Appropriate organization: development demands on organizational design in integrated rural development projects

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Michael A.H.B. Walter

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFTSEMU</td>
<td>Agricultural Field Trials, Studies, Extension and Monitoring Unit (Southern Highlands)</td>
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<td>APPI</td>
<td>Area Planning and Project Implementation (National Planning Office)</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>Budget Priorities Committee</td>
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<td>CUSO</td>
<td>Canadian University Services Overseas</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>DOSD</td>
<td>Division of Organization and Staff Development (Enga)</td>
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<td>DPI</td>
<td>Department of Primary Industry</td>
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<td>EPDP</td>
<td>Enga Provincial Development Program</td>
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<td>ESRDP</td>
<td>East Sepik Rural Development Project</td>
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<td>FASFS</td>
<td>First Assistant Secretary for Field Services (Enga)</td>
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<td>FASPP</td>
<td>First Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning (Enga)</td>
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<td>FASPPS</td>
<td>First Assistant Secretary for Policy, Planning and Advisory Services (Southern Highlands)</td>
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<td>HQPCC</td>
<td>Headquarters Project Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>HQPM</td>
<td>Headquarters Project Manager</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (World Bank)</td>
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<td>IRDP</td>
<td>Integrated Rural Development Project</td>
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<td>LDWAG</td>
<td>Less Developed Areas Working Group (National Planning Office)</td>
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<td>LGC</td>
<td>Local Government Council</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Council</td>
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<td>NPEP</td>
<td>National Public Expenditure Plan</td>
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<td>NPO</td>
<td>National Planning Office</td>
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<td>OPC</td>
<td>Office of Project Co-ordination (Department of Finance)</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Project Co-ordinator</td>
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<td>PCHQ</td>
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<td>PMC</td>
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<td>Provincial Management Team</td>
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<td>PNG</td>
<td>Iapua New Guinea</td>
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<td>Provincial Project Co-ordinator</td>
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<td>PPCC</td>
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<td>PPFC</td>
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<td>PPM</td>
<td>Provincial Project Manager</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
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<td>SHDC</td>
<td>Southern Highlands Development Corporation (Holdings), Pty. Ltd.</td>
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<td>SHMA</td>
<td>Southern Highlands Management Authority</td>
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<td>SHRDP</td>
<td>Southern Highlands Rural Development Project</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>Secretary Staff Committee (Enga)</td>
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<td>BVO</td>
<td>British Volunteers Overseas</td>
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<td>W AND S</td>
<td>Department of Works and Supply</td>
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We should like to stress that many persons have been extremely helpful to us in our gathering of information and ideas, persons who have interrupted their own routines and given us valuable time for interviews and guided tours. Naturally we feel our position keenly in making the critical appraisal that follows. Without exception the officers we have met, national and expatriate, have been dedicated, hard-working and sincere individuals. It is very important to us that, if the entire purpose of the exercise if not to be lost, these persons do not take offence at what we write but evaluate it objectively. Personal reasons also dictate our hope that we do not alienate those who have been our hosts, for in our travelling we have been afforded considerable hospitality.

Luis Quiros
Michael A.H.B. Walter

1 December 1981
INTRODUCTION

The physical inputs of development projects, even when they are well-researched, carry no assurance of spontaneously germinating the appropriate mechanisms and attitudes in government for ministering development. Development spawns bureaucracy and developing countries have overdeveloped bureaucracies. Unfortunately the convention-bound, hierarchy-conscious administrative system that typifies Third World bureaucracy, an effect of late colonial heritage and of western education induced elitism, is about the most unsuitable vehicle desirable for the promotion of development.

The major plea of this paper is for the organizational design of integrated rural development projects (IRDPs) and programmes to be regarded not as a blueprint for development procedure, but as a contribution essential to the process of development. The organizational design, in other words, should itself be a genuinely integral component of its own programme. Its objective is to provide administrative organization and attitudes pertinent to the demands of development in the target society.

Before proceeding further we should like to make clear our use of the label 'integrated rural development project'. 'Integrated', as one of us has noted elsewhere (Walter 1981), although initially a modish term, is threatening to become an outdated one. Its original and major referent was to the insight that economic changes have social impacts and hence the need exists to institute and co-ordinate social and economic goals within a development project. A subsequent additional or alternative referent has been the idea of integrated administration of different components of a project, something possibly assumed to have been included in the first referent originally, but through experience to have proved not necessarily so. Like many others, we could stress the importance of both referents, and while the second is more pertinent to our discussion here, the first is fundamental to all but the most economic deterministic concepts of development. However,

* We thank Mel Jones of the National Planning Office and Mark Turner of the PNG Administrative College for their most helpful comments on a draft of this paper.
our present use of 'integrated rural development project' is simply as a convenience to describe large-scale multi-component rural development projects which have both explicit economic and explicit social goals. The essence of the convenience is the generally accepted acronym 'IRDPP'. We hope that it is therefore clear that we have no argument with those who resolutely eschew the descriptive 'integrated'. Still, we would add that those favouring 'rural development programme' in preference to 'integrated rural development project' are arguing about the functions of projects, not the meaning of integrated.

To return to the theme of organizational design of IRDPs: we have found little material in the general literature that deals with its problems, and even less material that we can envisage being read by busy but thinking officiali in projects and in governments, national or provincial. We imagine international agency officials do read more, but agency missions are frequently so effective in alienating all sections of the societies they visit that the major source of influence agencies have is the vicarious one of conferences.

One publication we found interesting and pertinent was a report prepared for the World Bank by William E. Smith of the University of Pennsylvania, "The design of organizations for rural development projects - a progress report". The fact that the latter is labelled World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 375 is some indication of the belatedness with which even that resource-full body has acknowledged the problem. We particularly warmed to Professor Smith because, like us, he starts from the premise that the faulty design of project organization is not solely a matter of the structure within -- the internal rationale of the organization -- but that it also lies outside in the relation of the project organization to its environment, that is the external conditions in which the organization exists.

Our argument in brief is that one reason for IRDPs to fall short of expected achievements is bad organizational design. Where a design seeks to provide local autonomy, projects tend to become ends in themselves. Autonomy fosters rather than diminishes institutional and attitudinal blockages to the operational flexibility that the administration of development requires. Organization has to be designed to accommodate environment.
Our procedure is to discuss the concept of environment and characterize the environment of IRDFs in Papua New Guinea, and with this as a background then to examine those project organizations that exist or are projected. But first we will describe briefly the projects that provide the basis for our generalization.

Our resource material has been gathered from studies of five major projects -- at different stages of implementation -- in the provinces of Southern Highlands, East Sepik, Simbu, Milne Bay and Enga, but this is supplemented by information on projects being planned for Manus and Saunaun (West Sepik) provinces.

PROJECT SUMMARIES

East Sepik

An Asian Development Bank (ADB) mission proposed a project for the area in December 1974. A European firm of consultants was then contracted to make a feasibility study and paid a two-month field visit in 1976. This report to the ADB was followed by an ADB 'appraisal mission'. The project's six-year loan agreement was signed in January 1977. However, project spending did not start until July 1977. Project cost was budgetted at $US10 million, of which $7.2 million was funded by the ADB through a low interest loan and the remaining $2.8 million being met by the national government.

The components of the project are:

Gaviem Land Settlement Scheme
Buffalo farming
Inland fisheries
Crop intensification
Agricultural research
Agriculture and nutrition education facility in schools
An agricultural college

All of the income earning sub-projects existed prior to the ADB arrival in 1974; the consultants' proposal was to inject additional

1 Details are taken from I. J. Cairns (1980: 1-6)
capital and management and technical expertise to accelerate their development.

The project cannot in any way be classed as an 'integrated' project since, in the first place, the social and economic components were not designed to interlock. All the components have remained quite discrete. From inception, the project has been under the supervision of the Department of Primary Industry (DPI), whose Secretary chairs the Project Management Committee.

The Project suffered severe and successive setbacks in its three major cash-earning components. The Gavien scheme was affected by inadequate planning for the needs of settlers. The progress of the buffalo farming was abruptly halted with the discovery of tuberculosis in imported beasts, and the rapid expansion of the weed *Salvinia molesta* curtailed fishing and transportation on the Sepik river. While the project is now making some headway against its troubles, the great concern of the East Sepik politicians and officers is the source of funds to meet recurrent costs once the project is 'completed' at the end of December 1983.

Southern Highlands

Conception of this project in fact predates that of the East Sepik. It was originally an offshoot of the World Bank Highlands Highway Project. Plans for a project were initiated by a group of resident expatriate agricultural officers and as early as 1974 finance was sought for road construction. With the involvement of the local expatriate health officer, project proposals embraced nutritional, educational, and research considerations and became more closely identified with the World Bank's characterization of 'integrated'. Bank visits were made in 1975 and early 1976 and an appraisal of the project was made in early 1977. The credit agreement between the national government and the World Bank (or rather its lending arm, the International Development Authority, IDA) was signed in 1978. The World Bank covered 64 per cent of the US$30 million project cost with a soft loan and the national government is meeting the balance.

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1 Based on World Bank (1977: 13-14).
In general terms the project was 'aimed at helping to achieve the government's objectives of a more equitable interregional distribution of income, improved regional distribution of social services, satisfaction of basic needs, national integration, and increased percentage of the population in the monetary economy'. More specifically, the project aimed at making the province less dependent on national government hand-outs by establishing provincially owned 'estates', by improving the health of the population through education, by enhanced delivery of social services and improved land use, and by establishing the basis of a road network to open the western region of the province and extend the cash economy.

The major components of the project are:

Agricultural field trials, studies, extension and monitoring unit (AFTSEMU)
Media unit
Health training
Data collection and epidemiology
Health sub-centres
Non-formal education
Formal education
Cash-crop development
Electrification
Roads
Project management

The Southern Highlands project is clearly a much more ambitious development effort than that of East Sepik. It is larger (treble the cost), more elaborate (eleven components) and more structured (an overall project strategy aims at interrelating the impacts of the different components).

Like that of the East Sepik, the Southern Highlands project was negotiated and co-ordinated through the Office of Project Co-ordination in the Department of Finance. However, the initiative in project preparation came from the province and no foreign consultant (apart from the usual agency appraisal missions) was called in. Though the World Bank originally wished for consultants to be recruited and had to be dissuaded by the Southern Highlands officers, it eventually
asserted that this local initiative should be regarded as 'an important feature of project design and should greatly increase the likelihood of successfully implementing this project' (ibid.: 1).

Despite an urgency expressed in persuading the World Bank to produce its project appraisal report one year earlier, a major criticism of the project to date is its slowness to recruit the team of experts upon which the task of integration of inputs largely rests. The five-year life of project funding according to the credit agreement closes at the end of 1983 and AFTSEMU has yet to be fully established. As of April 1981 the monitoring and evaluation and the extension and training officers had not been recruited, nor had the mass media unit been put into operation (except that non-formal education officers have taken over some of the unit's functions).

Simbu

In 1977 the National Planning Committee created the Less Developed Areas Working Group (LDAWG) to plan development for backward regions, and though the LDAWGs were not as effectual as intended, the Simbu development project originated with them. In 1978 the National Planning Office (NPO) assumed from the Department of Finance the responsibility for setting up rural development projects in identified backward areas and Simbu was its first exercise.

The Simbu development project was written into the loan for the Highlands Highway, Simbu-Enge Section. A team of European consultants was brought in to draw up a project proposal for World Bank appraisal. However, its report was rejected by the provincial leadership which demanded a more emphatic orientation to industrial as opposed to rural development and proceeded to present its own report. In a subsequent rapprochement NPO sent one of its officers, an economist, to Kundiawa, the provincial capital, to rewrite the consultants' report in cooperation with the Simbu authorities. From a series of interviews in Moresby and Kundiawa we gathered a compromise satisfactory to both sides was then in process of being reached, with several of the industrial components proposed by the province included, though on a less grandiose scale than originally envisaged.

1 Or Chimbu.
This second report was subject to further revision of the industrial components as a result of political and administrative changes in the provincial government in the last quarter of 1980. These revisions entail another rewriting of the project by another group of consultants and NPO hopes this submission will be ready for the World Bank in 1983. But no decision on this matter has yet been made. The province would first have to sort out its political and financial problems and then ensure the commitment of political authorities and administration to the project's objectives and their implementation. While the Simbu premier and provincial secretaries would like to go ahead, the national government still has reservations about the project's viability. Moreover, it is also apparent that the provincial executing agencies are resisting involvement because of present provincial political uncertainties. The original gross estimate of a K50 million project over a ten-year period is no longer feasible. Should the project go ahead with the World Bank support the government would implement it in discrete four-year packages. No package would be likely to exceed K10 million.

Enga

The NPO was quick to learn from its initial experience with the Simbu project and has been much more circumspect in its arrangements for subsequent projects.

For Enga a provincial co-ordinator (an Engan) was appointed by NPO. He was associated with the local DPI senior area economist in identifying a list of possible subprojects from which a formal project proposal could be drawn (PNG 1979). Particular attention was paid to enlisting local provincial participation in this exercise and external foreign consultants were avoided except for the components on road construction, small hydro schemes, and forestry. The result of these efforts was the Enga Provincial Development Programme, Enga Yaaka Lasemana (1980), a broad-based plan of provincial social and economic development. It was not an 'integrated' project proposal in the style of the Southern Highlands, but one that was integrated into the on-going activities of the province, complementing them and establishing the means for effective provincial administration.

The major components of the original proposal were subdivided into 50 specific subcomponents with an estimated cost of K20,028,000 for a period of seven years starting in 1982. However, an internal NPEP
appraisal and the external appraisal conducted by the World Bank mission in March 1981 led to a drastic revision of the Enga submission. Its outcome was the formulation of a two-phase project, each phase comprising a four-year period. For the first phase a ceiling of K2 million per annum was agreed upon by NPO and the World Bank. One important reason for this change was that the Enga Provincial Development Programme represented a significant change in the allocation of responsibilities for management. Before the arrival of its mission, the World Bank requested detailed information from the national agencies and the province regarding technical aspects, existing policy resources, and preparations leading to project start in 1982. It was on that basis that the components and their priorities were redefined for the four-year period and the total amount was reduced to K7.852 million. The components are the following:

- Provincial staff development
- Agriculture: food crop production and subsistence systems
- Infrastructure: roads, land development, micro-hydros and town development
- Commercial assistance and training
- Education: schools and pre-school programs in Enga language
- Health
- Technical assistance
- Project management

After the arrival of the World Bank mission the Enga provincial government restructured its administration in accordance with the project. The Enga co-ordinator of the study was appointed as First Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning, on whom project coordination was going to depend. But as a result of the mission's visit the co-ordinator was to be placed under the First Assistant Secretary for Field Services, who is in charge of directing and supervising the provincial divisions to be involved in the project.

The Enga project has great relevance for other highlands provinces that may undertake their own development programmes -- especially Simbu -- because of the negative impact of law and order problems and tribal warfare on the viability of programmes. These factors have been recognized in the study (vol. 2:6. 25-26, 28) primarily in terms of their effects on the limited capacity of the public service to
perform its functions because of difficulties of recruitment of staff and problems of morale. However, the project may solve such problems to the extent that it can ensure continuity and efficiency in the provision of services and the improvement of social and economic opportunities in the province. It is for this reason the development of the capabilities of the Enga provincial government has been given a high priority.

Manus

The initiative for drawing up a project proposal came locally from an expatriate officer in 1979, though a preliminary survey of Manus resources and development potential had already been made some years before (Mundrau 1976). A province-endorsed documented proposal for a project research and identification study was submitted to NPO for approval. This proposal had several unique (for Papua New Guinea) features. It did not incorporate any assumption that an international agency would be approached for funding. While employing the term 'integrated', the primary referent intended was the planning and implementation rather than the impact of the project. It called for the recruitment of a project team of six volunteer 'experts' who would be paid at national salary levels and attached directly to appropriate provincial divisions for a period of 15 months. This team would be responsible for presenting for debate a provisional provincial development plan to the provincial assembly.

Projected expenditure for the proposed development study over the period 1980-1981 was K155,000, to be shared by the national and the provincial government.

The study proposal impressed the NPO and was submitted to and passed by the National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP) largely unchanged.

The project team has now been in the field for over six months. Since they all came through the offices of Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO), four of the team are Canadian, the fifth is a naturalised Papua New Guinean now resident in Canada and the sixth is a Papua New Guinean. They were first given orientation and familiarization tours before starting their research proper. The
study document emphasizes the expectation that the experts would spend as much of their time as possible in the villages. The issues raised by the team members are presently being discussed by them with the villagers. The study report was originally intended to be completed by July 1981. However, the planning team had set themselves the goal of a dual report, one on development strategies, the other on project identification. Preoccupation with the former has seriously delayed the latter, certainly until the end of 1981.

The study has had its problems. A lack of effective communication between planners on the one hand and politicians and bureaucrats on the other has prevented the integration of their activities in a manner that could lead to a coherent elaboration of the project. Even though bureaucrats and political leaders are receptive to the idea of development embodied in the project initiative, some of their decisions — for example, construction of roads and bridges — have not been integrated with the project's goals and objectives.

West Sepik (Sandaun)

The NPO was so impressed by the original Manus study that the document was taken to Vanimo and suggested as a blueprint for a West Sepik development study. The West Sepik authorities agreed to follow the plan outline to a large extent. However, some differences existed. The idea of six volunteers was regarded as excessive and experienced consultants were preferred to volunteers. Further, three project components (not simply component areas) were specified by NPO to be studied: a provincial planning system, the inclusion of the plans of the Border Development Program (presently administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the provincial project), and the Vanimo Timber Rights Lease. The latter appears to be an established component — identified by the Office of Forests — since tenders have already been called for (and indeed a decision has now been made). The main objective of appraisal is the different ways in which deforested areas might be developed.

The three experts recruited are an economist, a social planner and a tropical agriculturalist. The study was originally planned for three years but has been reduced to two, with the main purposes of research and planning. As with the Manus study, project budgetting
is included for short consultancies by officers seconded from national departments. Currently the team is engaged in generating the basic data for the study (maps, census and land use data).

**Milne Bay**

The approach to production of a project document in Milne Bay has similarities with those for Manus and Enga. The province has avoided the use of outside consultants for project identification; it has set up its own planning unit with a fairly complex organization to research, collect data, identify projects and discuss priorities. Key officers in this organization are a study co-ordinator and the NPO regional planning adviser for the Papuan region.

The preparation phase is reaching completion with the project identification and drafting of the project documents. An introduction to the study, containing basic information on the province relevant to the development plan, was published in draft form in December 1980 for completion in March 1981 (Milne Bay Development Study 1980).

The project document is scheduled to be ready for submission to NPO by the same date. The Asian Development Bank, which seems to have always been associated with the idea of a Milne Bay development project (though provincial authorities had still been ignorant of this at April 1980), was sending a 'fact-finding mission' to the area in June 1981, but with the project documents not ready a country mission only arrived.

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A very rapid change in the approach to rural development through large-scale multi-component projects is evident in the above summaries and we think Papua New Guinean planners at provincial and national levels deserve a very hearty congratulation for adopting so empirical an approach. We are especially impressed by the clear evidence that the concept of 'integrated' has acquired more and more connotations of integrated administration as well as integrated impact.

Provincial authorities have shown that they are growing increasingly sophisticated and are no longer to be seduced by the neat agency package panacea of large-scale aid and small-time experts. The failures of the East Sepik project, the expatriate image of the Southern Highlands, and above all the revolt of the Simbu authorities
against 'their' foreign consultants have all spelled out lessons to the provinces: they are in the best position to find out their own needs, present and future; they must be in a position to control the planning to cater for these needs; they must secure from the start the involvement and commitment of provincial personnel in the programme of development. It is sweet music, indeed for us when we visit 'backward' provinces like Milne Bay and Manus to hear local officials assert that needs have a greater priority than aid - they are prepared to abandon prospects of agency aid if to do so means their own carefully determined development programme will not be obstructed. The old adage about riches bringing troubles has never had so much application than in the disastrous consequences of ill-considered inputs of large amounts of cash into a countryside.

The learning from experience has not all been on one side. The NPO, which has taken over the role of negotiating and establishing these development projects, has shown itself flexible and adaptable. It quickly recovered from the Simbu debacle, made a positive and constructive response, and carried over the lessons it learned to its negotiations with other needy provinces. Whether the international agencies are also learning from these experiences presumably depends on how fast and effective the feedback flow of information is, and how institutionalized is the response.

We stress again the importance and, indeed, for Papua New Guinea's future, the fortune of insights and flexibility that have been shown at provincial and national levels. And we think they bode well for dealing with the considerable problems of project organization environment we will now raise.

We should like to make clear that many, probably most, of the problem areas we intend to deal with in an upcoming section are not being presented as 'significant discoveries'. We expect most of our readers, certainly in the ranks of provincial and national bureaucracies, will be able to remark at times 'well we all know about that problem'. Our intent is to publicize many of these commonplace problems, bring them into sharp relief, analyze them for their significance for the operation of a project organization and, by interrelating them, provide a source for ideas that can help alleviate them. Notice we
appear shy of offering solutions as such. We will certainly make some proposals, but we truly believe that a first task, the one we seek to accomplish, is to bring into the open many problems of which there is only an individual consciousness, and whose interrelation and full consequence are commonly not perceived at all.

THE CONCEPT OF PROJECT ENVIRONMENT

A project organization does not function in a vacuum. No matter how perfected a structural-functional model it may represent, it is subjected to outside influences. We refer to these influences as environment. They can be broadly divided into two categories, general and immediate.

The general environment comprises those institutions whose activities affect the performance of the project organization, but over which the latter has no capacity to control or influence directly or indirectly. Institutions and procedures of national government, government policies, social structure, cultural factors and the level of technological development are among the factors that shape this broader environment. In Papua New Guinea the essential background of development consists of a highly pluralist society, the predominance of subsistence agriculture, regional and intra-regional differences in development levels, and foreign economic dependence. Against this background two factors loom large in the general environment of projects: the role of the state as the main agent of development and the on-going process of decentralization, political and administrative.

Since independence the state in Papua New Guinea has assumed a greater role in the direction and control of the country's development process. This role extends to the economic and social life of the nation stemming not only from the volume of resources at its disposal, but also from a wide range of regulatory powers, provision of services and direct involvement in major productive ventures, mainly in mining and agriculture. One consequence has been the expansion of the number of institutions implementing policies -- nineteen line departments plus dependent agencies, and statutory bodies. But, at the same time, the enlargement of the bureaucracy has resulted in the fragmentation and the overlapping of functions among agencies, with the obvious problems of control and coordination over the process of policy
formulation and implementation.

The second factor, the process of decentralization, has effected a drastic change in the general environment of projects. Since decentralization was planned to be implemented in stages, this has meant a continuous process of changing requirements for public institutions to adapt to the outcomes of policy. Decentralization has had a multi-pronged impact upon the organizations of integrated rural development projects:

(1) The creation of nineteen provincial governments has redistributed political power. Hence, it has given them the capacity to redesign developmental goals from their own perspectives and generated demands for greater participation in their implementation.

(2) However, the gradual nature of the process has implied partial devolution of administrative powers and functions. This limits the province's implementation capacity because the national government still maintains a high degree of control over resources and policy.

(3) Decentralization has resulted in greater pressures on the country's limited economic and human resources necessary to carry out the institutionalization of provincial governments, their day-to-day administration, and development programmes. However, it has not decreased the differences in capacities between the provinces. Indeed, if anything, these have increased.

The major impact of decentralization on the general environment has been in creating conflict between national and provincial governments. While the powers of the central government remain strong enough to control the direction and implementation of projects, the conflict that such control can generate makes implementation of the project increasingly vulnerable to a hostile immediate environment. However, it has also made all parties sensible of the need to compromise and reach agreement on development strategies and objectives.

The immediate (task) environment is made up of the various institutions providing input to, or receiving output from, the project:
government agencies, political parties, interest groups (churches, associations etc.), regional-local banking and financial agencies, and the target population. In Papua New Guinea the prominent elements of immediate environment are the increasingly powerful and self-conscious provincial governments and administrations, and the awakening awareness of the villages (often fostered by returned university-educated youths) to "rights" of equitable distribution of benefits. The two are closely linked; for the presence (or promised presence) of an IRDP in a "backward" province is too huge for politicians, aspiring or arrived, to ignore.

Given the existence of these influences of the immediate environment, planners have before them three basic organizational options for securing the implementation of a project: they can seek to seal off the project as effectively as possible; they can establish project organization as the dominant authority of a region, if necessary by legislating its superiority; or they can co-ordinate project organization with its environmental influences to provide for a pattern of regulated functional relations. The latter is the direction followed in Papua New Guinea and it reflects the strategy that guides the planning.

The planners' intent behind integrated rural development projects in Papua New Guinea is to bring a province, usually an economically backward province, to a take-off point, to boost it toward the economic growth and social and educational changes that at the simplest level represent development. Essential to this design must be a gradual emergence of the specific project into a broader-based programme of change. This change, however, cannot be sustained beyond the life of the project simply by the latter's physical inputs and infrastructure. Such an accomplishment depends on a re-education of, on the one hand, local administrators and politicians, and on the other, of the local target population. This re-education process is what we have termed "development socialization", making people aware and appreciative of a new way of thinking, a new way of doing things — providing not only the image of a better standard of life but also the modes of thought and behaviour that can lead to it. To achieve this, the target population must be involved in the project. Not only must they be kept informed of aims, methods, progress and achievement, but they need to be conscious of participating in evaluation and decisions. Their
identification with the project will otherwise not come. But the administrators of planned development should also appreciate the 'view from below'. What may seem an eminently sensible development idea to the administrator may appear in an entirely different light to a villager aware of cultural constraints and, likely as not, experienced with past failed projects. As one of us has remarked elsewhere, there is need to mediate if not syncretize the little and great traditions of development (see Walter: forthcoming). The essential achievement of the IRDP can be won only by the project interrelating and ultimately merging with the immediate environment. The project's job is done when its structure disappears but its sentiment remains.

In the next section we examine more closely some of the "problem" areas in the immediate environment of IRDPs in Papua New Guinea.

PROBLEM AREAS

In depicting problem areas we purposely utilize a framework that brings into maximal relief the disruptive elements, actual and potential, in the environment that we seek to characterize. This does not mean that we think 'conflict' is necessarily the basis or most apparent quality of the relations we describe. Relations between the national and the particular provincial governments, for example, may in general be mutually appreciative and constructive; nevertheless a potential conflict is present and, together with the actual relations, helps form the project organization environment.

The problem areas we discuss below are not claimed to be an exhaustive list, but we believe that we cover the major areas.

Control of project planning at the centre

The Department of Finance played the major role in initiating the first IRDPs (in East Sepik and Southern Highlands). However, a new division of labour subsequently emerged. The NPO took over the appraisal and preparation stages, and the Office of Project Co-ordination in Finance administered the projects already established, though the monitoring role will be shared with NPO.

The diminution of the role of the Department of Finance evidently did not take place without challenge (scarcely surprising). However,
the relations between the two bureaucracies appear restored to a functional and co-operative relationship.*

The relationship between provincial and national governments

This is part of the general issue of decentralization. The wider concern is in fact the subject of separate research by one of us (Quirós) and we restrict our examination here to the relationship between the establishment of rural development projects and the provincial-national government relationship.

It is a law of the country that all international aid must be approved and channelled through the national government. A provincial government cannot independently contact and negotiate with an agency. This fits well with the agencies’ own policies. Thus the international treaty establishing the World Bank dictates that the Bank deal with only the national governments of member countries. A greater sense of responsibility — if only by virtue of greater experience and more plentiful expertise — is believed to reside at the centre.

Not only must international fundings be established through the national government, the actual funds also are subsequently administered (according to a project budgetary requirements) by the national government through the NPEP. Furthermore all manpower recruitment financed by a project on national government funds must be within the guidelines of the Public Service Commission (PSC) — which will, for example, dictate the level and salary of a post — and must be approved and arranged by that body. Foreign experts for project implementation are thus recruited to national departments, not to provincial divisions (although they may then be attached to the latter).

In practice the effect of the above constraints is that the national government (the actual agency concerned with setting up the project and the various departments involved) can endeavour to establish a project as a self-contained operation which can be undertaken more or less independently of the provincial authorities. Liaising and co-ordinating mechanisms would need to be included of course, but the necessity and pressure for making them effective would be an onus upon the province. The project, with its self-contained organization, would not be interrupted by lack of effectiveness in the co-ordination

* The November 1981 national budget has abolished the OPC and total supervision of projects will be assumed by NPO.
machinery, and management could carry on regardless. The province excluded from any control over funds, manpower and timetable, would have no chance of redressing its grievances through access to the funding agency. Not only would the front door be closed by agency policy, but the latter's structures on project identification ensure that for provincial personalities there would be no back-door approach by personal contact. In essence a project could be established and implemented as a self-sufficient operation and remain as such, an encapsulated exercise in the body provincial.

But would there be any attraction in such a mode of action for the national government? To tackle that question we need to refer to the process and progress of decentralization.

To understand the full range of political implications of development planning in Papua New Guinea it must be appreciated that decentralization was an instrument for the survival, and not the achievement, of unity. From the perspective of the nation-builders in Port Moresby (and undoubtedly Canberra) the provincial system was a necessary surrender to assuage separatist feelings in Bougainville and (to a lesser extent) the Gazelle Peninsula. However, there is no socializing element in Papua New Guinea society to counter the new, and more extensive, divisiveness initiated by the process of decentralization. Melting-pot pressures that typify plural, migrant societies do not exist, while the industrial and urban bases are insufficient to have fostered class interests. It is true that some writers perceive incipient class stratification on a national scale in rural society, but the consciousness of class is not present. There may be a similar identification of interests and woes in regions far apart, but this serves only to categorize types. It certainly has not promoted the group identity of class. Interest groups exist but they are not articulate at a national level.

Thus the figures on the national stage perceive their own atrophy in the increasing range of provincial government functions and the threatened shrinking of national government power to enact regulatory functions. The man who supervised the passage of the Organic Law, former Prime Minister Michael Somare, has himself lamented the haste in which it was proposed and accepted. And awareness of the redundancy
threat seems evident in measures to invest national members of parliament with roles in their respective provincial legislatures.

Apprehension of their declining relevance has effectively given ministers and departments a common cause for which to strive. However the degree to which particular departments are affected does vary. By the nature of their function, several departments are bound to retain a relatively larger, rather than smaller, national concern. The extremes here are departments such as Police, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Justice. At the other extreme, however, is the department that has been traditionally powerful in national affairs, the Department of Primary Industry. Like other Third World countries, Papua New Guinea entered the world of development by way of agriculture, which makes the concern of DPI central. But it is precisely because it is so central a concern that it suffers the heaviest attrition from decentralization. The provinces wanting to control their own destiny need to control their own development.

The other departments heavily involved in development planning are the NPO and the Finance Department. It was not surprising to hear from spokesmen in the Department of Decentralization that it was these three departments from which most 'trouble' and 'obstruction' (their description) came. Of course in terms of the traditional image of bureaucracies, Decentralization is an anomaly in that it is bent on hara-kiri (conspicuous self-destruction). The 'big three' on the other hand are the spearhead of the national government's determination to retain influence and relevance in the provinces -- and development is their tool. The provinces (politicians and bureaucracies) in turn strain fiercely at this control with different degrees of success. The richest province is the least susceptible to the control accompanying national planned and implemented development and consequently is the most autonomous. (One consequence of this is that altercations with national government are minimal. In the Post Courier Indexes for 1979 and 1978 -- see IASER, 1980, 1979 -- North Solomons Province is among the least newsworthy provinces.)

The point of this discussion of decentralization is not an assessment of Papua New Guinea's political future, and certainly not to sound any kind of warning. Decentralization is only a few years
old and patience is needed for a more stabilized situation in which relations between provincial and central authorities have become settled and conventionalized. But given the present context of project environment it is our purpose to indicate that, currently, considerable areas of antipathy, of a resentful nature on the provincial side and an apprehensive nature on the national side, exist between the governments. This is a fact of the environment and as such of impact on the course of a project. An objective appraisal of the dynamics of decentralization is thus essential for the planner.

What has materialized in actual instances of project identification and establishment? Examination of our project case-studies in chronological sequence reveals pronounced changes as national and provincial governments become aware of the implications large-scale projects have for their relationship. This awareness seems partly a function of experience and partly of the continuing process of decentralization (for instance the earlier projects were in provinces with provisional, not elected, governments).

The East Sepik and Southern Highlands governments played little if any role in the establishment of their projects, which have constituted in each case the major thrust of development in the province. The East Sepik government, with the end of the project (that is, the end of credits) in view, suddenly became aware of a detail called 'recurring costs'. It was galvanized into action, for it could no longer afford to allow the project to go its own way. The project was to be handed over precisely when credits could no longer be drawn. The provincial representatives at the subsequent project management committee (HQ) meeting were at least able to draw some bitter satisfaction from hearing the spokesmen of the Department of Finance and Primary Industry admit the matter had still to be resolved.

Of particular note is the rapidity with which problems surfacing in one project, such as recurring costs in the East Sepik, become stock considerations of provincial governments involved in the project process elsewhere. This, of course, is how it should be, but Papua New Guinea is fortunate that the process of transfer and dissemination of experience is so efficient in her case. All less developed provinces involved in contemplating projects are now quite explicit about the
dangers of living beyond the means that uncritical acceptance of large-scale capital works and social services can bring, and of avoiding expatriate domination of the management of their own integrated rural development project.

In the Southern Highlands project preparation, the province appeared to have considerably more participation than was the case in the East Sepik. Foreign consultants had not been brought in and local input was stressed as a significant innovation in project design. However, the significance of this local contribution changed with the onset of decentralization. The leading initiator became project co-ordinator (field) and was now identifiable with the centre, not the province. Theoretically he could have become a pivot for the co-ordination of national and provincial government interests, but this did not happen.

In one sense the Simbu case seemed an attempted reversion to the East Sepik prototype, though an improved model. A team of foreign consultants was brought in by the national government to prepare a project. However, the agency of the national government had changed. The Simbu project represented NPO's initial venture, and not surprisingly it marched the established road. The Simbu officials, however, well acquainted with the true significance of what lay under the tranquility of the East Sepik and Southern Highlands projects, after initial acquiescence subsequently reacted strongly against the NPO procedure. The list of projects that they put up against that submitted by the foreign consultants was inspired by what were, in effect, the provinces own foreign consultants, newly-arrived volunteers and expatriates recruited to the provincial strength.

The two-day meeting at NPO to discuss the consultants' reports (1979) produced some stormy scenes. A disastrous confrontation between national and provincial government loomed. It was an unprecedented situation in the short development project history of Papua New Guinea. Fortunately reason subsequently prevailed on both sides, permitting a general withdrawal from a position of some delicacy. Interestingly, in the compromise solution that followed, the inverse of the Southern Highlands sequence occurred. In the latter, the provincial initiator had become a national government man; in Simbu, the NPO officer who was sent to rewrite the Simbu project, having done so, as a personal
decision then changed his allegiance to the provincial government.

The awareness of the significance of provincial-national relations, shown from the beginning in the Simbu project preparation, was in marked contrast with the East Sepik and Southern Highlands projects. It ultimately boded well for co-operation over the project; in other words it promised a benevolent element for project environment. However, the project has been overtaken by local political developments and a law and order problem, so the situation is no longer clear. Nevertheless this in itself is no reason to suppose the co-operative climate for the project will hereby change.

The remaining project examples have all yet to reach completion of the project preparation stage, but already they have demonstrated that lessons taught by the first three projects have registered. Local and not simply provincial participation has been emphasized in the Enga approach and foreign consultants explicitly avoided. The identification of sub-projects has as its main objective not so much the preparation of a project document to be submitted for agency funding, but the provision to central government (NPO) of an informative record of the main development problems in the province (Project co-ordinator's personal communication). The project co-ordinator is an Engan.

Manus made quite explicit its acknowledgement of the importance of understanding and co-operation with the national government by holding a four-day seminar in Lorengau at which national department senior spokesmen gave talks describing their functions in relation to the provinces, and provincial spokesmen described the situation that existed in Manus and gave the views of the provincial government. This exchange of views, in formal and informal contexts, promises dividends later on.

Manus has decided to bring in outside 'volunteer' experts* to plan its five-year development programme, but as a provincially recruited team, attached to divisions, and to be resident for a year. The major initiator of a project concept as in the Southern Highlands is an expatriate civil servant. However the provincial government scene of

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* And one Manusian.
Manus in 1980 was considerably different to that of Southern Highlands in the mid-1970s. If this person became the project field co-ordinator (and no one has suggested that he should), he would be much more likely to play the pivotal role referred to.

West Sepik (now Sandaun) province has followed Manus to a large extent in endeavouring to lay solid foundations for a provincial-national government co-operation in its project. Its outside experts were hired for a period of two years, in considerable contrast with the few months spent by the Simbu experts. Originally a three-year period was intended, with the third year a transition between preparation and implementation stages. Since progress in project identification has been much slower than anticipated, the province may possibly revert to the original plan.

Milne Bay has followed Simbu in employing the NPO officer who had been assigned to help with project identification. This officer was recruited to the provincial government at the end of his national government contract. His continuing presence in Milne Bay should be helpful in ensuring that provincial-national relations are more conducive to the good running of the eventual project.

The rapidity of the learning process depicted above would have had little effect without a corresponding willingness to benefit from experience by the national government agency, the NPO. Once the implementation stage of a project is reached, Office of Project Co-ordination (Department of Finance) takes over as the major national government agency.* The implementation stage is more fraught with perils from provincial-national relations if simply because several departments, not a single agency, now become directly involved and, under present arrangements at any rate, will have a direct line to the imported experts in the field. This introduces the third problem area of project environment.

Project and province

The various adaptive measures taken by provinces in the project identification and preparation stages attest to the difficulties experienced in those provinces where projects are already at the

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* Not now, see footnote on page 17.
implementation stage — that is, the Southern Highlands and East Sepik. Many of the observations already made in the previous section have relevance here, for our area of discussion is the consequence of a project identity — the fact that someone can say 'that is project' is an indication that something else 'is not project'.

A project implanted by the national government in a province, with its own organization and management, its own personnel and hierarchy, separate financial existence and independent lines of access and communication to the central government, inevitably introduces a dichotomy, a we/them mentality. Attempts can be made to soften the impact, to blur lines of division — project officers may be seconded to provincial divisions, co-ordination apparatus may be set up with considerable ingenuity — but ultimately, if the project retains its autonomy in the province, the duality remains. When sectoral funds to provincial divisions are severely cut on the grounds that a province has already recovered its 'share' through project funding, project/provincial rivalry can grow fierce.

For the project the effects may not be serious. If it is self-sufficient, it can support itself and get on with implementing its components, and leave the provincial administration to work out its own way of co-existence. But here we find the crux of the matter: the project that exists for its own ephemeral sake is unlikely to exist for the sake of development. The alienating effect of its presence in this kind of situation will effectively be an obstacle to the developmental training of provincial staff; but more than this, it will actively serve to undermine the existing provincial administration.

We are repeating the point ad nauseam, but provincial government is still young. Provincial administration has not had the time to perfect a system, to rid itself of anomalies or at least relegate them to ineffectuality, to develop the system of conventions or habitualized actions (or rituals, if you like) which overcome the inconsistencies, contradictions and antagonisms that lurk within an operative organization. The presence of a separate, autonomous organization in the province in these circumstance is assuredly going to undermine the authority of the provincial administration. Ignorance of what is going on in the province will create difficulties for provincial officials
in the dealings with their own politicians. High officials frequently will be placed in positions in which they can lose face and their efficiency will be affected. Lower-level officials are likely to develop divided loyalties and indulge in playing off superiors. Project appointments may be seen as threats to existing provincial positions, and project activities as encroachments on and diminution of provincial divisional powers.

Two projects so far, East Sepik and Southern Highlands, are in the implementation stage. They have both introduced in marked manner the project/province dichotomy we have been discussing. That their effects have not been more deleterious than they might have been must be regarded a consequence of the early start of the projects as far as the emergence of provincial government was concerned. The preparation of both projects preceded decentralization. Thus, agricultural components were established before provincial division of rural development came into existence. This clearly blunted early provincial resentments. Nevertheless these resentments were slowly tempered. Less so in East Sepik where, with the end of the project in sight, with elected government attained, and with the matter of recurrent expenses placed firmly in front of the central government, prevailing attitudes appear to favour leaving the project alone to run its course. The resentments and impact of the project's presence in the Southern Highlands are more pronounced because implementation of the project started later, when provincial administration had already had time to entrench, and because the project is much bigger in scope and intended impact.

The Southern Highlands people have recently (1980) elected their provincial government representatives and a premier for the first time. However, whether this will result in a provincial/national rethink about the status of the project and the manner of its organization probably will not be known for some time because of the unexpected death of the newly elected premier and the indecision and confusion that ensued before a new premier was chosen.¹

¹ The first premier had been elected by popular vote. The provincial constitution was subsequently amended and his successor was elected by the provincial assembly.
The dichotomy of project and province in East Sepik and Southern Highlands has been more readily apparent by the superimposition of another polarization which we discuss below.

National and expatriate

Although the advent of provincial government was seen by some observers at the time as threatening a brain drain on national government, this has not occurred. Expertise, and especially planning expertise, is spread very thinly indeed in the provinces. The provincial planner is the second or third (according to whether there is an assistant secretary) senior post in provincial secretariat, but it is not rare to meet a planner who appears to have little idea of what he should be doing (just as it is not rare to meet finance officers who are unable to comprehend the technicalities and complexities of putting a provincial budget together). In some cases, an awareness of planning's need for base-line data has led to collection of data at considerable labour cost, but also at the risk of data gathering for its own sake.

A major consequence of the present situation is that the provinces are heavily reliant upon an input from expatriates - resident and visitor (consultant). This is not an outcome to decry as such. Clearly skills have to be provided and skills have to be learned, and though Papua New Guineans frequently show impatience with their continuing reliance upon the foreigner, for the most part they readily acknowledge the necessity of learning from him. However, there are corollaries to the expatriate presence that are not at all healthy in their implications for the training of nationals.

Expatriate workers (other than visiting consultants) are usually recruited on (or converted to) three-year contracts which may or may not be renewed. A specific objective of their recruitment is the provision of training for the eventual localization of their own position. In other words, the expatriate is required to engineer his own redundancy. Unfortunately this situation provides small guarantee that training will have the top priority in the recruit's view of his function. This in itself does not mean that he will renge on the training facility he is to provide. But clearly it is in his own interest to permit other priorities of his work to compete with the
training function, and the balance is tipped when he is encouraged to do this by the pressing demands of administrative expediency and the expectations of his Papua New Guinean superiors.

For the purposes of generalization, a (very) rough division of two categories of expatriate official can be said to be involved in provincial and national planning. The newer, and usually younger, arrivals and the pre-colonial officials who have stayed on since Independence in 1975. (A third category of older experienced non-European expatriates is also beginning to appear.) We will look at the work ethic of each in turn.

The new arrival is typically a young man and frequently a former volunteer.¹ Not permitted a career within the country he naturally has to think in terms of acquiring the experience that will provide him with career prospects outside -- with international agencies, home government, or private sector -- after he leaves Papua New Guinea. Fair enough, it would seem, an equitable exchange -- the country has the benefit of hard-working enthusiastic qualified young men and women, and the latter get the invaluable gain of practical experience at a level of command and seniority not open to them at home (an historical means for young Europeans to break out of the traditional circle that will not offer a job without experience).

But the fair exchange does not work out in reality. The young expatriate not unnaturally is planning-oriented and result-conscious. Hence time for him is at a premium. Among the sacrifices at this altar, pre-eminent is the regard for on-the-job training. A concern for training, for instilling the proper content and not simply the form of an operable development administration, demands time, holds up planning formulation and delays project implementation. A young expatriate official who in three years can claim as his triumph solely the fact that he has succeeded in tutoring a handful of Papua New Guineans in the intricacies of administrative awareness is not likely to find the home or overseas job market smiling at him benignly. What is more, he is also likely to find that his expatriate-counsellled Papua New Guinean

¹ Commonly this volunteer work will have been in Papua New Guinea. The Canadian Universities Service Organization (CUSO) and the British Volunteers Overseas (VO) are the two major bodies supplying volunteers. The American Peace Corps is also now commencing a programme. Young Australian officials, however, much less frequently have this volunteer background and are usually recruited straight from the university or more commonly after a short period in the Australian Civil Service.
superiors are not offering to renew his contract! And, yet his triumph, an intangible not to be recorded on a curriculum vitae, is infinitely more precious to the country than that of the whizz kid who performs wonders behind the scenes on behalf of his hosts and duly departs for his prestigious agency job, leaving behind national colleagues little the wiser for his presence and a project or routine that will collapse in his absence.

The effects of the older, 'ex-colonial' expatriate may turn out the same though from different causes. The ex-colonial is handicapped by his colonial experience, when masters had to be reported to and matters were pushed through regardless of the local scene. Orders were primarily for being obeyed, not understood. It is hardly to be expected that such persons will be paragons of patience in their administrative dealings or readily accept the delays contingent on making allowances for cultural dissonance in relating to Papua New Guinean colleagues. Again, for development, results are the thing, the substantive results of quantifiable components, not the tenuous achievements of a development socialization.

This situation is compounded when overseas (European) 'experts' are called in at the different stages of a project. They are usually in a greater hurry than anyone else, have the least sense of commitment, naturally gravitate to the local Europeans and provide a ready reinforcement of alienated attitudes. The provinces have in fact begun to react strongly against these aloof and, as they usually discover, not-so-expert expatriates. As the Milne Bay development study plan indicates, measures are now being taken to insert formal provisions for on-the-job training for nationals in such consultancies. But the teaching can only be as good as the teacher and it seems likely extra-supervisory sanctions will be needed to reinforce such a system. Furthermore international recruitment of professional consultants can no longer be taken for granted unless a country is willing to pay salaries at sufficiently attractive international rates, which Papua New Guinea has difficulty in doing.

Patently, in the post-colonial spirit of developing countries, no government is going to advertise career tracks for expatriates. It is therefore all the more important to make explicit allowance for the
training content of expatriate posts with regular assessments of the progress of national understudies as a check upon the expatriate holder.

Some observers have suggested that western expatriates are inappropriate anyway for training nationals in developing countries, and that on the grounds of background, experience and empathy expatriates from Third World countries would be much more suitable to fill training needs. The employment of Third World expatriates has certainly increased considerably in Papua New Guinea in recent years, but as far as we know this is a result of a lowering of the attractiveness of salary rates to westerners.

Secretariat and provincial politicians

The relations between secretariat and politicians commonly range from unease to hostility although, following house-cleanings by new elected governments, the extreme demonstrations of antipathy disappear. This is a crucial area for the success of decentralization, but treatment of it here will be cursory and centred on the implications for development socialization.

The relation between secretariat and politicians is the classic one between bureaucratic 'servent' and political masters stemming from their different perspectives of continuity and expediency. The Papua New Guinea scene, though it is not unique in the developing world, adds its own idiosyncrasies. In a country where considerable status rests upon formal education attainment, or at least where there is strong pressure from the 'haves' that such status exist, the bureaucrat's resentment finds a considerable power source in the knowledge that he is ultimately bound to carrying out the directions of persons who are often less educated and frequently are unsophisticated villagers. In turn the politician often fails to realize that his position does not give him a carte blanche of special privileges, and persistence in seeking special treatment is a typical cause of increased acrimony with the secretariat.

Since the provincial bureaucrats are only on contract (though the contract may be on the basis of secondment from the national administration), they experience considerable insecurity. This is marked where the officer is not himself of the province, and particularly so
where he is from a different major region, since this usually makes him an easier mark for threats or hints from politicians.

This insecurity of senior provincial bureaucrats provides a project management with a certain leverage against attempts within the provincial government to influence or control it. But the generally contentious atmosphere at provincial government level greatly enhances the autonomy of any compact, integrated group whose existence rests on the carrying out of quite explicit tangible programmes and goals.

Bureaucratic strife within the province

The formulation of the provincial secretariat concept, or at least the original design, contains a built-in opposition, that of the two secretaries, provincial and administrative. The first is a political appointment responsible directly to the provincial politicians, the second a civil servant responsible to a national department (though the appointment is still politically determined). In some cases co-operation has been achieved between the two offices by the pragmatic approach of the incumbents. In other cases administrative structure was changed to integrate provincial and national servants in the form of a national department (for example, the Department of the Southern Highlands). Nevertheless the polarization of authority has never disappeared and in many cases has ensured only a minimal communication and co-ordination. Where the administrative secretary is not of the province, strained relations or dissatisfaction are much more likely.

The situation is repeated at lesser levels of intensity among divisional heads in the province. Lack of communication is rife. We suggest this attitude is a consequence of a combination of inexperience and face-saving compulsions. Lack of trained, qualified and experienced personnel means a divisional head is young and anxious -- anxious about his capabilities and his status. He tends to be on the defensive and bulwarks to keep outsiders outside and ignorant are his major defences. We do not believe this is an inevitable consequence of young inexperienced persons in responsible positions. We see it as a function primarily of a fault in training, in an emphasis on narrow formal technical expertise to the exclusion of administrative and planning know-how and of encouragement to use initiative.
The consequences of this situation for a project management are complex. A coordinated effort, with several divisions or a single division, can be difficult because of mutual wariness among divisional heads (and secretariat members), or a fear and resentment from a specific officer of the superior expertise (and funds) of the project resources. This easily acts as a deterrent to project management's attempts to effect cooperation. The expatriate management and technical experts are unlikely to have any sociological (and certainly not psychological) reservations. Their attitude will be, "why voluntarily enlarge the area of external control over project activities?" Unfortunately the very lack of cohesiveness between provincial divisions and secretariat encourages and enables such a policy.

The result-oriented conditioning of management

Project managers of IRDPs are doers, practical and very busy men. They have a schedule to keep up, costs to keep down; they are short on time and expertise available, and have continually to think of most efficient means. They see immediate environment in terms of threat, for it seems to promise only interference and impediment to the efficiency of management. Thus, where control over environment is lacking, there is considerable temptation to maximise autonomy by withdrawal and isolation. Local officials and procedures are kept to a minimum because they slow things up; the targetted population, it is assumed, as a beneficiary does not also need to have explanations. Such a withdrawal can be justified by all the pressures on management to achieve the specific impacts within specified times. The result-oriented conditioning of management, however, is itself a threat, not to the limited success of project accomplishment, but to the general strategy of development. Management certainly has to be conscious of results, but it equally needs to pay attention to how those results are achieved. Where concern for the training of officials and the participation of people is lost in preoccupation with maintaining a rigid project timetable, the aims of development seem distorted. Paradox though it may be, efficiency is not necessarily in the interest of development.

The villager and the bureaucrat

Since most of the salient points of this relation are indicated in our concept of development socialization, we will provide only a summary
discussion here. Nevertheless we stress that this is probably the most basic influence on the progress of development in the Papua New Guinea countryside. The villager needs to be informed of what could happen, not merely told what will happen or has happened. Moreover, this kind of preparation of project ground is a complex operation and not the function of a helicopter and harangue visit. But the sad, and well-known, fact is that though the Papua New Guinean provincial bureaucrat is typically not alienated from his own culture to the degree found in other developing countries, western education encourages him to belittle villagers' abilities and assume the guardian attitude of 'I know what's best for you'. The villager not only resents this, but frequently his past experience or knowledge of bureaucratic bungles makes him both suspicious and demanding of attention. Far from being a major source of knowledge of villagers' motivation and a mediator of the programmes of some absentee planner, the provincial Papua New Guinea bureaucrat can be a major source of conflict.

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In the next section we examine the organizations of some of the IRDPs established or being established in Papua New Guinea and comment upon their appropriateness for the environment they are placed in.

PROTOTYPES OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

The brief experience of Papua New Guinea with integrated rural development projects has been restricted until now to the East Sepik and the Southern Highlands provinces. The experience resulting from those projects and the full impact of the provincial governments have created the conditions favourable to a flexible approach to management organization schemes for new IRDPs.

From the provincial point of view the basic issue is to incorporate in the project design the mechanisms that will permit project management to operate in an environment dominated by the transition towards a decentralized system. This activity should be part of an effort to develop the capabilities of the provincial governments to manage change within their areas.
The departure of projects from a situation of low levels of institutional development — administrative centralization and fragmentation, on-going decentralization, and scarcity of resources and skills — makes necessary a review of the basic features of management organization of the projects already underway. We analyse the East Sepik and Southern Highlands rural development projects organizational features. These are complemented by the Enga Provincial Development Programme's suggested organization that avoids some of the shortcomings encountered in the East Sepik and Southern Highlands by emphasizing the institutional aspects of provincial development.

The East Sepik Rural Development Project (ESRDP) organization

The management organization of the ESRDP has over time undergone several changes to take into account the establishment of the provincial government (see Figure 1). The original concept developed in the Asian Development Bank appraisal report did provide, within the centralized administrative structure at the time, that the provincial commissioner was to serve as a member of the Project Management Committee (PMC) and chairman of the then Provincial Coordinating Committee. Now, as a result of the changes brought by decentralization, the representation in the PMC has been assumed jointly by the provincial and administrative secretaries.

The East Sepik project also antecedded the implementation of the National Public Expenditure Plan, so it required further modifications for its implementation in accordance with budget forecasts and national priorities established in 1978.

The project management concept. The following patterns of organization have evolved:

Organization at headquarters level. The ESRDP is managed by a PMC, which reports to the Minister of Primary Industry. The PMC is assisted by a technical director from the Department of Primary Industry (DPI) and is responsible to that department's secretary and to a project coordinator, an official of the Loans, Investment and Coordination Division of the Department of Finance (Office of Project Coordination).
Figure 1

EAST SEPIK RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
ORGANIZATION CHART

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NATIONAL LEVEL

MINISTER OF PRIMARY INDUSTRY

PROJECT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

MINISTRY OF FINANCE

TECHNICAL DIRECTOR (DPI)

PROJECT COORDINATOR

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PROVINCIAL LEVEL

PROJECT MANAGER (FIELD-DPI)

PROVINCIAL SECRETARY

PROVINCIAL MANAGEMENT TEAM

'CAVIEEN LAND SETTLEMENT (DPI)'

'INLAND FISHERIES (DPI)'

'BUFFALO BREEDING (DPI)'

'CROP INTENSIFICATION (DPI)'

'AGRIC. RESEARCH (DPI)'

'AGRIC. COLLEGE (DPI)'

'EDUC. IN THE SCHOOLS (DOE)'

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NEC : NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

DPI : DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRY

DOE : DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

The members of the PMC are: secretary of DPI (Chairman), the secretaries for the national departments of Finance, Education, Lands, and Works and Supply, the managing director of the Papua New Guinea Development Bank, the secretary of the Department of East Sepik and the technical director of the project. The committee's functions include: reporting to the National Executive Council through the Minister for Primary Industry (quarterly reports), approval of the annual and quarterly works programmes and budgets, problem-solving consultative supervision of the project and decisions on matters that affect more than one government agency.

The responsibility of the technical director is to assist the PMC on all technical aspects of the project while working closely with the project manager. The project coordinator is the executive officer of the PMC and is in charge of the preparation and execution of budgets and the coordination with the project manager as well as with other national departments on the financial and non-technical aspects of the project.

Organization at the provincial level. The project manager, a senior officer of DPI and responsible to the technical director, is in charge of the following: the administration and oversight of the programmes under each of the sub-projects; the execution of the budget approved by the PMC; and the liaison and coordination with the project coordinator, the provincial rural development office staff, and the departments and agencies involved in the project. Each of the sub-projects has a sub-manager (except for Education, which has two) under the project manager's direction.

The Provincial Management Team (PMT) assumed the functions of the PMC after the establishment of the provincial government. Its membership comprises the provincial secretary, the province's divisional heads of the departments, and representatives of agencies involved in the project. The project manager is a member of the PMT.

The management organization of the ESRDP that has evolved possesses all the limitations of an ad hoc approach dictated by circumstances leading to the formulation of the project. The preservation of on-going government programmes in the area and the favourable attitude of the Asian Development Bank to their integration in a 'limited' multicomponent project appear to have minimized the consideration of organizational requirements, notwithstanding the fact that decentralization was already
proceeding at the time of the project appraisal. The problem has not been one of lack of commitment to rural development on the part of the national government, or for that matter by the new provincial government, but rather one of relatively low control of resources.

The original organization of the ESRDP reflects the level of centralization existing at the time. Thus, greater emphasis was given to control, as represented by the verticality of the organization. Coordination was restricted for the most part to the activities of the departments and agencies participating in the project. Consequently the autonomy achieved prevented the extension of the organization's influence to other institutions and social forces that could contribute to the achievement of the objectives. The dominance of the agricultural components, requiring specialists for each of the sub-projects, has imposed a narrow professional view not conducive to coordination beyond the scope of the project.

The narrow professionalization became apparent with the first manager of the project, a livestock expert who did not give enough attention to the sub-projects outside his area of specialization. Furthermore, the great importance attached to the cash-crop orientation of the project gave rise to criticism of the nutrition programmes and to personality clashes between the first manager and a nutritionist expert not of the project. A replacement project manager with a greater range of experience and awareness of the social implications of the project and of the views of the provincial government considerably improved the effectiveness of the project administration.

A second problem arising from staff of project management is that expatriates who are 'old hands' and have great practical experience in the province have had difficulties in adapting themselves to newcomers and the need for teamwork, and in showing sensitivity to the impact of the project. Moreover there is no provision in the project for organized training of national officers. Since DPI is exclusively in charge of recruitment (and thus leans towards agricultural specialists) other departments whose activities are relevant to social outcomes of the project have not always been consulted. On top of this, Public Services Commission (PSC) restrictions have prevented recruitment of international experts at competitive salary levels, hence difficulties
exist in filling up the personnel needs of the project (for example, PSC has been blamed for the absence of a research agriculturalist).

Lack of effective coordination between project and provincial government can also be traced to the latter's frustrations at having virtually no control over the project (May and Curtain 1981: 26). Such feelings are exacerbated by differences of view of the objectives, mode of implementation, and impacts of the project. Many in the province insist that the project is too technocratic, that it does not take into consideration the Melanesian traditions and social values which should inform its activities. They reject the emphasis on money-making projects which disregard subsistence agriculture and self-reliance.

In its endeavour to have more influence on the project, provincial administration has been handicapped by the difficulties typical of the earliest stages of decentralization: lack of qualified personnel, lack of financial resources, and the complexities of the institution-building process intensified by politico-administrative struggles. The PMT has not served as a regular instrument of coordination with the project; instead it has focussed on developing a planning capability for the provincial government. The provincial secretary, however, has assumed an important role as spokesman for the province at the Project Management Committee meetings, exercising increasing leverage over the orientation of the project (thus achieving a rewriting of the agriculture and nutrition sub-project -- Curtain and May 1981: 27). When the project terminates in 1983 many of the sub-projects then become part of provincial activities. The weakness of the coordinative mechanisms will limit further their smooth transfer, aggravating the present uneasiness stemming from the lack of financial provisions for recurrent costs once the project ends. The government's objective of formulating a provincial development plan (still in the data gathering and project identification stage) reinforces the need for better coordination in the future if the project's experiences are to be fully utilized.

A final dimension of ineffective coordination can be seen in the linkages between the project, its beneficiaries and the East Sepik people at large. The vertical, self-contained organization has been hindered in its capacity to reach effectively the target population or the province as a whole. Even though in 1977 an Information Coordinating Committee was established to develop a communication system for enhancing the
understanding of the people about the different sub-projects, the committee has been little more than a symbolic gesture. It has rarely met due to the lack of support from management and when it has met it has restricted itself to technical matters of the project. At the same time, it has not had the cooperation of DPI, sub-project managers and Education, the first and the latter having opted for their own channels of communications. The lack of personnel and equipment have further limited its capacity to operate. Subsequently, the provincial government has taken over the committee but, confronted with the same lack of cooperation from the national departments involved in the project, has had no greater success.

In conclusion, the management organization of the ESRDP provides a good illustration of the type of problems posed by drastic changes in the environment brought about by the decentralization process in Papua New Guinea. The project design responded to a centralized system and thus it became a case of 'development from above'. However, many of the problems arise from the basically ad hoc nature of the project design which emphasized central control and a minimum of mechanisms for coordination at the regional and national levels. Lack of qualified human resources and concern for economically viable cash crop sub-projects imposed a narrow professional view and in-built rigidities that were antithetical to a truly integrated rural development project. The implementation of the ESRDP has brought into light the problems of the Papua New Guinea public administration in implementing specific changes in the transition from a centralized to a decentralized system. These elements have to be considered in analysing the following design of the Southern Highlands project.

The Southern Highlands Rural Development Project (SHRDP) organization

The project management concept devised for the Southern Highlands province constitutes a prototype of a higher degree of organizational complexity given the number of components and ancillary inputs from several agencies. Since the later stages of the project formulation coincided with the establishment of the interim provincial government, the project is flexible in response to possible changes stemming from the decentralization process in the province. Explicitly, the main emphasis of the concept of management was on coordination of the project
activities of the national departments involved in the province (Provincial Affairs DPI; Health; Education; Commerce -- Office of Business Development; Public Service Commission -- Bureau of Management Services; and Works and Supply) (Project Agreement: 35). At the same time project design had an immediate impact on the organization of the business arm of the provincial government, the Southern Highlands Development Authority, whose functions were divided between two new agencies: the Southern Highlands Development Corporation Holding Pty. Ltd., (in charge of business and investment activities by the provincial government) and the Southern Highlands Management Authority (in charge of providing management services to 'estates' -- provincial owned plantations). Thus, 'the project management system ... [was] designed to achieve full coordination between all government departments or agencies responsible for project implementation at field level, access to funds through a central project budget allocation, and effective channels of communication between the field and headquarters'. (loc.cit.)

However, as in the case of the East Sepik project, although perhaps to a lesser extent, the expectations on the part of the designers of achieving effective coordination among multiple agencies were over-optimistic in view of the requirements of the project and the low levels of institutional development. That is, the availability of qualified human resources, the limitations of the organizational structure and the emphasis on control over coordination as a general feature of the Papua New Guinean bureaucracy would serve as constraints to the effectiveness of management. In the first place, the skilled resources required by the project are greater than those of the ESRDP. The Agricultural Field Trials, Studies, Extension and Monitoring Unit (AFTSEMU) has demanded highly trained specialists, and all the other components require management skills or professional knowledge that cannot be easily obtained within the country; thus the need for a large expatriate input into these activities. Secondly, notwithstanding the insertion of the project into the context of the decentralization process, the organizational impact upon the provincial government structure has been minimal because of the difficulties of coordination stemming from the way in which the design was formulated and from the problems confronted by the interim provincial government in its early stages of establishment. Thirdly, to the extent that implementation responsibilities are vested in
the Department of Finance (Office of Project Implementation), project management has been confronted with a centralized institution (reluctant to devolve power to the provinces) whose main emphasis has been on maintaining an effective financial control over provincial activities.

The project management concept. The concept of project management devised for the Southern Highlands project illustrates the imbalance between a complex and sophisticated organizational structure in the context of low institutional development (see Figure 2).

The organization at headquarters level. The implementation and overall direction and coordination of the project have been entrusted to the Division of Loans, Investments and Coordination, Department of Finance. The Headquarters Project Coordination Committee (HQPPC), made up of the heads of the departments involved in the project and an ex-officio non-voting representative of the Papua New Guinea Development Bank (PNGDB), has the responsibility for the formulation of operational policies and practices and problem solving, in particular the resolution of differences between departments. The departments operating as executing agencies through full-time field project officials and represented in the HQPCC are Finance, Health, Commerce, the Public Service Commission, Education, the Department of Southern Highlands (divisions of Health, Commerce, Education, Primary Industry, Provincial Affairs and Local Government), Works and Supply, the National Housing Commission and the Electricity Commission.

The organization at provincial level. The direct responsibility under the Headquarters Project Manager (HQPM) for the direction, control, and coordination of project activities in the province has been vested in the Provincial Project Manager (PPM). He is assisted by a Provincial Project Finance Comptroller (PPFC) and the Provincial Project Coordinating Committee (PPCC) with similar functions to those of the HQPCC and made up of the chiefs of the provincial divisions involved in the project. The PPM is the secretary of the PPCC and as such a non-voting member; he can also participate whenever necessary in the meetings of the HQPCC. His appointment, as well as those of the HQPM and PPFC, must be acceptable to both the national government and IDA.

The PPM has the power to decide, with the cooperation of the provincial agencies (project involved), on the programmes in line with
Figure 2
SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ORGANIZATION CHART

NATIONAL LEVEL

MINISTER OF FINANCE

DEPT. OF FINANCE

HEADQUARTERS PROJECT MANAGER

HEADQUARTERS PROJECT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

HQ. GOVERNMENT DEPTS. PROJECT INVOLVED

PAPUA NEW GUINEA DEVELOPMENT BANK

PROVINCIAL LEVEL

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

PROVINCIAL MANAGEMENT TEAM

PROVINCIAL PROJECT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

PROVINCIAL PROJECT FINANCE COMPTROLLER

PROVINCIAL PROJECT MANAGER

SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS DEV. CORP. (HOLDINGS)

SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

DISTRICT COMMITTEES

the project objectives to be presented for the approval of the PPCC. Any conflict arising from the PPM's decisions may be dealt with by the PPCC, or by the HQPCC if agreement is not reached at the provincial level, or as a last resort by the National Executive Council (the national government cabinet).

Within the provincial level of the project two specialized units for carrying on research training and monitoring and extension activities were established: the Media Unit and AFTSEMU.

The AFTSEMU has been attached for logistical and administrative purposes to DPI. It is intended to be made up of six senior staff, one of whom is the team leader, but with the approval of the PPM it can hire short-term consultants in areas that require expertise. Its main functions are directed to field trials and village demonstrations of new crops and agricultural and husbandry methods; to provide in-service training courses for DPI extension officers; to conduct research and data gathering relevant to subsistence farming in the highlands; and to collect data on land-use, farm management, nutrition and demography that are needed for project internal monitoring and evaluation, as well as for the formulation of new programmes.

The Media Unit has been organized as a field communications centre to be in the charge of a director specialist in communications. Although formally it is under the provincial Office of Information, its activities and facilities have been geared to serve mainly the extension needs of the project and to service when necessary the communication demands of the provincial government. The Media Unit director is an ex-officio member of the PPCC.

The executing agencies: The SHRDP is characterized by the large number of agencies involved in the project. To those national departments that form the HQPCC, other institutions at the provincial and local level have been added: firstly, within the Department of Southern Highlands, the six decentralized divisions (Health, Commerce, Education, Primary Industry, Provincial Affairs, and Local Government); secondly, in the executing agencies, the Southern Highlands Management Authority and the SHDC; thirdly, in project execution, the PNGDB and the PNG Banking Corporation, both in charge of credit for agricultural development;
finally, participating in the project through minor public works and their involvement in the cash crop components of the project, the local government councils -- 14 in total.

Monitoring and evaluation. The SHRDP contains a monitoring and evaluation component which is not present in the ESRDP. Furthermore, in the SHRDP, monitoring and evaluation have a double execution: one internal to the project itself to be conducted by AFTSEMU for the agricultural components and the Tari Medical Unit for health, the other external to the project, to be conducted by the Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, which includes the preparation of the completion report (Project Agreement: 43).

Control and coordination. The concept of organization management of the project has not solved the problems of control and coordination in a manner compatible with the decentralization process in the province. As stated earlier, and to a large extent comparable to the ESRDP, the initial centralized concept of project organization and the institutional weaknesses of the interim provincial government set the conditions for the cleavage between project and province.

Control over the project (for example, recruitment of expatriate personnel, priorities, and direction of the programmes) has remained largely within the project management itself. Until very recently the provincial government has had no means of control over project decisions. The transition from interim to elected provincial government was hindered by the resignation of the provincial secretary and then by the untimely death of the premier and the change of the secretary of the Department of Southern Highlands. Though these events implied a discontinuity of the provincial leadership, the efforts to obtain a degree of control continued unchanged. But institutional obstacles appear to have played an important role. According to Ballard (1980) the Provincial Management Team (PMT) had become a relatively ineffective body because: (1) it has had irregular meetings -- a probable consequence of the elections of the provincial government; (2) it has failed to communicate beyond its membership; (3) it has evolved into a large body comprising more than the divisional heads; and (4) it has lacked a clear direction in planning since initiatives have come from multiple sources and therefore the PMT has been unable to achieve a central focus for its activities.
The deficiencies of the PMT have hindered the establishment of mechanisms for province-project coordination. In practice, the formal links described in the chart have operated primarily through personal contacts of project personnel with the heads of provincial divisions who had participated in the formulation of the project or early stages of its implementation (for example, in the health and education components). The special situation of the Australian Corps of Engineers in charge of Public Works has permitted an effective coordination of its activities with the infrastructure components of the project. However, for other provincial divisions (DPI, Commerce, Information) and for national departments operating as executing agencies, effective coordination with the project has not been attained. In both cases (decentralized and centralized divisions) the project agreement has maintained a high degree of centralized decision-making at the national level. Further, effective communication lines were not established between national departments and their field officers, who in matters regarding the project must deal through the HQPCC and PPM. The negative or isolationist attitudes and behaviours resulting from lack of effective coordination were not conducive to the project manager's understanding of the decentralization process and the problems confronted by the province. Because of the technocratic emphasis on concrete results, the SHRDP evolved into another prototype of 'development from above'.

The difficulties encountered in the implementation of the SHRDP led to the adoption of a series of measures primarily to improve the linkages between project and provincial government. To a large degree these changes were taken in response to the concern within the Department of Finance with the existing organization (Project Coordination n.d.: passim) as well as to the criticism by the World Bank team that visited Southern Highlands in October of 1980.

In December 1980 the Southern Highlands Provincial Management Team approved the plan submitted by APTSEMU to establish its "working relations" with and for the provincial government. Thus the APTSEMU team leader now works in close association with the First Assistant Secretary, Policy, Planning and Advisory Services (FASPPS). Policy now is for the other staff to carry on APTSEMU activities in close relation with their provincial counterparts. The two agronomists and the landuse specialist with the Assistant Secretary, Primary Industry; the monitoring and evaluation officer (not yet appointed) with the data collection
officer of the Division of Policy, Planning and Advisory Services; the extension training officer (not yet appointed) with the provincial staff development officer; and finally the epidemiologist (not yet appointed) with the Assistant Secretary for Health Services. The Media Unit that originally was part of AFTSEMU, while not abandoned, seems to be presently in abeyance.

The reorganization of AFTSEMU and the search for better provincial-project coordination has entailed the restructuring of the Southern Highlands Research Committee of which the AFTSEMU team leader has become executive officer. The project coordinator and the team leader are two of the eight voting members of the provincial research committee. The latter's functions have remained the same except for the expansion of its research coordination activities regarding other institutions including AFTSEMU, and the solicitation of research from other research institutions in the country.

The Enga Provincial Development Programme (EPDP): an emerging prototype

The (EPDP) is at the most advanced stage among those provincial plans that are being submitted to the international lending agencies within the next twelve-month period. By the end of October 1980, the identification and first draft of project components had been completed and by early January 1981 the final proposal -- accepted in principle by the provincial and national governments -- was completed by the Enga Provincial Development Study Group and submitted to the World Bank in the following February. The proposal incorporated the observations and suggestions made by representatives of the national departments at the meeting held in Enga on 27-31 October 1980.*

Several features characterize the EPDP. First, the project has been the product of a provincial team relying mostly on the planning resources

* The Enga Provincial Development Programme comprises four volumes, entitled Enga Yaaka Lasemana. Volume I contains the summary and conclusions of the study group; Volume II the project components; Volume III is an edited set of the background papers; and Volume IV is the Enga Resource Atlas.
of Papua New Guinea, and particularly those available within Enga. Second it has sought to make the development goals of the province compatible with those of the national government. Thirdly, it seeks to retain the implementation of the programme in the hand of the provincial government. Fourthly, the achievement of the project's objectives and goals is closely linked to the development of the provincial administration's capacity with respect both to the execution of the project itself and to its role as one of the most important agents for change in Enga. Finally, it is not an integrated rural development project as in the previous cases, but a programme for provincial development that includes rural components.

The project management concept. The management organization established in the EPDP makes it an integral part of the provincial administration, the Department of Enga. There are significant changes in this concept with regard to the functions of control and coordination exercised by the national departments, especially Finance, in the implementation of the East Sepik and Southern Highlands projects.

The management organization and its formal relationships with provincial and national departments and agencies are contained in Figure 3.

The distinctive features of the management organization for the EPDP deal with the placement of the functions of implementation, control, and coordination within the structure of the provincial government, and the allocation of the responsibilities for execution in the various divisions. The office of project manager is replaced in the EPDP by that of programme coordinator. A Programme Coordinator (PC) will now be an executive officer to the First Assistant Secretary for Field Services in the Department of Enga for the coordination of the project activities to be carried out by the provincial divisions. The coordinating functions of the PC extend to those project activities undertaken by the field officers of national departments in the province.

Other major functions of the PC will be to assist the provincial divisions, to report regularly to the secretary's staff committee (the equivalent of the provincial management teams in other provinces), to prepare the quarterly and annual reports on physical and financial progress, to execute financial disbursements and accounting, to recruit project staff, and to supervise all construction and acquisitions.
Figure 3
ENGA PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME PROPOSED MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION CHART

DEPTS. OF DECENTRALIZATION: ENGA, FINANCE, PRIMARY INDUSTRY, W&S, HEALTH, EDUCATION, PSC, NPO.

NATIONAL LEVEL

PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

SECRETARY STAFF COMMITTEE
SECRETARY OF THE PROVINCE
DEPUTY SECRETARY

1ST ASSIST. SECRETARY POLICY AND PLANNING
1ST ASSIST SECRETARY FIELD SERVICES

RESEARCH RE-COORDINATION DPI W&S HEALTH EDUC. COORDINATION

NEC: NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
DPI: DIVISION OF PRIMARY INDUSTRY
W&S: WORKS AND SUPPLY

NOTE: The project organization at the national level needs to be approved by NEC (broken lines).

The PC will have no support staff of its own. For financial matters he would depend on the Finance and Management Services Division, expected to be upgraded in its personnel. Since probably no national will have the necessary experience to occupy the PC post, the project is likely to recruit an expatriate. But a counterpart officer would be hired in the second year of the project to be trained for the PC position.

The control of the project at the provincial level would be the responsibility of the secretary of the province as head of the Department of Enga, assisted by the Secretary's Staff Committee (SSC) comprised of the deputy secretary, the first assistant secretaries for field services and for policy and planning, and the divisional heads. Overall coordination of the project would also be a function of the SSC.

The major innovation contained in the EPDP deals with the management organization role of the national government. As the borrower of funds and responsible for the implementation of the project on schedule, the national government is in control, through the Department of Finance subject to the conditions of the agreement with the World Bank. All the components requiring disbursement of public funds are subject to the NPEP process subject to the approval of the Budget Priorities Committee (BPC) and ultimately of the National Planning Committee of the NEC.

The coordination functions at the national level would be vested jointly in the project coordination branch of the Department of Finance and the Area Planning and Project Implementation office (APPI) of NPO. An officer of this branch would be appointed as Project Coordinator Headquarters (PCHQ) for the project. His tasks would be to liaison with the PC, attend the meetings of the SSC when required, inform quarterly the national departments involved in the project on its progress, and process the reimbursement of funds from the lending agency to the project. It is expected that these procedures will be similar to those followed by the Southern Highlands.

The initial EPDP concept of management organization did away with the national decision making and coordinating structure of the East Sepik and Southern Highlands development projects. As a consequence of the allocation of the project responsibilities in the Enga provincial government, the way was opened for the reorganization of national level management of all rural development projects, present and forthcoming. The creation of a
new committee at the national level has now been proposed: the Provincial Integrated Rural Development Programme Review Committee. It will be made up of the secretaries of the Departments of Decentralization (Chairman), Finance, DPT, Works and Supply, and Health, and of the respective provincial department, the director of NPO and the chairman of the Public Service Commission. Representatives of their institutions may be invited to participate in the committee. The functions envisaged for the committee will be to review progress of all rural development projects, to coordinate department activities and to solve problems deriving from the implementation of projects.

The executing agencies. The implementation of the programme's components would be assigned at provincial level to the Department of Enga and the provincial divisions of Commerce, Community and Family Services, Education, Health, Primary Industry, and the Enga Investment Corporation as the business arm of the provincial government. At the national level components would be assigned to the departments of Finance and of Works and Supply, the Public Services Commission, the Papua New Guinea Development Bank and the departments whose activities have been decentralized in those areas that fall under concurrent functions.

The provincial divisions and the national departments are to implement the components under their specific areas of competence, although the integrated nature of the project generates an overlap among them in terms of objectives and requirements of inputs (staff, housing, vehicles, etc.). However, the project has been carefully drawn up to specify the overlaps and need for coordination within and between its components.

The concept of management organization embodied in the EPDP represents the first attempt to give coherence to the developmental goals of a province. The efforts of the Enga bureaucracy in devising the programme and agreeing upon a management organization that emphasizes coordination has shown a degree of commitment that enhances the prospects of the efficiency of the project. The external support provided by NPO and the various departments to be involved in the projects has permitted a better coordination of national and provincial developmental objectives and, to a large degree, pre-emption of problems and obstacles of implementation because of bureaucratic opposition to change. Finally, the control of the project by the provincial government avoids the
problems that arise from components' recurrent costs after the project termination. The provincial government is fully aware of and will have to plan in advance for the financing of such costs.

It is a well-known fact -- and so recognized by the provincial government -- that Enga has serious shortcomings in administrative resources and skills. In this respect the EPDP has included an administrative component with the functions of management advice, on-the-job training of the provincial personnel, assessment of manpower and training needs, and of collaboration with the Programme Co-ordinator in the recruitment of staff. The Division of Organization and Staff Development (DOSD), as this component will be known, would extend its activities to the whole provincial structure, whether project involved or not. It therefore seeks to improve the capacity of the Enga provincial bureaucracy to deal effectively with the administration of the province and the implementation of the project. In this way existing as well as new resources and capabilities would be used more efficiently.

The scope of DOSD's activities with its provincial nature should enhance the (development) socialization of the bureaucracy. Implicitly its functions would not only train officials in administrative techniques like planning, accounting and the like, but also provide the base for the improvement of extension capabilities and awareness of the project-related implications of their functions. Since training for the civil service has remained a national function, however, the creation of DOSD could become an element of contention between national and Enga governments. In particular, the PSC, with its adherence to formal procedures and resulting slowness of effect, may have a dampening effect on the Enga undertaking to overcome its administrative deficiencies and assure the continuity of its public service.

The management design, however, presents some problems with respect to the organizational requirements and the linkages of the project organization with its immediate and general environments. It is primarily a structure that emphasizes the role of the provincial bureaucracy, the Programme Coordinator will be subject to the hierarchical controls of the First Assistant Secretary for Field Services and the provincial secretariat. This situation may block the flexibility of the Programme Coordinator in initiatives for problem solving and
setting the direction of the project. Since the project starts being implemented by a provincial administration lacking effective instruments and qualified staff, it may become the target of politico-administrative struggles that paralyze or demand the reformulation of stated objectives. The coordinator may be placed in a part of the bureaucracy and therefore lose his effectiveness for providing impartial advice. But the members of the project study committee did note that the project would be unlikely to face this kind of obstacle. They maintain its components are mostly designed for infrastructure development and that this 'technical' prevalence would not create conflicts between project and provincial government.

The EPDP has provided a drastic departure from the conventional views held by the World Bank in that it has approached integrated development through the build-up of the provincial administrative capacity. The acceptance by the recent World Bank appraisal mission of the organizational structure of the project has implied the establishment of a more creative structure to guarantee the effectiveness of project management. The provincial government of Enga has been placed in a position in which it will have to demonstrate the political will to support the project implementation and avoid internal divisions and conflicts that have hindered effectiveness in the past. Therefore, the responsibility for the project does not lie exclusively on the Programme Coordinator and his capacity to build up support among politicians and bureaucrats, but also on the administrative authorities of the province to provide leadership and direction.

From the point of view of the national government, we must consider that Papua New Guinea's bureaucracy is hindered by its fragmentation and almost total lack of coordination between departments. The preparation of the EPDP represented an opportunity in which the provincial government set the issue and mustered the cooperation of the eventual executing departments. However, that is no guarantee that the continuation of their support will be assured in the implementation stage. Scarce technical resources, centralized decision-making and formalism are realities that the project organization will not be able to avoid. In the authors' views (unfortunately) the EPDP is perhaps too optimistic in expecting that the Programme Coordinator will be able to establish linkages and exercise influence on the national administrative apparatus.
The support from NPO and the Department of Finance is not the rule in the operations of the rest of the national bureaucracy and once implementation starts the obstacles posed by bureaucratic sluggishness will emerge. It is in this sense that the Programme Coordinator should have recognized powers to develop effective linkages instead of relying almost totally on the secretary of the province and the SSC.

Within the provincial scope of the immediate environment of the EPDP the possibilities of control and influence over its socio-political aspects are limited by the potential for conflict. If such conflicts occur they may be in part the consequence of the approach, mechanisms and procedures followed throughout the project formulation stage. This remained within the realm of the provincial administration in contact with political levels of the province, but not with the national politicians. In the province, however, the election period of its government in 1980 generated an unstable context for adequate contacts between planners and politicians. Once the new government took over, working relations were noticeably improved. Enqa Yaaka Lasemana was submitted to the PEC and the provincial assembly and approved by both bodies. Nevertheless it needs to be noted that commitment on the part of politicians to a plan does not ensure their continuous support during implementation. Conflict may arise over various matters -- priorities of components, allocations of funds, location of services, etc. But Enga appears to be in a good position to overcome obstacles. The continuity of the bureaucratic cadres, especially of the secretary of the province (well known for his conciliatory abilities) and of the first assistant secretary for field services, and the appointment of the Enga coordinator of the study as first assistant secretary for policy and planning may help to secure the coherence of implementation in face of political demands for changes.

The weak linkages between project and national politicians may not constitute a major obstacle to implementation, unless the proximity of national elections make them press for changes in the project schedule. The eventual solutions do not lie so much with the provincial government as in the province's national politicians who as the representatives of the province should improve coordination between national and provincial government.
The project coordination organization needs to consider its linkages of influence and control with the beneficiaries of the project. In many ways the formulation stage has followed the trend of not involving the people or their organizations. While it is understandable that fragmentation and conflict in the style of "big men" politics are not conducive to agreement at the formulation stage, they become relevant in obtaining individual and community support for effective implementation. The prevalence of "technical" components in the project should not be seen as precluding the integration of the people into its activities. The social components -- education and the expansion of family and community services -- as well as the agricultural ones need to be integrated through the support of the community and its favourable response to the objectives of the project as a whole. If not, implementation of the project may be obstructed or its impact diminished by popular opposition to such exclusion -- one more case of development from above, though this time from the provincial government.

To conclude, the EPDP plan constitutes a good prototype for the formulation of provincial development programmes of IRDPs. It has been able to generate a consensus among the politico-administrative levels of the province and has been especially successful in mobilizing the active participation of the bureaucracy through a learning process. Its approach to building the capacity of the provincial administration for change may enable solution of problems posed by a separation between project organization and the provincial government. By the same token, if such capabilities are built effectively, the project can serve better the process of mobilizing and integrating the people and resources of the province.

CONCLUSION

IRDPs in Papua New Guinea are still in an experimental phase given the changes being brought about by decentralization and the institutionalization of provincial government.

Since IRDPs have been directed mainly to the development of less developed provinces, they should be integrated into the provincial government structures to help consolidate the latter and so increase their capabilities for effectively managing change. An autonomous, self-sufficient project may have a short-term positive impact in the
economic growth of the province, but it may well also intensify social and political imbalances that in a longer range perspective may limit the distribution of the benefits of growth and the viability of the various project components.

The design of management organization of IRDPs should respond to the provincial administrative structures and the needs for improving their capacity of policy implementation. Given the indispensable role of the national government in formulating the policy directives for national development and in contracting with international agencies for financing IRDPs, the present organization and procedures should be reformed. The proposal for the establishment of the Provincial Integrated Rural Development Programme Review Committee with the executive and secretarial functions provided by the Department of Finance and NPO should be put into effect as soon as possible. In this manner an extensive review of the "lessons" of the Southern Highlands and East Sepik projects could be carried on at the decision-making levels. Also, clearer directives on matters such as priorities, ceilings for funding and phases of implementation should lead to better coordination between the developmental goals of the national and provincial governments for effectively planning IRDPs activities. Thus it should enjoy greater flexibility for the recruitment of both staff for the provincial study committee and the project senior management staff. At the same time NPO should be empowered to require and obtain information and data from the agencies to be involved in the project. In a longer perspective it should also develop its capacity to promote and assist the regional integration of programmes for less developed areas. If a monitoring and evaluation unit is created, it should be closely linked with NPO as a way of drawing in the implementation and impact experiences of current and future IRDPs.

At the provincial level, management organization should be an explicit component of the IRDP and integrated a priori into the provincial structure of government. At the same time, the composition of the study groups of the projects should be widened in order to include the political leadership and representatives of local governments. The bureaucratic domination of the study group may prevent effective implementation of the project through the lack of communication and information. In this sense, approval of the project by the provincial
assembly does not convey consensus throughout the implementation phase.

Project management or coordination should start prior to project implementation -- at least a year ahead. Particular attention should be given to the view that in integrated projects social components need the most groundwork and planning. The success in attaining social objectives will depend to a large extent in the early placement of the manager in the field. If the management organization is given priority ahead of the project's actual implementation, the provincial government would have the necessary time for the recruitment of the appropriate person. Once recruited the project manager would then be able to take charge of the organization, recruit its staff, define priorities in a detailed manner and establish the organization's linkages with the provincial administration, national agencies, the political levels and, if possible, with the beneficiaries themselves.

Since in the near future the managers/coordinators most probably will be expatriates, there is need to recruit Papua New Guinean counterparts with the explicit purpose of on-the-job training. Such recruitment should be accompanied by a schedule for the phase-out of the expatriate manager and take-over of the project by the national counterpart, though perhaps retaining the expatriate on a regular short-term consultancy basis.

Project staff should be Papua New Guinean whenever possible. Hence the manager/coordination component should extend the on-the-job training programme to include provincial government officers.

An internal monitoring and evaluation unit should be included in all IRDPs. Such a unit serves three essential functions. It is a management tool: it provides an up-to-date record of what is happening in the project and thus enables management to remedy or innovate with the minimal trouble and loss of time. It is also a research tool. A carefully constructed monitoring and evaluation unit can provide information in the science of project implementation, an invaluable aid to a country in which development will continue to be project-oriented. Finally it is an admirable instrument of participation by the people, the 'target' population, in their own project, enabling them to assess and report on local impact. Unfortunately to set up a monitoring and evaluation unit is not to guarantee its effectiveness. Projects
acquire an existence of their own, an existence dominated by schedules, timetables and deadlines. A busy and harrassed management is not kindly disposed to suggestions that all is not well, that impact is not measuring up to expectations, that the views of the project experts are not expert views, and so on. Where an external monitoring and evaluation is involved the potential for interest and personality clash is enhanced since project management has no direct line control, and a purposive obstructionism and a 'snooping' neurosis are likely to develop in management. The installation of monitoring and evaluation units, both internal and external, thus needs its own form of organizational expertise if the units are to function with their desired and very worthwhile effects. Simply to treat them as some kind of appendage is to set up one more obstacle to project fulfilment.

Finally, what criteria do we use to estimate the success of an IRDP? The question is not so easy to answer. Clearly, we need to establish project objectives first. But here we have to distinguish between (1) specific infrastructural objectives, for example, the establishment of a particular component such as a hospital or coffee estate; (2) the actual impact of their establishment, for example a health services delivery programme may have little impact or an entirely different impact to that envisaged; and (3) more general and vaguer goals, primarily the common preamble or promise that the integrated project is to establish a basis or take-off for an improved quality of life.

Clearly there is plenty of room to disagree, and to agree to disagree, over the success or failure of a particular project, but the authors believe that ultimately if all rhetoric about development is to have any ethical content, then judgement must be based upon the criteria of improving the quality of life. The spread of economic development, the extension of cash involvement, in the countryside is easily justified by planners in terms of balance of payment demands upon a developing country. But in terms of a philosophy of improving a quality of life, economic development needs some extra justification. And this concerns the manner in which integrated projects are implemented. It requires something more than mere provision for the training of nationals -- which after all may, and often does, simply constitute their initiation into the peculiar mazes and motivations
of western bureaucratic styles. It needs the emergence of a new awareness.

We have termed this awareness a development socialization. For this the informed participation of both officials and peoples is required. It is an elusive target. Nevertheless, given the ready flexibility of approach by the National Planning Office, its corporate readiness to learn and benefit from experience, there seems every chance that even if the target continues to be elusive, it will still be an explicit target. But please, participation is needed: officials need to learn in order to be effective, peoples need to know in order to identify.
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