BOUGAINVILLE AUTONOMY

Implications for Governance and Decentralisation

By

Dr. Edward Wolfers

Adviser, Bougainville Peace and Restoration Office
(on leave from position as Professor
of Politics, University of Wollongong)

NRI
The National Research Institute
First published in August 2007.

Copyright © The National Research Institute

NRI Discussion Paper No. 103

This discussion paper is part of a series of joint SSGM/NRI Discussion Papers to be published in support of a Memorandum of Understanding between the School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, and the National Research Institute, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.

The National Research Institute (NRI) is an independent statutory authority established by an Act of Parliament in 1988 and confirmed by the LAEER (Amendment) Act 1993. NRI's aims are to undertake research into the social, political, economic, educational, legal, environmental, and cultural issues and problems of Papua New Guinea and to formulate practical solutions to these problems. Research results are published in the following NRI publication series.

Monographs
Discussion Paper
Educational Reports
Occasional Papers

Post Courier Index
Bibliographies
Special Publications
Additional Publications

Direct any inquiries regarding these publications to:

The Publications Sales Coordinator
National Research Institute
P.O. Box 5854,
BOROKO, NCD. 111
Papua New Guinea

Tel: (675) 326 0300/326 0061 ext. 238
Fax: (675) 326 0213
Email: nri@global.net.pg
Website: www.nri.org.pg

ISBN 9980 75 148 7
National Library Service of Papua New Guinea

Printed by the NRI Printery

The views expressed in this discussion paper are those of the author, are sometimes speculative, and do not necessarily represent official positions, or the views of the Institute.
CONTENTS

Acronyms iv
Introduction 1
Background and Character of Bougainvillean Autonomy 5
Implications for Bougainville 7
Implications for the National Government 12
Implications for Decentralisation 17
Conclusion 20
References 22

Figures

Figure 1: Sources of Authority and Structure of the Autonomous Bougainville Government 10
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABG</td>
<td>Autonomous Bougainville Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIPG</td>
<td>Bougainville Interim Provincial Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Bougainville People's Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Bougainville Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRF</td>
<td>Bougainville Resistance Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Internal Revenue Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMB</td>
<td>United Nationals Observer Mission in Bougainville</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The founding and guiding principles for the establishment, operation, and development of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) are contained in the Bougainville Peace Agreement. Insofar as they are concerned with political, constitutional, and institutional reform, they represent an attempt to transform and channel previous violent conflicts into political processes and institutions (Bachler n.d.; Ghai 2004; cf. Widner 2005). They are concerned with governance — the process by which society collectively attempts to solve problems, maintain public order, and meet other shared needs, not just government, which is one of the main instruments used for such purposes (Osborne and Guebler 1993:24; cf. Wolters 2006a:4).

These principles are clarified by the way in which the arrangements for Bougainville autonomy are embodied together as one of three pillars in a much broader Agreement, which is concerned with autonomy, a guaranteed referendum on Bougainville’s political future, and weapons disposal. These three pillars are part of an Agreement which provides an amnesty for persons convicted, and immunity from prosecution, for offences committed during the Bougainville conflict, and a commitment by former combatant groups to disband and work through a unified set of administrative and political structures — the ABG.

The Agreement’s broader concern with governance relates to weapons disposal, amnesty, and reconciliation. This is further clarified in the provisions dealing with the referendum, which state that the timing of the referendum in the five-year window allowed — 10-15 years after the establishment of the ABG; that is, between 2015 and 2020 — will be determined by reference to weapons disposal and good governance. In the case of good governance, this will be defined with regard to internationally accepted standards, as they are applicable and implemented in the circumstances of Bougainville and the rest of Papua New Guinea.

The circumstances in which the arrangement for Bougainville autonomy was agreed are highlighted by the way in which the Papua New Guinean Constitution [Part XIV] as well as the Organic Law made under that part — which, together, give these arrangements legal effect — were deliberately given a title that refers to more and other than formal governmental arrangements: ‘Peace-Building in Bougainville — Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum’. This was done at the insistence of the Minister responsible for negotiating the Agreement, Hon. Sir Moi Avei, and despite some misgivings among members of the Bougainvillean team who participated in finalising the drafting of the constitutional laws giving legal effect to the agreement.

There were observers, as well as participants on the national government side, who saw relevance, and perhaps, precedents being set for other parts of the country in elements of the autonomy arrangements that were being considered, and agreed on, for Bougainville. However, the emphasis on ‘Peace-Building in Bougainville’ in the constitutional laws was intended to highlight the point that the agenda for discussion and the purpose of the arrangements being agreed upon were not primarily constitutional reform, improved service delivery, or anything else. It was a determination to secure lasting peace, by peaceful means. The focus was specifically on
peace-building in the post-conflict situation in Bougainville, not on issues and political aspirations, or possible claims, in other parts of Papua New Guinea.

As a result, Papua New Guinea now has a system of government in which arrangements that apply to different parts of country are not uniform. Bougainville, and in other respects, the National Capital District, are different from other provinces. Bougainville now carries the name 'Autonomous Region of Bougainville', although its boundaries continue to be defined in the Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries.

While the particular arrangements are not identical with any previously envisaged, the resulting diversity in the governmental arrangements in different parts of the country was originally foreseen in the Final Report of the pre-independence Constitutional Planning Committee, which recommended that provincial governments be established in three stages (Papua New Guinea 1974, Part 1:10/4). This is broadly consistent with the purpose of the Papua New Guinean Constitution [s.187G] which allows for provincial governments to acquire functions and powers in stages, for a gradation of provincial governments, and for the establishment of provincial governments on an interim basis.

It was primarily for managerial (not political) reasons that the 'one size fits all' approach was instituted when provincial governments were formally established in all provinces from 1977 on — even prior to the 'reforms' that were introduced in 1995. Undoubtedly, there were sound reasons for concluding that a uniform arrangement would be easier for the national government to manage than one which allowed for diversity. However, this reasoning does not depend on the widely held suspicion, sometimes bordering on fear, that if arrangements varied between different parts of the country, people throughout Papua New Guinea would be so shortsighted that they would always make or support demands which would give their particular province or region the greatest constitutionally available local control over the formal functions and powers of government.

People in parts of the country where educated manpower is in short supply, incomes are low, and the revenue base is narrow are not so ignorant or indifferent towards economic and other realities that they are likely to advocate or support changes which they must know, at least intuitively, will be to their disadvantage, or might not even work at all, if the system does not take account of differences between provinces, and allow for some variation in arrangements, as well as redistribution of human, and financial resources. Papua New Guinea now has an asymmetrical system of government, whereby governmental arrangements are not the same in every part of the country. It is the implications of this new reality, as well as the particular implications of the arrangements which now apply in Bougainville, that are this Discussion Paper's main concerns.

The implications that the new arrangements for Bougainville autonomy have for Papua New Guinea can be grouped under several headings:

- Bougainville, especially the ABG;
- the national government and Papua New Guinea as a whole, including relations with interested external actors who see themselves as having a stake in what has been agreed; and
specifically, the current form and future of decentralisation.

While the arrangements focus on government, their most important focus is on the effects they have for the broader issue of governance. The ultimate test of their impact and effectiveness will be the referendum, which is scheduled to be held 10-15 years after the establishment of the ABG — now maybe only nine year away — between 2015 and 2020. The ostensible issue — and the question which will be on the ballot-paper, unless the ABG decides otherwise, in accordance with procedures set down in the Bougainville Constitution — will be a separate independence for Bougainville.

However, as the result of the referendum will be subjected to the overriding decision-making authority of the National Parliament, the ultimate issue is bigger and more likely to have greater consequences; that is, whether people in Bougainville, and those at the centre of national government and in other parts of the country will accept the result of the referendum and the outcome of the National Parliament’s deliberations on that result, in an orderly and peaceful way. This will really depend on the degree to which critical elements of good governance, such as acceptance of democracy and the rule of law, have been achieved. The referendum will be a test of the ability of the government to persuade people to support the maintenance of the unity and territorial integrity of Papua New Guinea — an objective and principle which many people in Bougainville share. Sensitive policy making and administration, proper regard for the terms of the Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing laws, and the allocation of resources, including conditional grants to the ABG and direct expenditure by national government departments and agencies with continuing responsibilities in Bougainville, are likely to play a critical role, as will the commitment, ability, and effectiveness of the ABG and the national government to cooperate and achieve good governance, in Bougainville and nationwide.

The constitutional laws implementing the Bougainville Peace Agreement have been entrenched through a procedure, known as ‘double entrenchment’, which provides that they can only be changed if specified majorities in both the National Parliament and the Bougainville legislative — the ‘Bougainville House of Representatives’ — agree. This means that the provisions on autonomy and referendum are locked in together, as are the national government and the ABG. Neither can change the previously agreed arrangements, which are now implemented in national constitutional laws, unless the other agrees (the requirement is generally a two-thirds absolute majority vote in each, except in the case of the autonomy provisions, where only a simple majority is required in Bougainville).

In regard to the referendum provisions, in particular, it might be worth noting reports of the apparently calm and orderly manner in which the outcome of the independence referendum that was held in Montenegro, on 21 May 2006, was accepted in Serbia and elsewhere. A narrow majority of Montenegrins — just over 55 percent of the absolute majority required to participate in the ballot for a valid result — voted in favour of a separate independence for Montenegro (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2005, for background; ICG 2006, for the result). This has already given rise to the holding of ‘copycat’ referenda in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, the Transdniestr region of Moldova, the South Ossetia region of Georgia, although not to national or international recognition of these other referenda or their results (International Crisis Group 2006b).
This is in contrast to the continued deferral of referenda in other parts of the world where they have been agreed, for example, Western Sahara (Hodges 1983), the violence which erupted in East Timor (requiring the presence of international peacekeepers) following the referendum of 30 August 1999, and the manner in which other acts of self-determination have been conducted, for example, the Act of Free Choice in West New Guinea/Irian Jaya, now Indonesian Papua, in 1969.

The relatively cordial and peaceful dismemberment of the former Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony into Kiribati and Tuvalu, which became independent in 1976 and 1978, respectively, stands out. However, the formal split occurred before independence, and therefore, did not openly challenge the existing international order of sovereign states. So, too, do the plebiscites in Palau and other Micronesian states, which were formed out of the former United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and previously administered by the United States of America, and the referendum in Tokelau, in early 2006, the effects of which have been to maintain the political status quo, and for Tokelau not to enter into free association with New Zealand — at least, not yet (United Nations 2006:3-4).

While the referendum on New Caledonia’s ultimate political status continues to be deferred — most recently, for 15-20 years from 2000 — the deferral is by agreement between the parties, which has itself been confirmed in a referendum and given the force of law by amendment of the French Constitution and an Organic Law (United Nations 2005:2-3).
BACKGROUND AND CHARACTER OF BOUGAINVILLEAN AUTONOMY

The preamble to the Bougainville Peace Agreement describes the Agreement as ‘a joint creation’ of the parties which made it. The agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy are the product of protracted negotiation and compromise. While they draw on precedents and experiences in other countries, as well as Papua New Guinea before and following the 1995 ‘reform’ of the provincial government system, and Bougainville itself, they do not follow any single precedent or model. They are truly ‘home-grown’, and form part of a package, which includes:

- a guaranteed referendum on Bougainville’s political future — with a separate independence for Bougainville an available option;
- a weapons disposal plan;
- amnesty for crisis-related activities; and
- a commitment by former combatant leaders to disband their groups.

The various elements of the package are formally linked together, so that the coming into effect of the constitutional laws implementing the Agreement depended on progress with weapons disposal (verification and certification of Stage 2 of a three-stage plan by the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville [UNOMIB]). The holding of the first general election for the ABG depended on concluding the process. Weapons disposal and good governance will be issues which will determine the precise timing of the guaranteed referendum. In this context, ‘good governance’ is defined in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, Paragraph 313 (a) to:

take account of internationally accepted standards of good governance, as they are applicable and implemented in the circumstances of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. These benchmarks include democracy and opportunities for participation by Bougainvilleans, transparency, and accountability, as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law, including the Papua New Guinean Constitution.

The national government and the ABG are both committed to working towards these benchmarks, and to using the Joint Supervisory Body — an arrangement established with the specific purpose of facilitating consultation and cooperation, and for the prevention, and as required, resolution of disputes without resort to the courts — and other agreed procedures for resolving disputes to determine whether Bougainville has reached the agreed standard. The timing and credibility of the conduct and result of the referendum will require ongoing consultation and cooperation between the national government and the ABG.

The links between different elements in the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the implementing laws could already be found in the proposals which the various parties presented when negotiating the Agreement. The combination of a guaranteed referendum on a separate independence for Bougainville and autonomy made it possible for the different Bougainvillean factions to come together and develop a joint negotiating position, and form a combined Bougainvillean delegation to pursue it. The assurance of an amnesty was a precondition for former combatants to turn the agreed weapons disposal plan into action.
On the national government side, the linkages between weapons disposal and the other elements were critical in establishing the sense of mutual security, which made it possible to finalise the Agreement. Other linkages, which were even more critical for acceptance of the overall package, were the agreements that the arrangements would come within the framework of the Papua New Guinean Constitution (as amended to implement the Agreement), and that the outcome of the referendum would be subject to the final decision-making authority of the National Parliament.

The negotiations have been described as having multiple dimensions (Regan 2002) and layers (Wolters 2006a:4):

- in Bougainville, and on the national government side, where successive governments have been committed to a bipartisan/national approach; and
- 'across the table', between the combined Bougainvillean and national government delegations.

The situation was often similar, even as prior agreements were reached, when the parties found it necessary to negotiate and shore up, or build, coalitions on either side. For example:

- so that the Bougainville People's Congress (BPC), the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government (BIPG), and the Leitana Council of Elders in Buka would cooperate and accept the same compromises;
- to facilitate the involvement of former elements of the Meekamui Defence Force (a breakaway from the Bougainville Revolutionary Army [BRA] still largely outside the Bougainville peace process) in the formulation and implementation of the weapons disposal plan previously agreed between the State, the BRA, and the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF);
- for the BIPG to govern in consultation with the BPC, through the Bougainville Transitional Consultative Council, pending establishment of the ABG; and
- on the national government side, to address and overcome the concerns of officials who, in reviewing the ABG Constitution, expressed concern that the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the implementing laws were not completely consistent with the Papua New Guinean Constitution.

In this context, one of the strengths of the process has been, simultaneously, one of its weaknesses — the willingness of the parties to proceed in the knowledge that not all prospective stakeholders are involved, while continuing to welcome them to join in. Consequently, peace-making and peace-building have so far kept moving ahead, without the active participation of the hard core of the late Francis Ona's closest supporters (in what has become known as the 'No Go Zone' around Panguna), and without creating the opportunity which insistence on inclusiveness as a precondition for negotiation or final agreement might have created for them to become 'spoilers' (Wolters 2006b:9; cf. Stedman 2000). The circumstances in which the arrangements were negotiated not only influenced what was agreed, but continue to be closely relevant to their ongoing implications.
IMPLICATIONS FOR BOUGAINVILLE

The most obvious influence that the origins and purposes of Bougainville autonomy continue to have on its functioning is that the peace process, and the area and population in which the ABG operates, do not cover the whole of Bougainville. Although the ABG has made good progress in restoring services in the ‘No-Go Zone’, and in lowering or, at least, getting around the physical and psychological barriers which cut the area off from its surroundings, the ABG’s authority does not cover all of Bougainville.

The situation has been further complicated by the arrival, in 2005, of Noah Musingku — the architect of the illegal fastmoney scheme, U-Vistract, and the self-styled Kingdom of Papala — and his associates, in Siuai, and their efforts to cut off the area around Tomu and other parts of South Bougainville from the ABG and the rest of Bougainville.

In many respects, the Bougainville conflict was a civil war among Bougainvilleans, especially after the withdrawal of government services in early 1990. It was also a conflict between the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and its allies, on the one hand, and the Papua New Guinea security forces, on the other, operating with the support of the BRF (see Papua New Guinea 1990 for a detailed analysis of the origins and development of the conflict).

As the conflict spread around Bougainville, growing numbers of Bougainvilleans aligned themselves for secession, or remaining part of Papua New Guinea, on the grounds of principle or personal identification, as being primarily Bougainvillean or Papua New Guinean, or perceived personal or wider advantage. However, the ways in which many acted related more to local circumstances, including traditional enmities, rivalries, or alliances. For example, if a particular person, community, or group went one way, then neighbours were all the more likely to go in another (see Spriggs 1990 for a graphic firsthand account of the way in which the conflict spread in Central Bougainville).

Fear and a desire to settle old scores were sometimes relevant, as was the desire for adventure, theft, or ‘plain old thuggery’ (King 2001:166). The wider conflict divided families, communities, and larger groups, and in some cases, led people who had previously identified themselves with the BRA or the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF), after their formation in 1990, to change sides.

The devastating impact that this had on social capital or community has been documented in research (Peacock-Taylor et al. 1999), and in accounts of persons — especially women — directly affected by the conflict (Sirivi and Havini 2004a, 2004b; Wolfers 2005:170–173; Ninnes 2006). Reconciliation — creating a sense of community — is one of the challenges the ABG faces, especially if Bougainville is to be a genuinely democratic society, where citizens respect one another, and not just a place where elections are held (cf. the discussion of the distinction between liberal and illiberal democracy (Zakaria 2003), and of the basis and character of democracy (Sharan 2004)).

Another challenge is the growing ‘culture of claims’, in which individuals, businesses, and groups seek financial redress for losses suffered, services rendered, or
support provided, in return for explicit or implied promises made during the conflict, including former BRF combatants who fought or performed other services in support of the security forces.

The enormous damage and destruction which occurred to physical infrastructure and the economy — especially agricultural production — following the withdrawal of the security forces and the subsequent collapse of government throughout Bougainville, in early 1990, is a great challenge for the ABG (see Dorothy 2000, Part 3:2, for an account by the former BRA Chief of Defence, Sam Kauona, concerning the ‘madness’ with which vehicles and other property were taken and rendered useless).

It is of particular relevance to the ABG’s capacity and political future because of the way in which the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the implementing laws link national government grants to the ABG to restoration, and the taxation powers available to the ABG to the achievement of fiscal self-reliance.

More importantly, given the role that perceived disadvantages and inequities played in the origins and development of the Bougainville crisis, including the ways in which they divided families and communities (Papua New Guinea 1990; Filer 1990), these lingering effects of the previous conflict are a continuing source of pressure by constituents on the ABG.

This pressure has immediate implications for the ABG’s popularity and credibility, the prospects for members’ election or re-election, and ultimately for the causes in which leaders and people believe, whether it be continuing autonomy, a separate independence for Bougainville, or some other arrangement. If the ABG cannot deliver at least a reasonable proportion of what Bougainvilleans want, then the prospects are that:

- members will lose support;
- the ABG, as a whole, will fail to gain and might even lose credibility;
- people outside the peace process will continue not to join in, and might become an even stronger magnet for disappointed or dissident people inside; and
- pressure for a separate independence will grow, although the outcome might do little to resolve the issues which may lead people to vote in a particular way when the referendum is held.

A related consideration is that the way in which various political and former armed factions have come together — in a process which involved coalition-building through the Bougainville People’s Congress, the combined Bougainville delegation which participated in negotiations, and the Bougainville Transitional Consultative Council — does not mean that previous preferred positions, alliances, and differences have necessarily been left behind, or resolved, with the formal establishment of the ABG. Not all differences have been resolved with the establishment of the ABG.

Politics goes on (in what may be described as the pursuit of war by other means). Lobbying for particular policies and jockeying for positions are likely to continue within the ABG. This is evident in differences which have emerged among Bougainvillean leaders, over mining and other policies (Post-Courier, 3 July 2006:6),
and the questioning by an ABG member as to why the Bougainvillean Constitution does not make specific provision for an Opposition (Post-Courier, 28 June 2006:14).

The guarantee of a referendum on Bougainville’s political future might provide an incentive for the persistence of such differences, and even their growth. As the referendum date approaches, the question of a separate independence for Bougainville might become increasingly important, urgent, and central to politics in Bougainville. Those who were leaders or were otherwise involved in previous arrangements may provide convenient scapegoats for others, including those motivated by populist politics or political advantage.

As part of the agreed autonomy arrangements, the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the implementing laws vest quite substantial responsibility for government and development in Bougainville in the ABG. Additional functions and powers are available for transfer at the ABG’s request, provided it has the capacity and resources required to manage them.

If this is not the case, then the national government and the ABG are required to develop joint plans to facilitate implementation, and resolve any disputes through the agreed dispute resolution procedures.

The ABG also has the right to play a role in respect of functions and powers in areas which remain primarily national government responsibilities, including specific aspects of defence, foreign relations, administration of the common border with Solomon Islands, maritime surveillance, immigration, and others.

This will require additional human and other resources, as does the planning required for restoration, development, and good governance, and the proper management of human resources, infrastructure and equipment, and public funds.

Autonomy has implications concerning the need for an enlarged public service, and personnel with much higher-level policy and planning skills than provincial governments normally have at their disposal (or the North Solomons and Bougainville Interim Provincial Governments probably required in the past).

The implications for training and/or recruitment of persons with relevant skills seem clear, as are the associated costs. These costs include both money and time. Funds are also required for the various forms of consultation with the national government, for which the agreed arrangements provide, including, but not only, the Joint Supervisory Body. These are additional to the costs of the political structure for which the Bougainville Constitution provides — the core elements already established, and those which the ABG is authorised to establish as resources allow (see Figure 1).
**Figure 1: Sources of Authority and Structure of the Autonomous Bougainville Government**

- Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea
- Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville
- Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville

**LEGISLATURE**

- Bougainville House of Representatives
  - Speaker (elected from outside)
  - President (ex-officio)
  - 33 constituency members
  - 3 women's representatives
  - 3 former combatants
  - 4 National MPs (ex-officio, cannot move motions, vote, or count for quorum)

**EXECUTIVE**

- Bougainville Executive Council
  - President (directly elected)
  - Vice-President
  - 8 Ministers (2 per Region + 1 woman + 1 chosen by President)

**JUDICIARY**

- Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea (highest court of appeal)
  - National Court System unless the ABG establishes Bougainville Court

**ADVISORY BODY**

- Traditional Chiefs + Leaders if/when ABG decides

**3 Regional Governments**

- If/when ABG decides

**Key to Figure 1**

--- : line of formal, legal authority (except in the case of the Councils of Elders, where the line to the courts indicates relative position in the formal hierarchy of courts).

****** : not yet operational (Bougainville Courts, the Advisory Body of Traditional Chiefs and Other Leaders, and Regional Governments have not been established).

**Notes to Figure 1**

* The autonomy provision in the Papua New Guinean Constitution [Part XIV] and the Organic Law made under that Part can be amended following two months notice, consultations between the National Government and the ABG, and approved by a two-thirds absolute majority in the National Parliament in two separate votes, at least one month apart, and simple majority vote in the Bougainville legislature.

**: May be between 28 and 38 for future elections.

***: Subject to review before the end of the ABG's first five-year term (2010), and to cease when the guaranteed referendum on Bougainville's political future is held in the period, 2015-2020).

****: Chosen from the legislature. The President chooses the Vice-President, who must come from a region of Bougainville other than his own. The Bougainville Constitution provides for the President to appoint an additional four members of the Bougainville Executive Council when the
Bougainville House of Representatives considers that financial resources allow, and a law is made for that purpose.

Offices and institutions established under the Papua New Guinean Constitution which may be replaced/supplemented by Bougainvillian counterparts include: Auditor-General, Electoral Commissioner, Ombudsman Commissioner, Public Prosecutor, Public Solicitor, Public Services Commissioner, and Salaries and Remuneration Commissioner. Government services include the Public Service, Police, and Correctional Service.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The costs of government and the acceptance, or deflection to others, of responsibility for what transpires in Bougainville, especially failures or delays in implementing the agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy or in promoting restoration and development more generally, have immediate implications for public perceptions of the national government’s commitment to Bougainville autonomy and the effectiveness of the Bougainville Peace Agreement.

It is one thing to formulate an agreement, but another to turn what has been agreed into law. However, turning even implementing laws into practical actions can present further challenges. This has been the experience to date, despite the presence and participation of senior officials from relevant national government agencies in the negotiations which led to the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the implementing laws, and the decision-making processes through which the National Executive Council gave its approval.

When the Internal Revenue Commission (IRC) was asked to produce certain tax statistics in order to facilitate implementation of the agreed financial arrangements for Bougainville, the reality was that it does not normally have a need or reason to collect or classify certain information on a provincial basis, or in ways that can be easily determined to identify specific Bougainville activities and/or amounts.

When it came to delegating certain police functions and powers to Bougainville, it was not more laws or regulations that were required, but a method of implementing the delegations consistent with the way the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary is organised and operates, including the insignia and uniforms that police wear. This required many meetings between officials from the various agencies concerned with implementing the Bougainville Peace Agreement, and resulted in the decision that the position of police commander in Bougainville should be raised to the level of assistant commissioner. The time and effort were well spent, as the outcome has been successfully applied, without external supervision or review to achieve the intended objective.

The principles underlying the various grants which the national government is legally obliged to make to the ABG are quite clearly expressed. However, is a ‘recurrent grant’ expected to:

- be equal to funds previously provided for similar purposes, which are often less than actual costs, and require cross-subsidisation from funds intended for other purposes;
- be sufficient to meet real, overall costs;
- bring Bougainville up to a particular standard of service availability or delivery – pre-conflict or at the current national average; or
- be measured on a per capita or some other basis?

In every case to date, the mutual goodwill has existed to find a way through, often by deferring final decisions and making mutually acceptable ad hoc arrangements, thereby avoiding disputes and possible resort to the courts, while matters of detail are worked out. However, this cannot go on forever. The risk is that someone who objects or
believes they are in some way disadvantaged could legally contest one or more areas in which implementation falls short of the law, or make it a political issue. Fresh challenges of a similar kind could arise when the ABG requests the transfer of functions or powers currently exercised on a regional or national basis, and it becomes necessary to provide the human and financial resources for the ABG to assume responsibility.

The likelihood that ad hoc, band-aid approaches will be required is likely to increase, at least in the short and medium terms, as the ABG gives notice of its desire to assume formal responsibility for an increasing number and range of government functions and powers. It will take continuing mutual confidence and commitment to cooperate in realising the potential of the ‘joint creation’ outlined in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, for the system to operate and develop as intended, and to avoid disputes.

On the national government side, a major challenge is ensuring that government officers are aware of the relationship between their activities and the provisions in the Bougainville Peace Agreement. This challenge is made all the greater because of the rapid turnover of staff, often for reasons as mundane as promotions, resignations, retirements, and public sector restructuring. Relevant constitutional legislation comprises some 146 pages, and then there is the main aid to interpretation, the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which is mandated by the Papua New Guinean Constitution (s.278(3)), and comprises a further 73 pages. For officials and others, who need to understand what might be termed ‘the Bougainville end’ of many issues, the documents they should consult include:

- those which apply as national law (just listed),
- the Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (which covers 178 pages, including a number of annexes summarising relevant provisions of national constitutional laws, plus 65 pages of legislation providing for the first general election for the ABG), which must be applied consistently with the Papua New Guinean Constitution;
- other Bougainville-made laws; and
- a number of aids to constitutional interpretation, including the Bougainville Peace Agreement (again), the draft Constitution and a 368-page report prepared by the Bougainville Constitutional Commission, the records of the Bougainville Constituent Assembly which formally adopted the Bougainville Constitution, and a list of papers presented by the national government and accepted as aids to interpretation so that the draft could be finalised, formally adopted, sent to the National Executive Council for endorsement, and brought into force in accordance with its own provisions by the Governor-General.

Formal and on-the-job training are required to ensure that relevant national government officials are aware of their responsibilities towards Bougainville. Procedures have to be developed, put in place, and then implemented to ensure that the national government’s ability to meet its responsibilities in relation to Bougainville is more systematic and less directly dependent on particular incumbents. Briefings are necessary and procedures have to be put in place, in order to ensure that foreign aid donors, and others understand how they should conduct their relations with the ABG. Generally, this should be through the Departments of National Planning and Monitoring, and Foreign Affairs and Immigration, and/ or other relevant national government departments and agencies.
In relation to restoration and development, Bougainvilleans faced with the damage, removal, and destruction of infrastructure and equipment in Bougainville rightly point to the problems and disadvantages with which they must deal. However, the situation increasingly appears different to many other Papua New Guineans. Apart from statements which attempt to attribute blame for what has occurred, there is the reality that, on certain measures, Bougainville is better off than many other parts of Papua New Guinea. For example, Bougainville was awarded a prize for the best medical services in the country on the first anniversary of the ABG’s establishment.

Also, the proportion of the school-age population enrolled in Grades 1-6 is the most favourable in Papua New Guinea, at 95 percent, while the proportion of secondary school enrolments is also among the highest (Gomez 2006:163). However, exhortations to recognise that perceived disadvantage and need should be viewed against competing needs and aspirations in other communities are unlikely to mean much to people who have suffered the decline in living standards that is the reality of life in contemporary Bougainville. They will possibly be counter-productive when made to people who do not believe that Bougainville should remain in Papua New Guinea, or that the situation there should be viewed from a national perspective.

For Papua New Guineans who believe that the country should remain together as one, winning the referendum is an important objective. It is important to people who believe in equity, or fear that failure to devote sufficient resources to restoration and development in Bougainville could increase discontent and disaffection there. An impoverished and administratively weak Bougainville could become an area of vulnerability and concern for Papua New Guinea, whatever Bougainville’s political status.

The national government must face the challenges of honouring the recurrent, restoration and development, and police grants to the ABG, which are required by law, as well of identifying, mobilising, and ensuring the allocation of resources to restore and develop services that remain national government responsibilities. It would also be advantageous to engage in activities which will convince Bougainvilleans of the advantages of remaining with Papua New Guinea. This is among the reasons why the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the implementing laws provide for the national government to make additional, conditional grants. The ABG must agree, as the grants cannot be imposed.

It is also why peace-building projects and support are among the Bougainville Peace and Restoration Office’s priorities for 2006. The other priorities are capacity-building and relationship-building with other government agencies, the ABG, foreign aid donors, non-government organisations, and civil society, in order to support and facilitate the implementation of the agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy and other objectives of the Bougainville Peace Agreement.

Meanwhile, is it wise to expect people who were willing to compromise their previous positions for the sake of peace — and a combination of autonomy and a guaranteed referendum, with a separate independence for Bougainville as an option — to abandon their old hopes and ambitions? Are they likely to view the period leading up to the referendum as providing a test of their previous beliefs, or an opportunity to promote them?
Implications for the National Government

In this regard, some of the accomplishments of the celebrations marking the first anniversary of the ABG, on 15 June 2006, provide food for thought. For example, the remark in the Handbook (ABG 2006b:16) handed to visitors stating that, 'Over the past 12 months, Bougainville began on a thin road to full freedom and self-determination ...', the art exhibition with a painting referring prominently to autonomy and independence at the highest point at the centre of the wall at the end of the display, and other physical objects and remarks. These observations are not occasions for criticism or rejection. Rather, they remind observers of the many challenges that remain, or are likely to arise in the future. The statements and paintings observed need to be put in broader perspective. The ABG's Strategic Action Plan, which was prepared in 2005-2006, contains a Foreword by the ABG Vice-president, Hon. Joseph Watawi, stating that:

Bougainville is an autonomous region within Papua New Guinea. It is NOT a province. As an autonomous region, Bougainville has the power to make decisions that will determine its own destiny. However, the autonomy arrangements are a joint creation with the Papua New Guinea National Government, and therefore an effective and equal partnership with national Government is essential (ABG 2006a:2-3).

The Strategic Action Plan (ibid.:21) states that:

Even though Bougainville is an autonomous region it remains part of Papua New Guinea, and it is important that planning for Bougainville is consistent with planning at the national level.

To the degree that Papua New Guineans seriously want the country to remain as one -- and preferably, by consent of the people -- or can see the shared interest there is in ensuring a stable, orderly Bougainville, these statements are challenges to be met, not left to resolve themselves or to be ignored. The importance of meeting these challenges is made much greater by what many Bougainvilleans regard as a history of unkept or deliberately broken promises in relation to decentralisation, and mining policy, in particular. These issues arose before Papua New Guinea became independent, and played a role in giving rise to the conflict which engulfed most of Bougainville during 1989-1997.

Understanding will be required when politicians from Bougainville, like politicians elsewhere:

* engage in political grandstanding or try to shift responsibility for shortcomings and failures in public policy and implementation;
* give priority to overseas travel and foreign affairs, or become involved in controversial or risky financial or other deals; or
* give what critics and sceptics might regard as too much attention to activities other than restoration and development, which benefit people at the grassroots, including the (re-)integration of former combatants and communities.

The ABG provides political avenues for the pursuit and resolution of political differences among Bougainvilleans. The Joint Supervisory Body and other agreed
procedures, including the courts, established or specified in the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the implementing laws, are intended to prevent and resolve intergovernmental and other disputes. The bottom-line assurance is that the national government on a bipartisan/national basis, and Bougainvilleans on all sides state that they are firmly committed to ‘lasting peace by peaceful means’, and have generally acted accordingly in the nine years since armed conflict ceased, and the Burnham Truce was signed in 1997 (Dilm and Wolfers 1998).

The ‘joint creation’ embodied in the Bougainville Peace Agreement has become a joint venture, as the responsible Minister, Hon. Sir Peter Barter, has repeatedly stated, with the national government having a clear interest in cooperating to make autonomy work and produce results. The implications of the experiment with Bougainville autonomy, for governance in Bougainville and nationally, are accordingly clear.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DECENTRALISATION

As the Papua New Guinean Constitution, [Part XIV] and the Organic Law made under that Part make clear the arrangements for Bougainville autonomy have been agreed specially in order to make and build peace in Bougainville. This was the context in which they were made. The 'one-off' character of the arrangements agreed for Bougainville was critical to the support they eventually received in the National Executive Council and the National Parliament.

The Bills to amend the Papua New Guinean Constitution and make the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville were passed with much greater support than the two-thirds absolute majority required, with no votes against, and only a single amendment – for the national government to retain legal control over firearms. The Papua New Guinean Constitution, [Part XIV] and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville – Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum highlight the point that these arrangements were not intended to be a new form or gradation of provincial government available for further application in Papua New Guinea, as provided in the Constitution [s.187G]. The new constitutional laws are purpose and situation specific arrangements made for the sake of peace.

Inevitably, there have been people who have speculated about the relevance and application of the agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy in other parts of the country. Some participants in the negotiations had their eyes on other provinces, and saw the arrangements as a model or precedent. However, Bougainvillean leaders have frequently stated that Bougainvilleans did not experience and suffer the conflict in order to open the way forward for people in other parts of Papua New Guinea, as they believe was the case when the provincial government system was first proposed before, and subsequently established soon after Papua New Guinea became independent.

The East New Britain Provincial Government has been most active, having set up a high-level committee in 2002 to explore options for autonomy in East New Britain (the chairman was the MP for Pomio, Hon. Paul Tientsen, one of the two deputies was Sir Paulias Matane, now Governor-General, and other signatories of the committee’s report (Community Consultative Committee on Provincial Autonomy 2004) included all Members of Parliament from East New Britain. The initiative was partly motivated by perceived shortcomings in the system established under the provincial government 'reform' in 1995, as well as greater autonomy. Having received no clear response from the national government to the report, the East New Britain Provincial Government took a number of initiatives in 2006 to advance the proposal, by further promoting public discussion, and preparing a draft constitution.

The Governor of Morobe, Hon. Luther Wenge, has also spoken out for greater provincial autonomy. This is not a new theme in Papua New Guinean politics. It has been around for more than 30 years, since before independence. However, it is not clear what is meant or implied when some of Governor Wenge's supporters state that they belong to the 'Republic of Morobe'. In July 2006, the Morobe Provincial Government established a high-level committee to prepare detailed proposals, consistent with the Papua New Guinean Constitution, before the 2007 National General Elections.
The provincial budget for 2007 has allocated funds for a special committee to work on the proposal. The Governor of Morobe has also spoken of the need for Lae to be given autonomous status, although, in this context, the term presumably refers to increasing the powers, functions, and perhaps, control over resources to be exercised by the city authorities, and not according to Lae the same status as the Morobe Province (Post-Courier, 29 December 2006: 4).

The West New Britain Provincial Government has also been reported as being interested in greater autonomy (Post-Courier, 5 July 2006:4).

In the National Capital District, leaders of the area’s traditional inhabitants have called for the creation of a separate government in order to give the Motu-Koitabu people ‘autonomy’ (The National, 20 November 2006: 8).

Like the people in other parts of the country who have been pressing for the creation of new Hela and Jiwaka provinces out of the Southern Highlands and Western Highlands Provinces, respectively, they obviously see a separate government of their own as a source of greater control and access to resources for their communities, even within existing arrangements for decentralisation (Post-Courier, 9 November 2006: 7).

The East New Britain committee saw itself as charged to:

take the issue of provincial autonomy to the people and get their agreement to seek greater provincial autonomy for East New Britain (Community Consultative Committee on Provincial Autonomy 2004:8).

Members saw their report as providing the basis for negotiation with, and decision by, the national government. It is not intended to be a set of final demands.

The East New Britain report calls for the province to have its own constitution — a feature which is currently unique to the ABG, but which applied to every provincial government in Papua New Guinea before the 1995 ‘reform’. The legislative and executive structures that have been proposed are similar to those which currently apply to provincial governments in Papua New Guinea (consisting mainly of Members of Parliament and presidents of local-level governments in the provinces), but not the ABG. The innovation features of the proposal are to be found elsewhere.

The East New Britain proposals are concerned primarily with taxation and other revenue arrangements, and control over the public service. Although some of the language employed in the East New Britain report refers to the Bougainville Peace Agreement, it does not refer to those Bougainville arrangements which might be regarded as specifically relevant to the post-conflict situation, such as the special provisions contained in the Bougainville Peace Agreement regarding the police and the defence force as a result of experiences and perceptions during the Bougainville conflict. The reports focus on greater provincial control over sources of revenue, the budget, and the public service.

If every province had the control over their sources of taxes and revenues that East New Britain proposes, together with continuing, large national government grants, it is difficult to see how economic development could be planned, or services provided, on a
national basis, or what resources would be left to meet the costs of the national
government, let alone the range of grants that are sought. Interestingly, the proposals
recognise the need for the province to continue making what the Community
Consultative Committee on Provincial Autonomy (2004: 16) terms ‘a fair contribution
to the national government purse, in accordance with a revenue sharing formula’.
Establishing and operating a separate public service at the provincial level would
possibly weaken the capacity and cohesion of public administration at the national level
and nationwide.

These recommendations and reservations highlight the ongoing effects of some of
the basic, pervasive features of the provincial government system since independence,
both before and since the ‘reform’ — particularly, dependence on national government
funds and administrative resources, including foreign aid and technical assistance. The
social, political, and economic costs of collecting local government taxes were some of
the reasons for changing the system in which local government councils previously
relied heavily on locally-raised head taxes. The issue was especially contentious in East
New Britain’s Gazelle Peninsula. Another important reason was the reality that national
government revenues, including foreign aid, were widely perceived as providing a
sound fiscal basis for change.

Having a separate public service in every province would be costly, with increased
overheads, and possibly a separate Public Service Commission in each province.
However, a possible advantage would be increased responsiveness to local
circumstances.

It is in relation to these issues, in particular, that Bougainville should not be seen as
a model or precedent to be followed in other parts of Papua New Guinea, without
careful consideration, and possible modification.

As previously stressed, the national government did not intend that the agreed
arrangements for Bougainville autonomy would open the way for other provinces, as
the Constitution [Part XIV] and the Organic Law both show. Moreover, Bougainville’s
political leaders have been adamant that they do not wish to see a repeat of the pre-
independence situation, where the Bougainville Interim District Government and
pressures for provincial government in Bougainville led the way for the rest of the
country. There was no obvious benefit for Bougainville, and the outcome in which the
‘one size fits all’ approach was adopted, meant that other provincial governments
sometimes acquired powers and functions they did not need, want, or handle very well,
while Bougainville was held to a uniform standard.
CONCLUSION

The agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy were prepared through a complex set of multi-dimensional and multi-layered negotiations in a post-conflict situation, where the main shared objective was to secure lasting peace by peaceful means. The compromises that were made on many aspects of the agreed arrangements form part of a package in which the different elements are linked in a variety of ways.

Autonomy is not a clearly defined concept (Dinstein 1981; Hannum 1990; Lapidoth 1997:5). There are many different kinds of autonomy arrangements around the world:

- those which involve the devolution or acceptance of substantial authority under the control of institutions responsible for the government of the people, and the area encompassed by the autonomous entity ("political autonomies"); and
- those where the issue is primarily cultural and/or linguistic identity ("linguistic or cultural autonomies").

With its origins in the Greek term for ‘self-government’, ‘autonomy’ is also used as a way of describing or measuring the relative power or control over public affairs of subnational authorities. The term is used in this general way in the pre-independence Constitutional Planning Committee’s Final Report 1974, Part 1:10/9.

However, a seldom mentioned feature of many political autonomies is that they are often ad hoc, one-off arrangements. Consequently, it is not really accurate to describe Australia or the United States of America as federations. There is Norfolk Island and the Northern Territory in the first case, the Commonwealths of the Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico in the second case, and the national capital territories — the Australian Capital Territory and the District of Columbia. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and New Zealand are not really unitary states, when the Channel Islands in the first case, and Cook Islands and Niue in the second case are taken into account. And so on around the world.

In this regard, the essence — and truly innovative aspect — of Bougainville autonomy lies in the current successful compromise it represents as a means of providing an agreed arrangement to make and build peace by peaceful means, and recognising that ‘one size does not always fit all’. Realities in Papua New Guinea may require a certain measure of asymmetry, which is evident in other ways. However, Bougainville is a ‘one off’ arrangement for the sake of peace.

The Papua New Guinean Constitution, the Bougainville Peace Agreement, and the Bougainville Constitution are all ‘home-grown’; that is, made in Papua New Guinea, by Papua New Guineans, to suit Papua New Guinean conditions. It may, therefore, be appropriate to reflect on the origins of the provincial government system, before independence.

The issue then was not just service delivery, or responsiveness to local circumstances although this was clearly relevant, but conflict prevention and resolution. Actions were directed towards addressing pressures in East New Britain and Bougainville, in particular, without yielding to the threats that growing regional identity in Papua and the Highlands were widely believed to pose to a united Papua New
Guinea, while using existing administrative arrangements as the infrastructure for the new, decentralised arrangements (Papua New Guinea 1974: Part 1, Chapter 10).

Thus does an arrangement agreed as part of a package of measures to transform violent into political conflict cast light on the origins, and raise interesting new questions for the future, of the provincial government system and other aspects of decentralisation in Papua New Guinea, and the role that governmental arrangements can play in promoting good governance and peace.

In doing so, it may well be that it is not simply the system of government which has significant implications for national governance. Rather, it may be the ways in which power is just as influential in other parts of the country, which does not only apply to errors of judgment or mistakes. It is also not hard to imagine leaders, officials, and communities in other parts of Papua New Guinea being inspired by such positive innovations as the ‘bottom-up’ approach, which the ABG used — consulting leaders from Councils of Elders, and officials from the Districts — when preparing its budget for 2007.
REFERENCES


References


Stedman, J. S., 2000. ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’, in Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, International Conflict Resolution...


