teacher appointments were done in a timely manner, and the failure of the PEB to comply with the approved procedures for appointing and deploying teachers to schools.

**Table 25: Teachers' and head teachers' perceptions of the weaknesses of the teacher appointment process**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Teachers appeal against postings	53	29.6	Corrupt practices/nepotism	10	25
Teachers forced to take up positions	44	25	Teachers forced to take up positions	9	22.5
Lack of transparency	30	16.7	Teachers interests/welfare not considered	7	17.5
Teachers placed in the pool	26	14.5	Disorganised teacher appointment	6	15
Teachers interest and welfare not considered	9	5	Illegal appointment	2	5
Late resumption of duties	5	2.7	Teachers' tenure/eligibility not considered	2	5
Late arrival of the education vacancy Gazette	5	2.7	Teachers not appointed on merit	2	5
Vacant positions not advertised	4	2.2	Late resumption of duty	1	2.5
Teachers tenure/eligibility	2	1.1	Late arrival of the education vacancy Gazette	1	2.5
Teachers stay in position too long	1	.5	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>

### ***3.5.3 How the teacher appointment process can be improved***

The respondents were asked to suggest strategies for improving the weaknesses of the teacher appointment process that they had identified. Table 26 presents their views on how the teacher appointment process can be improved. Thirty-one percent of the teachers would like to see teachers' interests and welfare to be considered when decisions are made on their postings. This was also pointed out during interviews with the teachers. A female teacher explained that many of the weaknesses of teacher appointments in the province can be addressed:

If only the appointing authorities in the province consider teachers' interests and post teachers to schools that they prefer. The PEB should really look at the wishes of the teachers and just post them to the schools that they applied for (Female teacher).

However, 22.1 percent of the teachers seemed to hold the view that this will not happen unless teacher appointments are done in a transparent manner. This view is held also by seven percent of the teachers who suggested that the appointment process can be improved if correct procedures are followed. Although 10 percent of the head teachers agree with the teachers that the issue on teachers' welfare and interests needs to be addressed, 23 percent of the head teachers were in agreement with the teachers who indicated that this can be done if teacher appointment is done in a transparent manner and the 20.5 percent of the head teachers who point out that it can be achieved

when teacher appointments are done on merit. Other improvements recommended by the teachers and the head teachers relate to the availability of the Special Education Gazette and the early notification of teachers of their postings. Eighteen percent of the teachers and the head teachers recommended that the education vacancy Gazette should be in the provinces early while 8.1 percent of teachers and eight percent of the head teachers recommended that teachers be notified of their postings early. The timing of the printing and the distribution of the Special Education Gazette to the provinces was discussed during interviews with teachers. One of them observed:

A lot of problems of teacher appointments in the Simbu Province are due to the late arrival of the Education Gazette. The Gazette with updated positions should be sent to us prior to teacher appointments so that teachers have enough time to apply for positions and PEB appoints them to positions in schools (Female teacher).

This seems to be a recurring failure in the system of teacher appointments and must be addressed by TSC and PEB. Generally, the data in Table 26 shows that both the teachers and the head teachers were of the view that the teacher appointment process and practice in the province will improve when corruption is addressed by the TSC and the PEB.

**Table 26: Teachers and head teachers’ suggestions for improving the teacher appointment process**

TEACHERS			HEAD TEACHERS		
Responses	N	%	Responses	N	%
Consider teachers’ interests/welfare during appointment	53	31	Transparency practiced during appointments	9	23
Transparency practiced during appointments	38	22.1	Appointment on merit	8	20.5
Send vacancy Gazette to provinces early	31	18	Send vacancy Gazette to provinces early	7	18
Notify teachers of their postings early	14	8.1	Consider teachers’ interests/welfare during appointments	4	10
Correct procedures must be followed in appointing teachers	12	7	Consider DEOs, BOMs, Church agency, standard officers recommendations	4	10
Screen teachers before appointments	6	3.5	Notify teachers of the postings early	3	8
Use teachers’ data to guide appointments	6	3.5	Screen teachers before appointments	3	8
PEB decision on appointments must be final	5	3	Use teachers’ data to guide appointments	1	2.5
Consider DEOs, BOMs, Church agency, standard officers recommendations	4	2.3	-	-	-

**Table 26 (cont'd)**

Appointment should not be used to punish teachers	1	.5	-	-	-
Teachers should be formally notified of their postings	1	.5	-	-	-
Other	1	.5	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>

### ***3.5.4 Changes teachers and head teachers would like to make to the present process and practice of teacher appointments***

The head teachers and teachers provided various recommendations on the kinds of changes they wished to see made to the teacher appointment process in the province. As can be seen in Table 27, logistics of moving teachers to schools, specifically the financing of transfer costs, was recommended by 34 percent of the teachers and 41 percent of the head teachers as an area that needed changing. Obviously, both the teachers and the head teachers want to see changes in the way logistics are handled to enable them to assume their postings and commence their duties on time. Non consideration of teachers' and head teachers' rights and interests in the appointment of teachers is a recurring problem in the province. Twenty percent of the teachers and 18 percent of the head teachers want to see changes in the way PEB handled this issue. When teachers' and head teachers' rights and interests are not given due and fair consideration, they often attributed it to nepotism and corruption which 16 percent of the teachers and 18 percent of the head teachers want eliminated from the teacher appointment process. Six percent of teachers and eight percent of the head teachers want to see a change in the process of appointing teachers. This can be attributed to their lack of confidence and trust in the process of serving the best interest of the teachers and the education system in the province. Providing incentives for teachers teaching in rural and remote schools is another change recommended by eight percent of the head teachers and four percent of the teachers. The other changes recommended are: building of education officers' capacities, replacement of dishonest and unprofessional appointment officers, improvement in the methods of notifying teachers, implementation of teacher tenure policy, and early appointment of teachers. Recommendations for change by teachers and head teachers not only give an insight into the underlying teacher appointment problems; they also reflect their desire to see a change in the teacher appointment process for their benefit and the benefit of their students.

**Table 27: Teachers' and head teachers' recommendations for change in the current teacher appointment process**

Responses	TEACHERS		Responses	HEAD TEACHERS	
	N	%		N	%
Financing of teachers' transfer costs to schools	52	34	Financing of teachers' transfer costs to schools	16	41
Consideration of teachers rights and interests in appointments	31	20	Consideration of teachers' rights and interests in appointments	7	18
Elimination of corrupt practices	24	16	Elimination of corrupt practices	7	18

**Table 27 (cont'd)**

Improvement of the appointing process	9	6	Provision incentives for remote schools teachers	3	8
Building of education officers' capacity	7	5	Implementation of teacher Tenure Policy	2	5
Improvement in the process of appointing teachers	7	5	Improvement in the process of appointing teachers	1	2.5
Provision of incentives for remote school teachers	6	4	Replacement of dishonest and unprofessional appointment officers	1	2.5
Replacement of dishonest and unprofessional appointment officers	6	4	Improvement of the method of notifying teachers	1	2.5
Implementation of teacher Tenure Policy	5	3	Improvement in the appointment of teachers to remote schools	1	2.5
Improvement of method of notifying teachers	3	2	Building of education officers' capacity	-	-
Improvement in the appointment of teachers to remote schools	1	1	Teacher appointment should be done early	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>

#### 4 CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this study was to examine the teacher appointment process and practice in the province, and its impact on teachers and head teachers in particular, and the provincial education system, in general. It was found that the majority of teachers and the head teachers did see some strength in the process and practice of teacher appointments, employed by the province. Only a small proportion of teachers and head teachers did not see any strength in the way teachers and head teachers were appointed to teaching and head teacher positions. This reflects the uneven impact of the teacher appointment process and practice on teachers and head teachers. It also highlights the differences in their individual lived experiences of teacher appointments in the province. For the majority of the teachers and the head teachers their lived experiences of teacher appointments were positive. On the other hand, for the minority of teachers and head teachers their lived experiences of teacher appointments in the province were negative. Despite these differences in the impact and lived experiences of teachers of teacher appointments, it is important that the PEB and the TSC take necessary actions to address these ongoing as well as emerging problems, and build on the strengths to improve the process and practice of teacher appointments in the province.

The strengths of the teacher appointment process and practice employed by the province as identified by the majority of the teachers and the head teachers include:

- serving teachers given priority in the appointment of teachers to teaching and head teacher positions;
- logistical support for teacher deployment;
- teachers able to fight for their rights;
- some teachers are appointed on merit;
- most schools in all locations are fully staffed;
- applications can be lodged through the DEO;
- new graduates are screened, and
- some teachers are willing to teach in remote schools.

Despite these perceived strengths, overall the process and practice of appointing teachers to positions in schools in the province are weak and embedded with a multitude of problems. These include:

- late printing and distribution of the Special Education Gazette by the TSC to the province and the schools;
- late appointment of teachers to teaching and head teacher positions;
- late notification of teachers and head teachers of their appointments for the following school year;
- late resumption of teaching duties by teachers and head teachers;
- late submission of RoDSS to PARS;
- appointment of teachers through bribery and nepotism;
- poor logistical support for teachers transferring to new positions;
- lack of an effective and efficient Teacher Appeals Mechanism;
- abuse of the 'teaching pool';
- lack of consideration of teachers' interests and welfare in teacher appointments;
- forcing teachers to take up positions they had not applied for; and
- using teacher appointment as a form of punishment.

The following are the main contributing factors to the problems of teacher appointments in the province:

- late publication and distribution of the Special Education Gazette to the province and the schools;
- non compliance by the PEB with the relevant provisions of the *TSC Act, 1995*, the *National Education Act, 1995*, and relevant policies on the appointment of teachers and head teachers to teaching and administrative positions;
- poor performance by PEB and TSC of their mandated teacher appointment roles and responsibilities;
- absence of an effective and efficient appeals mechanism, and
- reliance on informal systems by appointing officers in appointing and informing teachers of their teaching positions.

The Special Education Gazette, which contains vacancies of teaching positions in the national education system, continues to be printed and sent to the provinces very late in the year. Because of this, the process of appointing teachers to teaching positions starts very late. Consequently, teachers are notified of their postings very late. This then leads to teachers getting to their schools and resuming their teaching duties late. Moreover, because teachers commence their duties one or two weeks into the school year, their RoDSS were often not completed and submitted to PEO and PARS at the NDoE in time for them to continue to receive their salaries. Many teachers end up being put off the payroll as a result, however, are reinstated later when their RoDSS are received by PARS.

Although the data from the study seemed to indicate that the province was complying with the relevant provisions of the *TSC Act, 1995* and relevant policies in the appointment of teachers, there is a prevailing practice of teachers being appointed outside of these legal and policy frameworks. The PEO officers, in most cases, were appointing teachers to teaching and head teacher positions without complying with the relevant provisions of the *TSC Act*. These appointments were not merit based and were done without due consideration of its negative impacts on the teachers and the teacher appointment process in the province. They were often not vetted by the PEB. This is a major contributing factor to the poor teacher appointment practices in the province.

Both the teachers and the head teachers perceived teacher appointments in the province as corrupt. Lack of transparency in the appointment of teachers, non consideration of teachers' interests and welfare, and appointment preferences, non-compliance of *TSC Act, 1995* and the approved policies and procedures for appointing teachers to teaching and head teacher positions, and the appointment of teachers through nepotism and bribery were the main contributing factors to teachers and head teachers' perceptions that the teacher appointment process and practice in the province are corrupt. These were also the main contributing factors to teachers' dissatisfaction and protests over their appointments.

Furthermore, it was found that teachers were more likely to refuse the teaching positions offered if these were not made according to their choices and would opt to challenge the decisions of the PEB. However, the fact is that when they lodge their appeals these were often not heard and a decision not communicated to them in an efficient manner. Many teachers often wait to receive the outcome of their appeals rather than travel to schools in which they were appointed. Often they wait for weeks to receive some kind of feedback from the PEB. This has caused many of them to lose faith in the system and eventually decide to leave the teaching service or move to another province.

Late resumption of duties by teachers is a persistent problem relating to teachers' resumption of duties. Late appointment and notification of teachers of their appointments, poor logistical support, the failure by the PEB and TSC to carry out their mandated teacher appointment roles and responsibilities, dissatisfaction over appointments, challenge of PEB decisions by teachers, and lack of a teacher appeals mechanism to effectively handle teachers' appeals are the main contributing factors to teachers resuming their duties late. According to the teachers and the head teachers, the problem of teachers resuming duties late can be addressed through, among other strategies, improvement of the logistics of getting to schools, early appointment and notification of teachers of their appointments, and a fair consideration of teachers' interests and welfare in the consideration of their applications for positions.

In order to address the teacher appointment problems in the province, the teachers and the head teachers recommended, among others, the following:

- the TSC/PEB should meet all transfer costs because teachers can no longer afford this exercise;
- the appointment authorities should consider teachers' capabilities, interest and rights during the appointment process;
- eliminate nepotism and other malpractices in teacher appointments;
- appointments should be completed and formal confirmations of teacher appointments should be done before teachers go on school vacation; and
- The Special Education Gazette should be sent to the province and the schools on time for the appointment process to begin without delay.

While there are strengths that the province can build on to improve its teacher appointment process and practice, it must focus on addressing the underlying problems and the main contributing factors in order to improve and put in place good teacher appointment practices. These practices must be informed and comply with the relevant provisions of the *TSC* and *Education Acts*, and the relevant teacher appointment policies.

## 5 RECOMMENDATIONS

### 1. Printing and Distribution of the Special Education Gazette

#### *Recommendation 1.1*

That PEB initiates and fosters a dialogue with the TSC for a time-bound **Action Plan** to be developed and implemented to ensure that the Special Education Gazette is printed and distributed to the provinces by the end of June each year.

### 2. Appointment of Teachers to Teaching and Head teacher Positions

#### *Recommendation 2.1*

That the PEB and the TSC develop and implement a time-bound **Teacher Appointment Action Plan** with clear deliverables for every calendar year.

#### *Recommendation 2.2*

That PEB must comply with all the relevant provisions of the *TSC Act, 1995* in the appointment of teachers to teaching and administrative positions in the province.

#### *Recommendation 2.3*

That TSC and PEB eliminates nepotism and corruption in the appointment of teachers by ensuring that all nature of appointments are made through a duly constituted PEB meeting.

#### *Recommendation 2.4*

That the PEB effectively addresses nepotism and corruption by taking disciplinary action against officers who engage in such activities, who fail to comply with the relevant provisions of the *TSC Act, 1995*, and who fail to perform their responsibilities described in the **Teachers' Appointment and Logistics Action Plans**.

#### *Recommendation 2.5*

That the PEB put in place a confidential and a non-punitive process for teachers, head teachers, BoM, PEB members, and parents and citizens to report cases of nepotism or corruption in the process and practice of teacher appointments.

#### *Recommendation 2.6*

That the PEB develops and communicates to all teachers, school agencies, BoM, parents and citizens, standard officers, district education advisers, church education secretaries, and local leaders, a criteria for appointing teachers to teaching and head teacher positions.

***Recommendation 2.7***

That PEB ensures that teachers and head teachers are appointed to teaching positions and administrative positions with due consideration of their personal welfare and interests, eligibility to promotional positions, tenure rights, and potential risks to themselves and their families.

***Recommendation 2.8***

That PEB, in collaboration with TSC, develops and maintains an up-to-date **Database** of all teaching positions in the province, teachers occupying each position and their particulars, vacant positions, and movement of positions from one school to another.

***Recommendation 2.9***

That PEB considers all recommendations for teacher appointments from the church agency personnel, standard officers, and BoM, on merit.

***Recommendation 2.10***

That TSC provides increased financial incentives for teachers teaching in remote schools and that these are paid on a fortnightly basis as part of their pays.

***Recommendation 2.11***

That PEB prepares and presents an **Annual Teacher Appointment Report** to TSC and NEB

### **3 Acceptance of Teaching and Head Teacher Appointments by Teachers**

***Recommendation 3.1***

That PEB develops and implements an effective, transparent, and time-bound **Appeals Process and an Action Plan**, if there is currently none in place. This process must state clearly when the appeals will be received, how long the appeals will be heard, and when the outcomes will be communicated to the appellants.

***Recommendation 3.2***

That PEB establishes an **Appeals Board** comprising members other than PEB members together with clear roles and responsibilities.

***Recommendation 3.3***

That PEB and TSC abolish the teachers 'pool'.

#### 4. Teachers' Resumption of Duties

##### *Recommendation 4.1*

That the PEB develops and puts in place a time-bound **Logistics Action Plan** that will include all required activities, including, travel costs and arrangements for teachers transferring to new positions, monitoring of teachers resumption of duty in schools, filling in and submission of RoDSS, and reporting on the resumption of duty by teachers to PEB. The person(s) responsible for executing each activity and the required timeframe for its completion must be clearly identified for monitoring and accountability purposes.

##### *Recommendation 4.2*

That the PEB budgets for teachers' travel costs yearly and mobilise all resources necessary to effectively implement the Logistics Action Plan. All funds must be acquitted and reported in the **Annual Teacher Appointment Report**, which must be submitted to TSC and PEB for ratification by March every year.

#### 5 Amendments to the *Teaching Services, 1995* and *Education Act, 1995*

##### *Recommendation 5.1*

That TSC and PEB amend the *TSC Act, 1995* and the *Education Act, 1995* to include provisions that will make it mandatory for PEB to develop and implement time-bound Teacher Appointments, Logistics, and Appeals Action Plans, and to produce a Teacher Appointments Annual Report for TSC and PEB by March every school year.

##### *Recommendation 5.2*

That TSC amends the *TSC Act, 1995* to include provisions that will allow for implementing officers to be held accountable by the PEB if they fail to carry out their responsibilities stipulated in the Teacher Appointment, Logistics, and the Appeals Action Plans.

#### 6. Respect and Strengthen Church–Government Partnerships

##### *Recommendation 6.1*

That the roles and responsibilities of church agencies in the appointment of teachers to teaching and head teacher positions must be clearly described and communicated to all teachers, BoM, Parents and Citizen's Associations, PEB members, and all PEOs.

##### *Recommendation 6.2*

That PEB must give due consideration to the recommendations of church agencies and take into serious consideration their views on teacher appointments.

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**ANNEXES**

**Annex A**

**Teachers' and Head teachers' Teacher Appointment Questionnaire**

**Instructions**

This questionnaire is designed to allow you to give us your views and share your experiences of teacher deployment **in the Province you are teaching**. Specifically, we want to know YOUR views and experiences of how teacher deployment works, how it affects teachers and schools, and how it could be improved to make it more effective and efficient.

***Biographical Information***

1. Gender: ..... 2. Age: ..... 3. Number of teaching years: .....
4. Number of years teaching in current school: .....
5. Number of schools in which you have taught: ..... 6. Home Province: .....

***Appointment of Teachers***

7. In your own words, describe how the teachers get appointed to teaching positions in schools

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.....

8. When are teachers advised of their postings?

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9. How do you get advised of your posting?.

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.....

10. Is teacher deployment done with due consideration of teachers' interest?

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.....

***Acceptance of Teaching Appointments by Teachers***

11. Have you refused to take up your teaching appointment at anytime in your teaching career? If yes answer question 14.

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.....

12. Why did you refuse to take up your posting?

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13. What would you do if the appointment you are given is not according to your choice?

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14. Why do you think teachers refuse to take up their teaching appointments? Give as many reasons as you can.

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15. What do teachers do when they are not given the positions they apply for?

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16. What do the appointing authorities in the Province do when teachers refuse to take up their teaching appointments?

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.....

***Resumption of Teaching Duties***

17. What might stop you from resuming your teaching duties on time?

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18. Why do you think some teachers do not resume duties on time?

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19. What do you think should be done to ensure teachers start the school year on time?

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20. What problems exist with the resumption of duty process?

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***Strengths and Weaknesses of Teacher Appointment***

21. What are the strengths, if any, of teacher appointment in the Province?

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22. What are the weaknesses, if any, of teacher appointment in the Province?

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23. How can the above weaknesses be addressed to improve teacher appointment in the Province?

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24. If you could change one thing about the present practice of teacher deployment, what would that be?

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.....  
.....

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE

## **Annex B**

### **Teacher Appointment Focused-Group Interview Questions**

**Instructions:** The questions should be used as a guide. It is important to focus on the actual experiences of the participants of the teacher appointment process and practice in the province.

#### **Theme 1: Appointment of Teachers to teaching and head teacher positions**

1. How would you describe the process of teacher appointment in the province?
2. Is teacher appointment done with due consideration of teachers' interests?
3. How has teacher appointment-process and practice in the province affected you personally?
4. How can the teacher appointment-process be improved?

#### **Theme 2: Acceptance of Teaching and Head teacher Appointments by Teachers and Head teachers**

1. Has any one of you refused to take up your teaching or head teacher appointment any time in your teaching career? Why?
2. What would you do if the appointment you are given is not according to your choice?
3. Why do you think teachers and head teachers refuse to take up their postings?

#### **Theme 3: Resumption of Teaching Duties**

1. What might stop you from resuming duties on time?
2. Why do you think some teachers and head teachers do not resume their duties on time?
3. What do you think should be done to ensure teachers and head teachers resume duties on time?

#### **Theme 4: Strengths and Weaknesses**

1. What are the strengths of teacher appointment in the province?
2. What are the weaknesses of teacher appointment in the province?
3. How can the weakness of teacher appointment in the province be addressed to improve teacher deployment in the province?

