

**The National Research Institute
Special Publication No. 52**



**THE 2007
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
NATIONAL GENERAL ELECTIONS
DOMESTIC OBSERVATION REPORT**



**NRI
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DOMESTIC OBSERVATION REPORT**

by

**Dr. Nicole Haley
&
Dr. Ray Anere**

**Report submitted to the Inter-Departmental Elections Committee (IDEC) on
7 July 2008 and supported by the Australian Government, AusAID, under the
Electoral Support Program (Phase 2).**

This Report was jointly prepared by the National Research Institute, under the coordination of Dr. Ray Anere, in collaboration with Dr. Nicole Haley, who was contracted by the Electoral Support Program (Phase 2).

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ACRONYMS

ANU	The Australian National University
ARU	Assistant Returning Officer
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CS	Correctional Service
EHP	Eastern Highlands Province
EM	Election Manager
ESP	Electoral Support Program
FPTP	First-past-the-post
ID	Identification
IDEC	Inter-Departmental Election Committee
LLG	Local-level Government
LPV	Limited Preferential Voting
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRDC	Mineral Resources Development Company
n.a.	not applicable
NA	National Alliance
NACS	National Aids Council Secretariat
NATEL	National Elections
NATO	National Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCD	National Capital District
NGO	Non-government Organisation
NRI	National Research Institute
OLIPPAC	Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates
OLNLLGE	Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections
PAC	Provincial Aids Councils
PEM	Provincial Election Manager
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defence Force
PNGEC	Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission
PO	Provincial Officer
POM	Port Moresby
PRO	Provincial Returning Officer
RO	Returning Officer
RPNGC	Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary
SHP	Southern Highlands Province
VCT	Voluntary Counselling and Testing
WHP	Western Highlands Province
YWCA	Young Women's Country Association

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In June and July 2007, Papua New Guinea (PNG) conducted its 7th National General Election since independence. The election saw Sir Michael Somare — PNG's first Prime Minister and the first Prime Minister to survive a full-term in government — form government following his re-election.

The 2007 National General Elections were particularly significant because they offered the first nationwide test of the new Limited Preferential Voting (LPV) system. This new voting regime replaced the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, under which all previous post-independence elections had been conducted. Prior to this election, candidate numbers had proliferated with each general election, and as a result, Members of Parliament (MPs) were elected with smaller and smaller mandates. In 2002, two-thirds of MPs were elected with less than 20 percent of the votes in their respective electorates. With the introduction of LPV, it was hoped that the 2007 Elections would be more peaceful and would see the election of MPs with wider and more representative mandates.

The 2007 Elections were also significant because, for the first time in PNG's history, domestic observers were mobilised to monitor and review the elections. The exercise was coordinated by the National Research Institute (NRI), and funded by AusAID, through the Electoral Support Program, Phase 2 (ESP 2). In all, some 150 observers took part in the domestic observations. The purpose of the exercise was to generate and analyse quantitative and qualitative data in order to provide an impartial, accurate assessment of the 2007 Elections, which might then inform and further improve the PNGEC's management and operational plans for future elections.

The 2007 Elections domestic observation involved a partnership between academics and civil society. All of PNG's major tertiary institutions were represented — the University of Papua New Guinea, Papua New Guinea University of Technology, University of Goroka, Divine Word University, and Vudal University — under the leadership and coordination of the National Research Institute. Others involved included personnel from the Australian National University (ANU), and members of 22 civil society groups who had been actively involved in undertaking civic and electoral awareness throughout the country in the lead-up to the elections. These groups had been trained and funded by ESP 2 and had successfully completed wide-ranging awareness activities throughout PNG's four regions. The observation was jointly coordinated Dr. Ray Anere of the National Research Institute and Dr. Nicole Haley of the ANU's State, Society, and Governance in Melanesia project.

Specifically, the 2007 Elections domestic observation comprised 18 observer teams, each covering a single Open or Provincial Electorate. Typically, the teams consisted of an academic team leader and six to ten civil society observers, depending on the type of electorate. Electorates were chosen so that each region was represented, as well as ensuring that there was a mix of rural and urban, and Open and Provincial electorates. There were some electorates included which had previous experience with LPV, through by-elections. Because of problems in the Highlands Region in past elections — particularly 2002 — nine Highlands electorates were chosen.

Individual observers were engaged for up to 28 days, over a two-month period, and were given the task of making observations during the campaigning, pre-polling, polling, and counting periods. To assist them in this task, observers undertook a day-long training program and were given an observer journal to complete. In most cases, observers were able to observe the elections unhindered, and in many cases received support and assistance from the security forces that had been deployed to assist with the smooth running of the elections. A few observers were threatened in relation to their work. These incidents aside, observers found the exercise both positive and rewarding. The key findings arising from their observations are contained in this report. It should be noted that, given the small number of electorates subject to observation, and the high degree of variation observed, few generalisable patterns have emerged.

Key Findings

Papua New Guinea's 2007 General Elections were better managed and more peaceful than the 2002 Elections, which were marred by electoral irregularities, widespread violence in the Highlands Region, and were widely regarded as the worst elections in Papua New Guinea's history. Briefly, all of the seats were declared, Members of Parliament (MPs) in the new Parliament were elected with larger mandates, government was formed, and for the first time in many years, concerted electoral and civic education was undertaken in the lead-up to polling. Also, there were appreciable gains with respect to electoral administration, so much so that the elections ran smoothly in many provinces — in particular, in the New Guinea Islands Region. Nevertheless, there is room for further improvement. Electoral fraud and malpractice continue to be problematic in the Highlands Region. These issues will require attention in the lead up to the 2012 Elections.

The 2007 General Elections involved the first nationwide test of Limited Preferential Voting (LPV), which was introduced following the 2002 Elections. LPV was primarily introduced in order to 'promote the election of more broadly supported candidates' (Reilly 2006:189). Its proponents have repeatedly suggested that it would also contribute to improved security and less violent elections, because it would require candidates to widen their support base, make alliances, and/or campaign cooperatively. Furthermore, it has been suggested that it would afford women voters, in particular, more freedom of choice, while at the same time increasing the likelihood of women being elected to National Parliament. These assumptions are tested in this report.

Security

The 2007 General Elections were considerably less violent than previous elections. However, how much this trend can be attributed to LPV will become clearer in ensuing elections. While it had been believed that LPV would contribute to improved security, observers around the country reported that campaigning in the elections was generally quieter, more relaxed, and more accommodative than in past elections. They also noted there was little or no violence in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regional seats, and the overall levels of violence in the Highlands' seats were substantially reduced. There was a huge investment in security — especially in the Highlands Region — and it was widely observed that the security forces were well-disciplined and better behaved than in past elections.

Candidates

The number of candidates in Papua New Guinea has tended to proliferate with each election. The 2007 General Elections proved to be an exception, as 2 759 candidates contested, which slightly fewer than the 2 875 who contested in the 2002 Elections. More than 1 478 of the candidates ran as independents, and there was a high turnover of sitting MPs. Sixty percent of sitting MPs were not returned, and eight party leaders lost their seats.

Women

Some 101 women contested the 2007 General Elections, compared to 66 in 2002. On both occasions, only one — Dame Carol Kidu — the member for Port Moresby South, was successful. It has been argued that LPV would increase the likelihood that women would be elected, and that it would give female voters more choice and more freedom to exercise that choice. Observers around the country noted that female voter turnout had increased, especially in the Highlands provinces. However, the introduction of separate voting compartments, which was intended to allow gender-segregated voting for women, was a mixed success. It was observed in only eight of the 18 electorates in which observations were conducted. Improved representation did not prove to be the case, and it is impossible to determine whether women voters had more choice.

Awareness

Electoral and civic awareness activities were undertaken in the months leading up to the 2007 General Elections. This was coupled with an extensive PNGEC media campaign, which involved television, radio, and the print media. Media awareness proved to be most effective in urban areas. In the main, face-to-face awareness was undertaken by civil society groups — many of which were funded by the Electoral Support Program Phase 2 (ESP2). The awareness provided by these groups was generally comprehensive. Pre-polling and post-polling surveys that were conducted by individual observer teams also revealed that it was particularly effective — especially in the Highlands Region — where five times as many people reported having attended civil society run LPV/civic awareness, compared with the awareness programs that were conducted by the PNGEC.

Despite the extensive civil society awareness campaign, observers noted several irregularities on polling day, and many voters reported that they found the new voting system confusing, and therefore, needed assistance when voting. Ongoing awareness is needed between now and the 2012 General Elections.

Electoral Administration

The findings of individual observer teams varied in respect of electoral administration. For example, the NCD observer teams reported that electoral administration was much improved, and reports from observers based in the New Guinea Islands Region indicated that the elections were run smoothly and successfully. Observations in Momase and Southern Regions were generally positive as well, in that the administrative problems and irregularities that are documented in this report were found to be isolated, rather than the norm. Problems with electoral administration, such

as accuracy of the new Electoral Roll, the late release of funds, the delayed delivery of essential election materials, and inadequate training, were most pronounced in the Highlands — although some improvements were noted.

A major problem with respect to electoral administration across the whole country has been the lack of completed returns. At the time of finalising this report, we had only managed to secure the final results for 32 of the 109 electorates. The results that we do have, some of which were privately obtained from returning officers, while others were recorded in counting rooms around the country, reveal anomalies in several instances. These include the NCD Provincial, the EHP Provincial, and the WHP Provincial.

The New Electoral Roll

On the face of it, the new Electoral Roll, which was the result of a re-registration exercise that commenced in late 2005, appears more accurate than those used in the 1997 and 2002 General Elections, in that it is considerably smaller. The new roll, which contained the names of 3 938 839 registered voters, has 1.4 million fewer names than the 2002 Electoral Roll.

Nevertheless, observers around the country received complaints from people who claimed that they were not on the roll, and many reported seeing voters turned away from polling stations on polling day. Collectively, our domestic observers in the Highlands Region noted major faults with the voter re-registration and verification exercises, reporting duplications and ghost names, as well as omissions. Specifically, they reported that less than 25 percent of the adults who surveyed had completed a 'Claim for Enrolment' form. In contrast, observers in the other regions, for the most part observed that the roll registration and verification exercises had taken place satisfactorily.

Polling

Polling proceeded peacefully in each of the electorates that were observed. However, the conduct of polling varied greatly across the country. Observers in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions reported that polling was generally well-organised and well-managed, and that polling places were set up in the recommended manner. Unfortunately, gender-segregated polling was not observed, except in the NCD Provincial, the Ijivitari Open, and the Madang Provincial seats.

In contrast, voting in the Highlands Region — particularly in Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces — remained generally chaotic. One-day polling proved to be unworkable, except in the urban areas, and significant irregularities were identified in each of the Highlands provinces — particularly in relation to the conduct of polling. Additionally, many Highlands voters reported that they had experienced intimidation, and many felt that the 2007 General Elections were worse than the General Elections 2002 despite widespread agreement that the security situation was much improved.

Voting Irregularities

Cheating, and voting irregularities were reported in all regions of the country, but were certainly widespread and most pronounced in the Highlands Region. Outside the

Highlands Region, irregularities such as underage voting, and multiple voting were observed to be isolated rather than the norm.

Underage voting, ‘line-up’ voting, serial voting, ‘outside’ voting, and proxy voting were all commonplace in the Highlands Region. Voting took place publicly, and there was no ‘secret ballot’. The indelible ink was not used — or was only applied randomly — and excess ballot-papers were used in many cases. Observers in six of the nine Highlands ‘electorates’ — Koroba-Lake Kopiago, Kagua-Erave, Southern Highlands Provincial, Eastern Highlands Provincial, Chuave Open, and Wabag Open, also witnessed bribery and intimidation on the part of candidates and their key supporters. That intimidation was commonplace, and was also reflected in post-polling surveys.

Money Politics

‘Money politics’ continues to be pervasive in the Highlands Region, and was more significant in this election than in previous elections. During the campaign period, huge amounts of money and gifts of various kinds were observed to change hands, and many candidates (winning and losing alike) are known to have spent upwards of K1 million. Voters and observers asserted that LPV had contributed to the proliferation of ‘money politics’, in that candidates were able to move around more freely, but having done so, were under pressure to reward people for their pledged support. Although it was not as pronounced as in the Highlands Region, money politics, vote buying, and gifting were also reported in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions.

The New Ballot-Paper

The 2007 General Elections saw candidates’ photographs removed from the new ballot-paper and the introduction of separate candidate posters. This change was effected very late in the election cycle, being certified by the Speaker of Parliament, in September 2006 – nine months out from the election. Despite concerted civil-society led awareness concerning the changes, many voters were not aware of the new arrangements.

The changes were not insignificant. The way that people were required to vote in 2007 was markedly different to previous elections. Rather than marking their ballot-papers with an X, as they had in recent general elections, or with 1, 2, and 3, as they had done in the LPV by-elections, voters were required to write three two-digit code numbers and/or the names of their preferred candidates, on both the Provincial Electorate and Open Electorate ballot-papers. This proved to be very slow, especially when voters marked their own papers.

The process was further complicated because the Open Electorate and Provincial Electorate ballot-papers were very similar in appearance, being differentiated only by a pale blue or pale pink band at the bottom of the ballot-paper. Voters found it difficult to differentiate between them. Many of the informal votes that were identified in counting rooms across the country arose because voters mixed up the forms – writing their open seat preferences on the provincial ballot-paper, and vice versa.

There may well have been many more papers marked in error than were identified as informal. For this reason, voters and polling officials around the country were universally critical of the new ballot-papers. Many officials have since called for the

reintroduction of photographs on the ballot-papers, while others have insisted that bolder colours should be used in the future, or that the ballot-papers should be markedly different in size or shape.

Despite the confusion brought about by the new ballot-papers, the informal vote remained very low. In no small part, this resulted from the high level of assisted voting witnessed around the country. In the Highlands Region, the vast majority of voters were assisted — either by polling officials, police, campaign managers, candidates' scrutineers, or family members. Given the low literacy levels, especially in remote rural areas, assistance proved to be necessary in many cases. However, assistance was often forced. It was also observed that completed ballot-papers were often checked as well. As a result, very few voters were afforded a secret ballot.

Counting

Counting was generally well-organised, although slow. As a result, the deadline for the return of writs needed to be extended by a week. For the most part, irregularities in counting were identified by the checks and balances that were employed. Observers in most electorates reported that individual ballot-box counts were checked against the returns, and serious anomalies were investigated, which often gave rise to recounts. Anomalies were identified with the NCD Provincial, the EHP Provincial, and the SHP Provincial counts.

At a procedural level, counting in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions was generally well-organised, as evidenced by the individual team reports. Counting was conducted in an open and transparent manner. Used and unused papers were reconciled, individual ballot-box counts were reconciled against the ballot-papers that were issued and the presiding officers' returns, and checks and balances picked up papers that had been wrongly allocated in the first instance.

Counting in all of the Highlands provinces was centralised in the provincial headquarters. Procedurally, it varied — within provinces and between them — but overall, it tended to be well-organised, with varying degrees of transparency.

The Impact of LPV

It was expected that LPV would 'require candidates to widen their support base' (Standish 2006:197), and 'promote the election of more broadly supported candidates' (Reilly 2006:189). It is arguably too early to judge whether this will necessarily be the case, although observers did note that many candidates sought votes and preferences more widely than they had been able to in the past. Even so, there was little concerted collaboration, and no serious evidence, of widespread preference swapping, either between parties or individual candidates.

In view of this, the election of more broadly supported candidates will largely depend upon two things:

- whether LPV attracts fewer candidates, or gives rise to a proliferation of candidates; and
- whether voters choose to make their votes count.

The early indications are positive. First, overall candidate numbers dropped slightly in 2007, and significantly in several electorates which had experienced an LPV by-election. Second, preliminary analysis of the available results suggests that there were critical differences in how people in different electorates used preferences.

In at least five of the electorates which had experienced an LPV by-election, preferences seem to have been utilised more strategically and effectively than in the by-elections. In these cases, voters with previous LPV experience chose to ‘make their vote count’, and did not allocate their preferences to minor local candidates, but to strong candidates with a track record and/or wide appeal. This has seen more-widely representative candidates elected – something that LPV advocates had hoped for.

A thorough assessment of the election and definitive conclusions about LPV will not be possible until such time as the full results are available for analysis and scrutiny. In the interim, preliminary observations can be made, based on the analysis of the available results. Preliminary analysis suggests that, after the allocation of preferences, the mandates of winning candidates broadly doubled, such that successful candidates typically had the support of approximately one-third of voters in their respective electorates. By comparison, two-thirds of the MPs who were elected in 2002 were elected with less than 20 percent of the vote.

Recommendations

The following recommendations arise from the key findings of the various observer teams, as incorporated in this report. The recommendations are grouped under thematic subheadings and not necessarily in order of priority. Many seek to address problems specifically identified in the Highlands Region. The highest priority should go to Electoral Roll verification and cleansing, training, and ongoing awareness activities. These will be absolutely critical in the lead-up to the 2012 General Elections.

Electoral Rolls

1. ***The Electoral Roll requires ongoing attention through thorough verification and cleansing, in good time for the 2012 General Elections***, in order to ensure political equality between citizens, restore confidence in the PNGEC, and ensure that the elections have integrity. To facilitate this verification, rolls should be publicly displayed at both the district and ward levels.
2. ***Public readings of the Electoral Rolls, in the presence of community scrutineers, the ward councillor, and the village recorder should also be incorporated into the roll cleansing and verification exercise***, as a means of producing more accurate rolls. This would also help to generate community ownership of the rolls.
3. ***Mechanisms for ensuring that proper enrolment procedures are followed need to be established***, so that enrolment officers and individuals who enrol or witness duplicate claims, or claims from underage children and deceased persons can be duly prosecuted.
4. ***The ‘Claim for Enrolment’ form needs to be reviewed and revised***, such that the declaration accurately reflects the legislatively proscribed eligibility

requirements. The redesigned form might also collect additional personal information (names in particular), and should be designed in such a way that enrolling voters retain a receipt or enrolment card, bearing their elector ID and ward of enrolment. This would facilitate better roll cleansing and easier identification of duplicate entries across and within wards.

Administration and Planning

5. ***It is imperative that transparent selection criteria are used when engaging staff to conduct the 2012 General Elections.*** To facilitate this selection criteria, detailing core competencies must be established, such that returning officers, assistant returning officers, polling and counting officials are recruited on the basis of merit. Staff should then be properly trained and supported, but then held accountable for their actions.
6. ***Returning officers and assistant returning officers must be appointed early in the election cycle.*** The constant appointment, revocation, and reappointment of personnel should be avoided in future elections.
7. ***Further review of polling schedules is recommended, with the aim of reducing time and overall costs.*** Consideration should be given to alternative approaches in high risk areas such as the Highlands Region, including the use of mobile polling teams, with each backed up by a section-strength PNGDF security attachment – with a single ballot-box per LLG. This would not only enhance the secrecy of the ballot and undermine the growing trend towards money politics, but also could be more effective in terms of financial, security, and human resources.
8. ***One-day polling per Highlands province should be abandoned as it is unworkable. Instead, polling in each of the Highlands' provinces should be staggered over several days.*** This will allow for a more concentrated security presence and will allow time for security personnel to move between districts.
9. ***Where two or more wards are gazetted to poll at a single location, consideration should be given to amalgamating the ward rolls and creating a single polling place,*** in order to limit the potential for multiple voting. Such an amalgamation should necessarily involve cross-checking and the removal of duplicates.
10. ***Effective mechanisms for the timely release of necessary funds need to be established.*** This will help ensure that critical operational and logistical matters are finalised well in advance of polling, essential materials are delivered on time, and scheduled activities, such as awareness and the insertion of polling teams, occur according to plan.
11. ***The Provincial and Open ballot-papers need be redesigned so that they are more easily distinguishable from each other.*** This could be achieved in a number of ways — by using bolder colours, or changing the size or layout of one or other of the ballot-papers. Such changes would most likely reduce the number of informal votes and reduce the counting time.

12. ***Procedures to ensure that presiding officers' returns are available in the counting room need be established.*** This could be achieved by producing the returns in duplicate. The duplicate copy could be provided to the security commander on the ground, in order to ensure that returns can be produced, and the votes that have been cast balanced against the returns, even in the event that presiding officers choose to withhold them.
13. ***In 2012 and future elections, polling officials should be provided with a letter explaining why tax has been deducted from their payments.*** An explanation about taxes should also be included in the polling officials' training manual.

Awareness and Training

14. ***Training needs to be given priority and budgeted for between now and the 2012 General Elections, and PNGEC training manuals need to be revised and updated in view of the recent legislative amendments and policy changes (e.g. gender segregated polling).*** Quality assurance checks also need to be put in place to ensure that polling officials receive proper training, prior to polling.
15. ***Electoral and civic awareness and voter education involving civil society needs to continue and should be given priority,*** in order to generate and foster demand for good, trouble-free elections and to build on the good governance gains made during the 2007 General Elections. Where necessary, civil society groups undertaking such awareness should be supported with training and funds.

Interagency Cooperation

16. ***Interagency structures should be formalised, and the roles of the various stakeholders clarified,*** especially in relation to who has responsibility for recommending the appointment of returning officers and assistant returning officers.
17. ***Electoral officials and security personnel who are deployed to remote districts need reliable and effective communication.*** They need to be able to communicate with each other and other agencies involved in running the elections. As such, they need to be provided with radios or satellite phones (according to context) that are in good working order.

Security

18. ***The role of the security forces should be clarified, and predeployment training provided to all security personnel, prior to the 2012 Elections.*** Police, Correctional Service, and Defence personnel who are assigned to polling places should be properly trained and made aware of what is expected of them in relation to electoral offences, so that they are seen to be making a significant contribution to electoral governance.
19. ***A training package that is specifically designed for security personnel should be developed and rolled-out to each of the services.*** Given the important role which they play at election time, and that elections are a whole-of-government exercise, the RPNGC, the PNGDF and the CS personnel need specific and consistent training, as opposed to ad hoc training, on electoral procedures and

electoral offences, guidance on when to intervene, and the extent of their special constable powers under a call out.

20. *As in this election, the PNGDF personnel who are deployed under a national call out should be deployed early (preferably a fortnight or month before polling), to each of the Highlands' provinces, so that necessary reconnaissance and intelligence can be gathered in order to identify local flashpoints and appropriate action taken.*

Domestic Observers

21. *Domestic election observers should be retained, and encouraged in future elections.* To ensure the capacity and professionalism of the domestic observer program, preparations should commence early in the election cycle, so that observers can be recruited and properly trained well in advance.
22. *The research capacity of Papua New Guinea's academic institutions needs to be strengthened, so that there is a sizable pool of suitably qualified academics and practitioners who might be engaged in future domestic observations.* Continued international assistance is likely to be required to achieve a robust and high quality domestic observer presence in future elections.

Gender

23. *Further research concerning how to encourage greater numbers of female candidates is needed, as are enabling mechanisms which would see an increase in the number of women entering Parliament.* Models that have been employed in other countries should be examined for their suitability in a Papua New Guinean context.
24. *The gender segregated polling procedures that were trialled in this election should be retained.* Staff should be trained and made fully cognisant of these procedures, and if necessary, should be legislatively proscribed.

HIV/AIDS

25. *Awareness about HIV/AIDS should continue to be undertaken, in conjunction with any future electoral and civic awareness, as many of the behavioural problems noted in this election — especially those associated with campaign houses, increase the likelihood of HIV transmission.*

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

Independent observation, monitoring, and assessment of the 2007 General Elections was undertaken under the Electoral Support Program — Phase 2 (ESP 2) in order to provide an analysis that can be used by the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) and other government agencies critical to the elections, to further improve the planning and delivery of future elections. These observations were undertaken by a team of domestic observers, led by academics appointed by the National Research Institute.

The exercise was funded by AusAID, through ESP 2. Some 150 observers took part in the domestic observation, whose purpose was to generate and analyse quantitative and qualitative data, in order to provide an impartial and accurate assessment of the 2007 General Elections.

The domestic observation involved a partnership between academics and civil society. All of Papua New Guinea's major tertiary institutions were represented, including the University of Papua New Guinea, the University of Technology, the University of Goroka, the Divine Word University, and the University of Vudal, under the leadership and coordination of the National Research Institute. Other institutions and individuals who were involved in the observation included personnel from The Australian National University (ANU), and members of 22 civil society groups who had been actively involved in carrying out civic and electoral awareness throughout the country, in the lead-up to the elections. These groups, including the Amazon Bay HIV/AIDS Committee, PNG Caritas, Western Highlands Students' Association, the East New Britain Field Workers Association, Meri i Kirap Sapotim, EHP Women in Agriculture, Central Besana Hahemauri, and Ima Kelo Associates, to name just a few, had been trained and funded by ESP 2 and had successfully completed wide-ranging awareness activities throughout Papua New Guinea's four regions.

The observation was jointly coordinated by Dr. Ray Anere, Senior Research Fellow, NRI, and Dr. Nicole Haley of the ANU's State, Society, and Governance in Melanesia Project. The domestic observation was based on the Terms of Reference accepted by the Inter-departmental Election Committee (IDEC), in May 2007.

Specifically, the 2007 General Election domestic observation comprised 18 observer teams, each covering a single Open or Provincial Electorate. Typically, the teams comprised an academic team leader and 6–10 civil society observers, depending on the type of electorate. Electorates were chosen so that each of the four regions — New Guinea Islands, Momase, Southern, and Highlands — was represented, to ensure a mix of rural and urban, open and provincial, as well as electorates which had and hadn't experienced an LPV by-election. Because of the problems in the Highlands Region in past elections — particularly in 2002 — nine Highlands electorates were chosen. Table 1 shows the electorates that were subject to observation.

Individual observers were engaged for up to 28 days¹ over a two-month period, and were given the task of making observations during the nomination, campaign, pre-poll,

¹ Those observers who underwent training and/or were accredited very late – just prior to polling in some cases — were engaged for only 21 days.

polling, and counting periods. To assist them in this task, observers undertook a day-long training program, and were given an observer's journal to complete. In most cases, these individuals were able to observe the elections unhindered, and in many cases, received support and assistance from the security forces that were deployed to assist with the smooth running of the elections. Unfortunately, a few observers were threatened during their work activities. These incidents aside, observers found the exercise a positive and rewarding one.

Upon completion of the observation exercise, each team, in collaboration with their team leader, was responsible for compiling a team report. The key findings arising from their observations are contained in this overarching report.

Table 1: Electorates Subject to Observation

Team	Electorate	Province	Region	Outcome
1	NCD Provincial	NCD	NCD	Urban, By-Election
2	Port Moresby South	NCD	NCD	Urban, no By-Election
3	Bougainville Provincial	Bougainville	New Guinea Islands	Rural, By-Election
4	Gazelle Open	East New Britain	New Guinea Islands	Rural, no By-Election
5	Ijivitari Open	Northern	Southern	Rural, no By-Election
6	Abau Open	Central	Southern	Rural, By-Election
7	Lae Open	Morobe	Momase	Urban, no By-Election
8	Yangoru-Saussia Open	East Sepik	Momase	Rural, By-Election
9	Madang Provincial	Madang	Momase	Urban/Rural, no By-Election
10	Goroka Open	Eastern Highlands	Highlands	Urban/Rural, no By-Election
11	EHP Provincial	Eastern Highlands	Highlands	Rural, no By-Election

Team	Electorate	Province	Region	Outcome
12	Wabag Open	Enga	Highlands	Rural, By-Election
13	Chimbu Provincial	Chimbu	Highlands	Rural, By-Election
14	Mt. Hagen Open	Western Highlands	Highlands	Urban/Rural, no By-Election
15	Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open	Southern Highlands	Highlands	Remote Rural, By-Election
16	SHP Provincial	Southern Highlands	Highlands	Rural, no By-Election
17	Kagua-Erave Open	Southern Highlands	Highlands	Remote Rural, no By-Election
18	Chuave Open	Chimbu	Highlands	Remote Rural, By-Election

(Table 1 continued)

Observation Objectives

The key objectives of the domestic observation were to observe and assess the 2007 General Elections in order to:

- generate and analyse quantitative and qualitative data that will inform and further improve the management of and operational plans for future elections; and
- assess the positive and negative impacts of the recent reforms on the Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections (OLNLLGE), and the first full use of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC), and comment upon the extent to which they have achieved their desired outcomes, and influenced the conduct of the election.

Research Methodology

In undertaking this activity, the observation team utilised field-based methods to observe, assess, and review the 2007 General Elections. In order to ensure they relevant data were collected in a systematic way, a comprehensive observer journal was developed. For the most part, the journal comprised questions that were designed to gather information, which would allow for qualitative analysis, as well as direct comparisons made between electorates.

Two key sections of the observer journal — Sections 7 and 13 — involved undertaking voter surveys. These surveys provided the basis of the quantitative analysis which assessed key aspects of electoral administration in respect of the Electoral Roll and awareness, as well as voters' polling day experiences:

- Did they require assistance in order to vote?
- Did they experience intimidation when voting?
- Were they afforded a secret ballot?

Gathering this information involved:

- direct personal observation during the nomination and campaign periods, on polling day, during the counting period, and during the period immediately following the declarations;
- focus group discussions; and
- selective interviews with key informants, including election officials and the police.

These observations, discussions, and interviews were undertaken in the respective electorates, the provincial headquarters, and other urban centres.

Specifically, team members were tasked to carry out observations and record them, answer questions contained within the Domestic Observation Observer Journal and collect other relevant information. The journal consisted of 18 separate sections, each covering a different aspect of the election. These sections included:

- Key Personnel (Section 1);
- The New Electoral Roll (Section 2);
- The Nomination Period (Section 3);
- The Campaign Period — General Observations (Section 4);
- The Campaign Period — Candidate Information (Section 5);
- The Campaign Period — Candidate Rallies (Section 6);
- The Campaign Period — First Survey (Section 7)
- Survey 1 — Worksheet (Section 8)
- Pre-Poll Period — Observations (Section 9); and
- Polling Day — Polling Observation (Section 10);
- Polling Day — Second Survey (Section 11); and
- Post-Polling — Observations (Section 12);
- Post-Polling — Third Survey (Section 13)
- Survey 3 — Worksheet (Section 14)
- Counting — General Observations (Section 15),
- Results and Statistics (Section 16);
- Disputes (Section 17); and
- Evaluation Form (Section 18).

Team members also conducted selective interviews with key informants, including community and elected leaders, councillors, the clergy, women, candidates, and campaign managers and their supporters. Supplementary material was sourced by undertaking a literature survey and through discussions with officials and security personnel.

In each case, the observers' own personal observations were recorded. Once individual observers had completed their observations, they were required to submit

their journal to their team leader, who was tasked to produce a team report, drawing on the team's observations. This overarching report summarises the findings and observations contained within the team reports. No attempt has been made to independently verify the personal observations of individual observers, although photographic evidence of many of the voting irregularities does exist.

The Research Team

Observations were undertaken in 18 separate electorates. Teams notionally comprised an academic team leader, as well as 6-10 observers drawn from civil society. The team leaders are set down in Table 2.

Table 2: The Team Leaders

Team	Electorate	Province	Team Leader
1	NCD Provincial	NCD	Ms. Patricia Kassman
2	Port Moresby South	NCD	Ms. Patricia Kassman
3	Bougainville Provincial	Bougainville	Dr. Alphonse Gelu
4	Gazelle Open	East New Britain	Mr. Bruce Ningakun
5	Ijivitari Open	Northern	Mr. Dickson Susab
6	Abau Open	Central	Dr. Ray Anere
7	Lae Open	Morobe	Mr. Albert Ayius
8	Yangoru-Saussia Open	East Sepik	Fr. Pat Gesh
9	Madang Provincial	Madang	Mr. Patrick Matbob
10	Goroka Open	Eastern Highlands	Dr. Goru Hane-Nou
11	EHP Provincial	Eastern Highlands	Dr. Michael Unage
12	Wabag Open	Enga	Dr. Philip Gibbs
13	Chimbu Provincial	Chimbu	Ms. Anna Naura
14	Mt Hagen Open	Western Highlands	Mr. Matthew Rapenda
15	Koroba-Lake Kapiago	Southern Highlands	Dr. Nicole Haley
16	SHP Provincial	Southern Highlands	Dr. Nicole Haley
17	Kagua-Erave Open	Southern Highlands	Dr. Richard Eves
18	Chuave Open	Chimbu	Mr. Steven Gari

The Challenges

The domestic observation had many challenges. From the outset, there were major problems mobilising and keeping the activity on track. In the first instance, this resulted from the very short lead time. Subsequently, NRI experienced difficulties and delays with respect to the release of funds to the academic team leaders. This meant that the NRI team leaders did not attend team training sessions, which necessitated a re-run. This delayed the observation from the outset and had flow-on effects, in that many of the team leaders and civil society observers operated independently of each other — the Yangoru-Saussia Open and Madang Provincial teams, being particular cases in point.

In many cases, individual observers did not complete all sections of the journal. The reasons for this includes:

- nominations had closed prior to the commencement of the observation;
- in some cases, there were no rallies to observe; and
- delays to polling and counting meant that some observers had worked 28 days – even prior to the commencement of the count.

The mobilisation and retention of team leaders also proved to be somewhat difficult. The team leaders for Mt. Hagen Open, Chimbu Provincial, and Eastern Highlands Provincial were all removed for various reasons, while the team leader for NCD Provincial chose to drop out. For the three Highlands teams, one of the civil society team members stepped in and assumed the leadership role, whereas in the case of the NCD, the Moresby South team leader, Patricia Kassman, assumed leadership of both teams.

Several of the academic team leaders were not political or social scientists and had no election-related research experience. These data impacted on their capacity to offer guidance to their fellow team members.

It also became evident that many of the academic team leaders remained unclear about their roles. For example, several claimed not to have been aware that they were required to produce an observation report – having instead focused on topic specific chapters for the separate, but nevertheless linked, NRI election research activity.

Several team leaders did not collect the observer journals from their team members until very late, or not at all, and Agnes Titus and Caleb Warike, who were civil society observers from the Bougainville and Yangoru-Saussia teams, respectively, brought their journals, and those of their fellow team members, to the September 2007 debriefing workshop in Port Moresby. The team leader for Lae, failed to produce a team report. However, individual reports were produced by the two Lae Unitech researchers involved in this team, and a team report was subsequently prepared by Dr. Anere, based on these data and interviews with the team leader. Similarly, the Yangoru-Saussia team leader failed to produce a team report. The short report we have in respect of that electorate was subsequently written by Mr. Caleb Warike, who was one of the Yangoru-Saussia team members.

Only 11 of the 18 individual team reports were written by academic researchers. Needless to say, the individual team reports are of variable quality. It is to the credit of the civil society observers who were involved, that reports for the remaining electorates were forthcoming. It should also be noted that the degree to which individual authors

have incorporated quantitative data and the observations of individual team members, as reflected in their journals, also varies greatly. This not only reflects research capacity, but has hindered efforts to write this report.

Despite support at the highest level, and the whole-of-government approach to the 2007 Elections, there was surprisingly little knowledge about the presence of domestic observers. Several teams found that key electoral officials and security personnel were unaware that a domestic observation was being undertaken,² and as a result experienced obstruction in the first instance.

For example, the Mt. Hagen Open observers were initially denied access to the Western Highlands Provincial counting centre, and one of the Southern Highlands Provincial regional observers was beaten up by security personnel when he tried to observe a training session for polling officials. Thankfully, the problems that were experienced tended to be quickly resolved. Many teams reported receiving valuable assistance from the security personnel in particular.

Another quite significant challenge has been the inability to obtain the official results. Eleven months after the return of writs, the full results are still not available for analysis and scrutiny, although we understand that the PNGEC is currently working on finalising the results. At the time of finalising this report, results for only 24 of the 89 Open seats and eight of the 20 Provincial seats were available. As a consequence, our conclusions concerning LPV remain preliminary.

Challenges aside, the domestic observation proved to be a very worthwhile exercise. The lessons learned will undoubtedly help future observations to run more smoothly.

² The first version of the security booklet prepared by the RPNGC (RPNGC 2007a), and issued to Police, Defence, and Correctional Service personnel deployed under the National Elections (NATEL) operations did not include anything about the domestic observation. A second version of the booklet, entitled *Election Handbook 2007* (RPNGC 2007b), which was printed in June 2007, did include a section on observers, but unfortunately was issued too late to be distributed to security personnel already in the field.

Recommendation

- ***Domestic election observers should be retained, and encouraged in future elections.*** To ensure the capacity and professionalism of the domestic observer program, preparations should commence early in the election cycle, so that observers can be recruited and properly trained, well in advance.
- ***The research capacity of Papua New Guinea's academic institutions needs to be strengthened, so that there is a sizable pool of suitably qualified academics and practitioners who might be engaged in future domestic observations.*** Continued international assistance is likely to be required to achieve a robust and high quality domestic observer presence in future elections.

SECTION 2: ELECTION PREPARATIONS AND PRE-POLLING

This section of the report details observations concerning election planning and the pre-polling period. It draws on Sections 1 to 7, as well as Section 13 of the Observer Journal.

The Election Timetable

The following events constituted the election timetable:

- Issue of Writs – 4 May 2007;
- Close of Nominations – 10 May 2007;
- Commencement of Polling – 30 June 2007;
- Completion of Polling – 10 July 2007; and
- Return of Writs – 30 July 2007.

As detailed in Section 3 of this report, polling fell behind schedule in the Highlands provinces, which necessitated a ten-day extension to the polling period. Several factors contributed to this situation — poor infrastructure and bad weather, a lack of air transport, last minute changes to the air transport schedules, and poor planning and logistical support in some provinces. As a consequence of the extended polling period and slow counting in Southern Highlands and Western Highlands Provinces, which was exacerbated by court injunctions, the return of writs was also initially extended by a week, and subsequently by a further week. In total, some 23 court cases were brought against the PNGEC during the election period (Nonggorr, personal communication 2008).

Key Electoral Personnel

This section is based on Section 1 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were required to identify the key electoral personnel in their electorate. Based on personal observation, they were then asked to make assessments about their performance, including whether:

- they understood their role;
- were unbiased;
- supervised and trained subordinates well; and
- were present when needed.

Two of the 18 observer teams commended the performance of the key electoral personnel in their province and/or electorate. The others reported poor performance on the part of provincial election managers (PEMs), and/or returning officers (ROs) and assistant returning officers (AROs), while observing that they were difficult to locate and didn't demonstrate a good understanding of their roles. It was also noted that many PEMs and ROs were conveniently absent, when administrative issues, problems, and complaints arose (see Bougainville, Ijivitari, Kagua-Erave, Koroba-Lake Kopiago, and Southern Highlands provincial team reports). Even when they were present, many proved to be ineffectual.

Observers in several electorates also reported concerns that key electoral personnel were partisan, that they failed to properly train polling and counting officials, and that the appointment of AROs, presiding officers, and other polling officials were all subject to political interference. Specific allegations were raised in Koroba-Lake Kapiago and Kagua-Erave electorates.

The three Southern Highlands teams and the Wabag Open observer team reported that key electoral personnel were changed in the lead up to the election. This hampered election preparations, and resulted in pre-polling and post-polling disputes in Southern Highlands Province.

Recommendations

- ***It is imperative that transparent selection criteria are used when engaging staff to conduct the 2012 General Elections.*** To facilitate this selection criteria, detailing core competencies, must be established, such that returning officers, assistant returning officers, and polling and counting officials are recruited on the basis of merit. Staff should then be properly trained and supported, and held accountable for their actions.
- ***Returning officers and assistant returning officers must be appointed early in the election cycle.*** The constant appointment, revocation, and re-appointment of personnel should be avoided in future elections.

The New Electoral Roll

This section is based on Section 2 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were asked a series of questions about the new Electoral Roll, and in particular, the enrolment and verification exercises. Specific questions that were asked included whether:

- the observer had completed a “Claim for Enrolment form”;
- their name appeared on the new Electoral Roll;
- it appeared in the right ward; and
- they were enrolled multiple times.

They were also asked whether a verification exercise had taken place in their area, and if the Electoral Roll had been publicly displayed for verification purposes.

Where appropriate, observers were also asked to undertake an electoral roll audit activity. Very few observers completed this task — mainly because they were unable to obtain copies of the Electoral Roll.

Observers were also asked to conduct a pre-polling and post-polling survey of 20 voters — 10 men and 10 women. These surveys, which were based on Sections 7 and 13 of the Observer Journal, included a series of questions about the Electoral Roll and awareness. As part of the pre-polling survey, intending voters were asked the following questions:

- Did you know that there is a new Electoral Roll?
- Did you complete a “Claim for Enrolment” form?
- Are you enrolled to vote?
- Have you seen verification teams in your area?
- Have you checked whether your name appears on the new Electoral Roll?

In addition, people who participated in the post-polling survey were asked how many times they had voted. However, no attempt was made to independently verify voter responses.

Political commentators have long been aware of problems with Papua New Guinea’s Electoral Roll. It is well-documented that enrolled voters have far exceeded the number of eligible citizens, for more than a decade (Standish 2002, 2003; Haley 2002, 2004:20; Gibbs 2006), in the Highlands electorates. Recognising this, a decision was made to do away with the old common rolls following the 2002 Elections. The PNGEC then embarked upon a nationwide re-registration exercise, which was a mammoth task.

The new Electoral Roll, which resulted from a reregistration exercise that commenced in late 2005, appears more accurate than those used in 1997 and 2002, in that it is considerably smaller. The new roll, which contains the names of 3 938 839 registered voters, has 1.4 million fewer names than the 2002 roll. This is certainly an achievement.

However, observers around the country repeatedly received complaints from people who claimed that they were not on the roll, and many reported seeing voters turned away from polling stations on polling day. Collectively, our domestic observers noted major faults with the voter re-registration and verification exercises, although observations varied.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Survey work that was undertaken by our Madang and NCD observer teams suggests that enrolment teams in urban areas did go door-to-door in an effort to ensure all eligible citizens were enrolled. For example, the Madang observer team reported that 40 percent of survey respondents had completed a claim for enrolment form, while a survey of 180 voters in Port Moresby revealed that 73 percent had actually filled out a “Claim for Enrolment” form. The same survey also revealed that 58 percent of the 180 voters who were surveyed had seen the verification teams, and 39 percent had managed to check that their names actually appeared on the electoral roll.

Our observer teams in the Islands Region — Bougainville and Gazelle — also reported that the enrolment and verification exercises took place satisfactorily, and enrolment teams visited each ward. A survey of 120 voters on Bougainville revealed that 38 percent had completed a claim for enrolment form, 33 percent had seen the verification teams, and 43 percent had managed to check whether their names appeared on the new electoral roll. The Gazelle team also reported that checks and balances were employed and voters were not permitted to complete a “Claim for Enrolment” form on behalf of absent family members. That said, the Gazelle team also noted:

Many people surveyed after the elections said that although they had filled out registration forms and given them to the ward councillors and village recorders, their names still did not appear on the Electoral Roll for them to vote.

The enrolment and verification exercises seem to have taken place satisfactorily in Yangoru-Saussia and Abau Electorates, as well. A survey of 120 voters in Yangoru-Saussia revealed that 42 percent had completed a “Claim for Enrolment” form, 64 percent had seen the verification teams, and 42 percent had managed to check whether their names appeared on the new Electoral Roll.

In the Ijivitari electorate, by contrast, observers noted that the enrolment exercise took place hurriedly and with little warning. Voters who were interviewed claimed that a third to a half of eligible citizens were not enrolled. They also reported that there were duplicate entries, and ‘dead people’ included on the rolls. They further reported that verification rolls were only displayed in provincial headquarters, and not in the districts or wards, and that amendments to the verification rolls were not reflected in the final rolls. Dissatisfaction with the new Electoral Roll gave rise to much discussion and delayed the start of polling by 30 to 60 minutes at almost all polling stations that were visited by the Ijivitari observer team.

The Highlands Region

Major problems with the Electoral Roll were noted in the Highlands Region. Observers in Eastern Highlands and Western Highlands Province reported that voter registration and verification exercises were inadequate. Verification rolls were not placed on public display in Mt. Hagen, and voter surveys revealed that less than 20 percent of men and 10 percent of women reported having completed a “Claim for Enrolment” form.

In Chimbu Province, the majority of voters who were surveyed reported that they had not taken part in the registration exercise, and were not aware that it had taken place. A pre-polling survey of 140 intending voters, and a post-polling survey of 120 people in Chuave revealed that only 36 people (14 percent of respondents) had completed a “Claim for Enrolment” form. Not surprisingly, some 60 percent of respondents found that they were not enrolled in their ward of residence. However, others found that they were enrolled, even though they had not completed a “Claim for Enrolment” form. Although so few people had enrolled, and more than half had found that their names were not on the new Electoral Roll, 98 percent of the 120 people who were surveyed in the post-polling period reported that they had voted, and a third admitted to having voted more than once.

In Wabag, a pre-polling survey of 140 intending voters, revealed that only 32 percent had completed a “Claim for Enrolment” form (see Wabag Open team report). A follow-up survey after the election, involving 120 voters, found that only 16 percent had completed a “Claim for Enrolment” form. The same survey found that more than 80 percent of the same respondents had actually voted in the election, and that 84 percent were actually enrolled. Similar responses were obtained in Southern Highlands Province, where a survey of 400 voters revealed that only 15 percent had completed a “Claim for Enrolment” form (see Southern Highlands Provincial team report). Also,

only one of the 12 Koroba-Lake Kopiago observers had filled in a “Claim for Enrolment” form, although all were enrolled — and most multiple times.

Although less than 25 percent of adults who were surveyed in the Highlands Region had actually enrolled to vote, electoral rolls in the region continue to be highly inflated. Detailed analyses undertaken by the Wabag and Koroba-Lake Kopiago observer teams indicate that the Southern Highlands provincial electoral roll is twice the size it should be (see Haley 2002; 2004; 2006), while the Enga electoral roll appears to be inflated by 45 percent (see Wabag team report).

Close examination of the rolls for the 19 wards within Lake Kopiago local-level government (LLG) — which is one of four LLGs within the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate — reveals that only 50.2 percent of the 10 351 enrolled voters were eligible to enrol. An examination of the 10 351 entries in the ward rolls for Lake Kopiago also revealed the following irregularities:

- highly inflated voter numbers in many wards;
- entire villages and hamlets assigned to the wrong wards;
- 2 426 (23.4%) enrolled voters were not known in the ward;
- 1 197 (11.6%) underage voters had enrolled with fictitious birth dates;
- 744 (7.2%) enrolled voters did not meet residency requirement;
- 664 (6.4%) enrolled voters were duplicate entries;
- 243 (2.3%) were deceased voters who had miraculously reregistered; and
- at least 735 eligible citizens did not appear on the new Electoral Roll.

The ward rolls for the remaining three LLGs in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Electorate appear equally problematic, and more so in the case of North Koroba and South Koroba LLGs. Sixteen of the 20 most overenrolled wards in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate are located in the Koroba area (see Koroba-Lake Kopiago team report). The Tumbite ward roll alone contains 314 duplicate entries (see Koroba-Lake Kopiago team report), while the electorate roll includes 288 people purportedly born on 1 January 1900 — many of whom are listed as ‘students’, and 1 123 people for whom no birth date is given.

As well as wards in which enrolments are highly inflated, there are many Southern Highlands provincial wards that are under enrolled (see Kagua-Erave team report). In some cases, this seems to have arisen as a result of administrative errors, but in other cases, because enterprising candidates successfully managed to ensure that their opponents’ supporters were disenfranchised. In Southern Highlands Province, observers identified whole families and clans that were disenfranchised as a result of being placed in the wrong wards, or by being left off the roll completely. They also collected information from a variety of sources — including AROs — which suggested that supporters of particular candidates had difficulty gaining access to “Claim for Enrolment” forms, which give rise to widespread speculation and claims of bribery, mismanagement, and corruption in several Southern Highlands electorates — Koroba-Lake Kopiago, Tari-Pori, Imbonggu, and Kagua-Erave.

Throughout the Highlands Region, observers repeatedly heard the complaint that ‘not enough forms were sent out’ during the roll reregistration exercise. Clearly, sufficient forms were sent out, as is evidenced by the highly inflated roll. However, they

were used inappropriately and in fraudulent ways, to enrol children and people who were already deceased, which caused eligible citizens to be left off the new Electoral Roll. In Lake Kopiago LLG, 735 eligible citizens do not appear on the new Electoral Roll.

Where “Claim for Enrolment” forms were completed and signed on behalf of children, dead people, or those long absent from the electorate — people who did not meet the legislatively proscribed residency requirement — correct procedures were not followed. For example, an official who witnesses a claim for enrolment is legislatively required, by s. 56 of the Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections (OLNLLGE), to satisfy himself or herself that the statements made, and information provided in the claim, were true.³ In most cases, the local village enumerators and witnesses — councillors and village recorders — would most likely have known which of the would-be voters were underage, deceased, or non-residents.

Compounding the problems arising from the enrolment exercise, each of the Highlands Region observer teams reported problems with the verification exercise. Verification rolls were not displayed in the districts or the wards – and in most cases were not seen prior to polling day. In Southern Highlands and Western Highlands Provinces, they were displayed only in the provincial headquarters and only for a very short period — a few days in each case. Where verification took place it seems to have been undertaken by individuals — many of the same people who were involved in the enrolment process. As a consequence, there was scant opportunity for public scrutiny of the electoral roll.

There were also claims of political interference at the verification stage. Certainly, in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate, enrolments in some of the previously overenrolled wards increased further during the verification phase — to the benefit of two particular candidates. The ARO for North Koroba was known to be supporting one candidate and the ARO for South Koroba, the other. In contrast, the AROs for Kopiago and Awi-Logaiyu LLGs reported that they were not given sufficient forms to enrol the missing voters (see Koroba-Lake Kopiago team report). Similar claims were made in the Kagua-Erave and Imbongu electorates.

³ This requirement is clearly spelled out in the *Electoral Roll Training Manual* (page 8, paragraph 3.3.6) which states that, “You are signing to verify that you saw the elector sign the enrolment form and you are satisfied the information contained on the enrolment form is true.”

Recommendations

- ***The Electoral Roll requires ongoing attention through thorough verification and cleansing, in good time for the 2012 General Elections.*** This is to ensure political equality between citizens, restore confidence in the PNGEC, and ensure that the elections have integrity. To facilitate this verification, rolls should be publicly displayed at both the district and ward levels.
- ***Public readings of the Electoral Roll, in the presence of community scrutineers, the ward councillor, and the village recorder should also be incorporated into the roll cleansing and verification exercise.*** This is seen as a means of producing more accurate rolls, and would also help to generate community ownership of the roll.
- ***Mechanisms for ensuring that proper enrolment procedures are followed need to be established.*** Enrolment officers and individuals who enrol or witness duplicate claims, or claims concerning underage children and deceased persons should be duly prosecuted.
- ***The “Claim for Enrolment” form needs to be reviewed and revised.*** The declaration accurately reflects the legislatively proscribed eligibility requirements. The redesigned form might also collect additional personal information and should be designed in such a way that enrolling voters retain a receipt or enrolment card bearing their elector identification and ward of enrolment. This would facilitate better roll cleansing and easier identification of duplicate entries across, and within, wards.

Nominations

This section is based on Section 3 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were asked a series of questions about the nomination period. Specific questions included:

- Was the election manager/provincial returning officer/ returning officer/assistant returning officer easy to locate during the nomination period?
- Did any candidate find it difficult to nominate?
- Was any intending candidate prevented from nominating?
- Did all candidates properly complete the nomination form?

The nomination period proved to be reasonably uneventful in most electorates that were observed, with the majority of candidates nominating on time and in official locations. Observers in several electorates noted that some nomination forms were incomplete, but they were still accepted by the returning officers. In the National Capital District (NCD) and many other parts of the country, candidates attended nominations in traditional regalia, accompanied by their supporters. In some electorates, impressive nomination rallies were noted. Only one team – the Koroba-Lake Kopiago observer team – reported that a candidate had difficulty in nominating. The candidate in question was prevented from nominating in the electorate after the ARO claimed that he did not have any

nomination forms. The candidate subsequently travelled to the provincial headquarters and nominated there.

Activities and Influence of Political Parties

This section draws upon observations made in Sections 5 and 6 of the Observer journal. In Section 5, observers were asked to collect information relating to each candidate, including whether they were endorsed, and if so, what kind of support they were receiving. In Section 6, they were asked to summarise the content of the candidate's speeches at election rallies.

As was noted by observers of previous elections, including the Limited Preferential Voting by-elections conducted by the PNG Electoral Commission under the *Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections, 2002*, party endorsement, where it occurs, often means very little on the ground (Standish 2006b:10). Gibbs (2006:13) noted that, in the 2004 Wabag By-election, only two candidates had party endorsement, and that 'party affiliation was not a very significant factor in voting patterns'. Standish *et al.* (2004:6) also noted that party policies are seldom discussed, and that party politics are 'largely decorative', being confined to 'impressive nomination rallies' and the occasional fleeting visit by party leaders or prominent ministers. Such statements ring true in the context of the 2007 National General Elections.

In the Papua New Guinean context, party endorsement in one election need not signal any long-term association with a particular party. Many candidates were noted to have changed party affiliations prior to this election, and the majority of those who were interviewed by various observer teams readily admitted that they had no long-term association with the party that had endorsed them. Instead, they claimed that party endorsement is a temporary alliance entered into for the purpose of the election in order to gain funding and logistical support.

Observations which were made at rallies around the country also reveal that there was very little substance in the form of party platforms and policies. The majority of candidates pitched their campaigns in the same way, by asserting that they would be good leaders, and bring goods and services. Very few candidates talked about women's issues or HIV/AIDS.

Given that there was very little differentiation between parties, by way of policies, and that 19 MPs in the 2007 Parliament were elected as Independents, we are of the view that party affiliation had little influence on voters. This is not to suggest that parties are completely irrelevant. On the contrary, strong candidates around the country sought, and gained, party endorsement, and many who had a party endorsement polled particularly well. This suggests that those candidates were able to gain endorsement because of their electoral popularity and likelihood of success, and that parties were more likely to endorse candidates who had a real chance of success. This probably explains why few women candidates were able to secure party endorsement, because few are expected to succeed.

Where candidates had party endorsements, this typically translated into some level of support with campaign expenses. The extent to which parties supported their

candidates varied greatly. For example, party leaders and officials attended many key rallies in the Highlands Region, although they were absent from rallies in the NCD, and were not seen at any rallies in the Ijivitari Open Electorate.

Observers around the country also noted that there were Independent candidates with close links to parties, particularly to the National Alliance (NA). In some places, people spoke of ‘undercover NA candidates’. Under the OLIPPAC, parties are only allowed to endorse one candidate in an electorate, and are prohibited from providing financial support to any other candidate.

Campaigning

This section is based upon Section 4 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were asked to make a series of general observations about the campaign period. Topics that were covered included security, awareness, vote buying, HIV/AIDS, and gender issues. Specific questions concerned:

- the general law and order situation;
- whether candidates were free to move around the electorate;
- whether the observer had witnessed any election-related violence;
- whether they had seen firearms in civilian hands or in the hands of candidates, campaign managers, or die-hard supporters;
- the cost of black market ammunition; and
- whether there were any airstrip or road closures as a result of election-related violence.

Campaigning in the 2007 Elections was quieter, far more relaxed, and more accommodative than in past elections. Observers reported that the majority of candidates were able to move around freely — something that had also been observed in the various LPV by-elections (Standish 2006b:8; Haley 2006). However, in the Highlands Region, there were places where individual candidates’ freedom of movement was curtailed (see the Southern Highlands Province, Koroba-Lake Kapiago, Kagua-Erave, and Wabag team reports), and reports of violent attacks on individual candidates, including the speaker of Parliament, Jeffrey Nape.

Seven observer teams — Chimbu, Eastern Highlands Provincial, NCD Provincial, Chuave, Port Moresby South, Wabag, and Koroba-Lake Kapiago — also noted that campaigning was a much more low-key affair compared with the 2002 Elections, and several of the LPV by-elections. These teams reported far fewer large public rallies. Instead, candidates seemed to prefer smaller clan or village-level gatherings this time around. Voters in Chuave reflected upon this change, and commented that elections are ‘getting boring’ and have ‘lost their flavour’.

Observers also noted that there was little or no violence in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions, and that the overall levels of violence in the Highlands seats were substantially reduced.

Around the country, campaign speeches were typically very short on substance and took a similar form. The vast majority of candidates invoke the rhetoric of good governance, and alleged corruption and inaction on the part of sitting MPs, while

promising to provide better health and education services, bring development, and improve law and order. Very few candidates spoke about social issues such as HIV/AIDS or gender violence.

Influence of LPV

Across the country, candidates tended to campaign in much the same way as they had under the former first-past-the post system; that is, by concentrating their efforts on areas where they believed they had their support base. While campaigning in their home areas, they typically focused on gaining first preferences only. Quite a few candidates were also observed to campaign more widely than they had in the past.

Even so, there was little concerted collaboration and no serious evidence of widespread preference-swapping, either between parties or individual candidates. Observers reported very few alliances or preference-swapping deals. Some were noted in the Gazelle Peninsula, where the observer team recorded inter-ethnic alliances between some Tolai and Baining candidates; in Mt. Hagen, where several preference-swapping MOUs were signed; and in Koroba-Lake Kapiago, where a preference-swapping MOU was signed between Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye.

No candidates were seen to offer voters any explanations about the count, and few talked about the different ways that preferences might be used. However, many advocated the negative use of preferences, by advising supporters to give their preferences to weak candidates. It was only the candidates who campaigned widely who actively campaigned for second and third preferences.

Some of the observer teams, particularly those in Chimbu, Mt. Hagen, and the NCD, formed the view that LPV had contributed to an improved security situation, whereby ethnic rivalry, and conflicts between candidates and supporters were reduced. In contrast, the Chimbu and Southern Highlands provincial teams observed heightened intra-provincial regionalism which resulted in a fair degree of pre-polling tension and post-election related violence. Large 'regional' identities covering more than one district have been mobilised in these provinces since 1982 (see Standish 1989; Ballard 1989; Haley 2007).

Ethnicity and regionalism also played a huge part in the campaigning in the Kagua-Erave and Koroba-Lake Kapiago electorates, and this was reflected in the way people allocated their preferences. In both electorates, ethnically closed campaigning was the norm, with both candidates and voters espousing the view that preferences should be retained within the one cultural, linguistic, or ethnic area. In the Koroba-Lake Kapiago electorate, this is particularly noteworthy, because, during the 2006 LPV by-election, candidates had freely and successfully campaigned across the ethnic divide – something that hadn't happened in the 1997 and 2002 National General Elections or the 2003 Supplementary Elections (Haley 2002, 2004, 2007). The return to ethnically closed campaigning is a significant shift, which undermines the hope that LPV will enable candidates and elected MPs to develop cross-electorate support bases.

Influence of Guns

Guns did not feature as extensively in this election as they had in the 1997 and 2002 polls. Seemingly, they did not feature during the elections in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions.

The Highlands Region

In Wabag, bush knives and axes were seen at rallies and during the campaign period, but not guns. However, dozens of illegal weapons were recovered by the PNGDF during a series of raids conducted during the polling and counting periods. The Wabag Open team reported that candidates and/or their supporters used guns to intimidate voters at two polling stations, and that a ballot-box at another polling place was seized at gunpoint.

In Chimbu, there were far fewer gun-related incidents reported than in 2002, although three candidates and some supporters were charged with being in possession of illegal firearms. One such incident involved the National Alliance endorsed Chuave Open candidate, Francis Kaupa, who was arrested in Kundiawa and charged with being in possession of an unregistered .22 rifle and ammunition (Poiya 2007). Of the seven Chuave observers, four reported seeing supporters carrying bush knives and axes. Only one reported seeing a home-made shotgun during campaigning.

In Goroka, observers encountered consistent rumours that supporters of various candidates were heavily armed, although no weapons were actually seen.

Observers in Mt. Hagen reported that, unlike 2002, when there was much intimidation and forced voting through a show of weapons, this election proceeded peacefully. They noted that, in particular, guns and other weapons were not brought to polling places and were not being used to intimidate people, and that there were no post-polling roadblocks or hold-ups by civilians.

However, guns were present in Southern Highlands Province in significant numbers, despite the imposition of a ten-month State of Emergency and special operation prior to the elections. Members of the Southern Highlands Provincial, Kagua-Erave, and Koroba-Lake Kapiago observer teams saw firearms during nominations, the campaign period, in the lead-up to the poll, and even on polling day. However, these and other weapons, such as bush knives, tended not to be openly displayed at polling places (except at Lake Kapiago), or used to influence voters, as had occurred in the past. It should be noted that weapons were reported — and observed — to be close at hand in several polling places, having been hidden in the nearby bush in case they were needed. There was also an incident which one Southern Highlands provincial observer recorded on film, whereby the occupants of a ‘fake’ Mobile Squad vehicle, reputedly kitted out by one high profile provincial candidate, fired upon the crowd in Tari.

During the campaign period, in particular, observers throughout Southern Highlands Province reported seeing home-made weapons and a variety of high-powered weapons, including M16s, AR15s, SLRs, and an Ultimax 100 in civilian hands. They also noted the presence of blackmarket ammunition in the province, in the lead-up to polling. They reported that shotgun cartridges were selling in Koroba for K10 to K15 each, and that 5.56 x 45mm NATO Standard ammunition, which is used in M16s and AR15s, was

selling for K5 to K7. This is consistent with the pre-State of Emergency pricing, and suggests that there was no shortage of ammunition in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate (see Haley and Muggah 2006).

It is also worth noting that several high-profile candidates in Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces were reputed to have armed their own militia. In Southern Highlands Province, one sitting MP also provided police uniforms to his militia. These were distributed on 31 January 2007, in the presence of an observer. Another sitting MP had a look alike Mobile Squad vehicle kitted out in Port Moresby, shipped to Lae, and transported to the Highlands. Observers saw this vehicle being loaded at the wharf in Moresby, and photographed it in Southern Highlands Province. On polling day, the occupants of this vehicle made several unsuccessful attempts to intercept ballot-boxes known to contain votes for an opposing candidate. Their attempts were thwarted by conscientious polling officials and the PNGDF.

Influence of “Money Politics”, Vote Buying, and Gifting

This section is based on Section 4 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were asked to make a series of general observations about the campaign period. One subset of questions within section 4, specifically concerned money politics, vote buying, and gifting. Observers were asked whether:

- they had seen people buying and and/or selling votes, and if so for how much;
- they had seen anyone offering bribes;
- grandstands had been constructed in their electorate, and if so, were candidates being charged a fee to use the grandstands.

Although guns played less of a role in this election, “money politics” was more significant than ever before. Candidates across the country were observed to have spent huge amounts of money by offering material incentives to voters. Several candidates in the Highlands Region are rumoured to have spent upwards of K2 million on their campaigns. Despite the high stakes, there were key candidates in many electorates who refused to engage in “money politics”, the most notable being Fr. John Garia (Governor elect), Noah Kool, and John Kerenga Gugl, who came first, second, and third in the Chimbu Provincial electorate.

The Highlands Region

Money politics, vote buying, and gifting were most pronounced in the Highlands Region, although provincial variations were noted. The Goroka Open team reported that there was no evidence of vote buying, but they observed substantial gifting in the form of foodstuff and campaign feasting. They noted, in particular, that the PANGU Party candidate, Thompson Harokaqveh, spent K15 000 per day keeping his campaign houses running, and that the amount of food cooked and distributed during the weekend prior to polling was ‘overwhelming’. In contrast, the Chuave team reported that several high-profile candidates openly distributed cash, while the Chimbu Provincial team noted that

some candidates, including the former governor, campaigned using ‘huge sums of money’. On the eve of polling in Enga Province, first preferences were being sold for K100 in both Wabag and Wapenamanda electorates, and second and third preferences for K30-K50, and K20, respectively.

In Southern Highlands Province, LPV has ushered in a new era of opportunism with respect to vote buying, in that voters now have three preferences to sell (see the Southern Highlands Provincial team report). Many made the most of this by courting and promising support to several candidates. The amount being paid by individual candidates varied from place to place and candidate to candidate, within the range of K5 to K100. Typical payment configurations were K100, K50, K20; K50, K20, K10; or K20, K10, K5 for first, second, and third, preferences, respectively. That said, on the eve of polling, one particular Southern Highlands Province candidate was observed to pay K1 000 per person to voters who were willing to commit their first preference to him. In Mt. Hagen, the incumbent was reported, by one observer, to have paid out as much as K10 000 cash to individual families – including his own family. Individual payments in Mt. Hagen tended to be far more modest, with candidates typically paying K50, K30, and K20 for first, second, and third preferences.

The movement of voters across ward and electorate boundaries also seems to have increased with the introduction of LPV. Voters who are living in close proximity to existing electoral boundaries in Southern Highlands, Eastern Highlands and Chimbu Provinces were seen crossing boundaries to sell their votes to other candidates. In Southern Highlands Province, thousands of people were seen capitalising on the new opportunities that LPV presented, by moving across electoral boundaries, and turning three payments into anywhere up to twelve per person. This was particularly so in the Hela region⁴ where many Huli voters were reported and/or witnessed to have voted in the Komo-Magarima, Tari-Pori, and Koroba-Lake Kapiago electorates, as well as for the provincial seat. Similar movements and voting practices were observed in the eastern end of the province, with many voters voting in both the Ialibu-Pangia and Imbonggu electorates.

On an even larger scale, some particularly enterprising voters capitalised on the rolling elections in the Highlands Region by voting in several provinces. Mt. Hagen youths, who were observed voting in Koroba, reported that they had accepted payments from candidates in three provinces, and that they had promised to vote in Southern Highlands Province, in their home province, Western Highlands, and then again in Chimbu Province.

Grandstands and opening ceremonies also served as money-making ventures during this election. They were erected and organised by clans, church congregations, youth and women’s groups, and school committees, as a means of generating funds. Candidates were then invited to speak at these events and were expected to pay for the

⁴ The people occupying the western end of Southern Highlands Province — namely the Duna, Huli and Bogaia, along with their Paiela neighbours in Enga Province, share the view that they descend from a common ancestor, Hela. On the basis of this connection they have been pushing for more than three decades for a separate Hela province, which would incorporate the Koroba-Lake Kapiago, Tari-Pori, and Komo-Magarima electorates. Collectively, these electorates/districts are referred to as the Hela Region (see Haley 2007).

privilege. Observers confirmed that hire rates ranged from between K100 and several thousand kina per speaker, and that some events netted upwards of K20 000 (see Kagua-Erave and Koroba-Lake Kopiago team reports). In addition, there were unconfirmed reports of some candidates paying K30 000 to K40 000 for the privilege of using a grandstand to campaign (see Kagua-Erave report).

Inducements such as food and drink, material items such as blankets, spades, bush knives, stereos, and even cars, and the transporting of dead bodies and contributions to funeral feasts were also common place (see Goroka, Wabag, Koroba-Lake Kopiago team reports and the Chimbu Provincial report).

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Although not as pervasive as in the Highlands Region, cases of vote buying and gifting were also reported in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions. There were widespread allegations of bribery in Lae and in the Gazelle Peninsula. Candidates contributed K100 to speak to local gatherings and were reported to be paying up to K200 for votes. Although there was no evidence of outright vote buying in Abau, observers reported that six of the twelve candidates had used gifts to entice voters, and most were serving food during and after campaign events (see Abau team report).

Similar observations were made in Yangoru-Saussia, in that there was little or no vote buying, but significant gifting. The sitting MP reportedly distributed thousands of mobile phones to his supporters. In the Gazelle Peninsula, the sitting MP reportedly donated lawnmowers to various schools and churches. The Ijivitari team observed that gifting in terms of goods and cash was far more prevalent during this election, and that prior to 2002 it had not been a feature of Oro provincial politics at all.

As well as offering incentives of one kind or another, such as cash, food, and promises of projects and future support, many candidates around the country funded or made arrangements for people living outside the electorate to travel home in order to cast their votes. One candidate who contested the Abau Open seat was observed to transport truckloads of Wanigela supporters, at Koki, to Wanigela, at Marshall Lagoon, in the Aroma LLG. Many of the Koki-based Wanigela voters admitted to having voted several times, while at Aroma (see Abau team report).

Influence of Campaign Houses

This section is based on Section 4 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were asked to make a series of general observations about the campaign period. One subset of questions within Section 4 specifically concerned HIV and AIDS, and behaviour which might increase the likelihood of HIV transmission. It contained a series of questions about campaign houses – whether they had been constructed, who had erected them, who was frequenting them, what hours they operated, and the nature of the activities taking place inside. Observers also asked whether cannabis was being used, whether alcohol was being consumed, and whether there was any evidence of transactional sex taking place inside campaign houses.

The extent to which campaign houses featured in, and influenced, this election varied from region to region. Although they were not a feature of the elections in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions, they were prevalent in the Highlands Region.

The Highlands Region

The use of campaign houses in the 2007 National General Elections varied throughout the Highlands Region. Apparently, they were particularly significant in Eastern Highlands Province — so much so, that the Goroka team attributes Thompson Harokaqveh's electoral success to the way he managed his campaign houses. He was reported to have 53 campaign houses – one main house at Kama, near Goroka town, and 52 smaller camping houses.

In Eastern Highlands Province, campaign houses operated day and night. Key activities that were observed in these houses included political singsings, and strategising, as well as feasting and drinking. In Chimbu, this was also the case, but the Chimbu Provincial and Chuave teams, as well as the Eastern Highland provincial team, noted that, overall, there were fewer campaign houses than previously. This was especially so in the rural areas, although there tended to be more in the towns.

Campaign houses continued to play a significant role in Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces. In some parts, they operated day and night, while in others, they operated only during the day. Gibbs and Mondu (2008) reported that, in Enga, campaign houses are commonly referred to as 'animal houses' because of their reputation as houses of illrepute, and the lack of sense said to be displayed by people who frequent them. They also reported that campaign houses in Enga are associated with generous hospitality, the consumption of free food and beverages, including alcohol, dusk to dawn gambling, night-time entertainment, courting rituals, and 'a good deal of sexual activity ... aided by free alcoholic beverages, drugs, and home brew, a lot of money, political pressure to win votes, as well as erotic songs sung during the *tanim het* courting rituals' (Gibbs and Mondu 2008:8-9).

Similar observations about campaign house activities were made in Southern Highlands Province. Typically, Southern Highlands province observers reported cannabis use, the consumption of free food and alcohol, and evidence of transactional sex, along with political campaigning and strategising.

Awareness

This section is based on a subset of questions from Section 4 of the Observer Journal concerning awareness, and on the findings of the pre-polling and post-polling surveys conducted by observers (Sections 7 and 13 of the Observer Journal). In Section 4, observers were asked whether they had seen or attended any LPV or civic awareness, who had conducted the awareness, and what topics had been covered.

As part of the pre-polling and post-polling surveys, voters were asked:

- Did you attend any LPV/civic awareness?
- Who conducted the awareness?
- Where did it take place?
- Will it change, or did it change the way you voted?

Voters were also asked whether they had seen or heard any of the PNGEC newspaper, television, or radio advertisements. No attempt was made to independently verify the voters' responses.

Community awareness about the changed voting system commenced late in the election cycle, because the legislative changes to introduce the new ballot-paper and the separate candidate posters were only certified by the Speaker of Parliament in September 2006 — nine months out from the elections. Voters and candidates were critical of the late change. However, this problem was beyond the control of the PNGEC.

Bearing in mind the narrow window for awareness, the PNGEC focused its awareness campaign on television, radio, and print media initiatives, and supplemented it with face-to-face awareness by election managers and returning officers. Observers reported that the awareness which was conducted by the PNGEC teams was limited, and in most cases delivered very late, mainly because the PNGEC funding for awareness was only released after the close of nominations.

In the main, electoral and civic awareness, where it occurred, was carried out by civil society groups, many of which were funded by the Electoral Support Program Phase 2 (ESP2). The majority of this awareness was conducted before the issue of writs. Observers reported that its accuracy varied from place-to-place and that it was contingent upon which group was conducting the awareness.

In the majority of cases, the awareness or instruction that was offered by the PNGEC was deemed inadequate because staff either explained the new voting system in a cursory manner — focusing only on the 1, 2, 3 formality aspects of LPV, or because of inaccuracy. In much of Southern Highlands Province, the PNGEC awareness consisted of LPV election posters being affixed to hire cars operating in and around Mendi. Allegations were also raised by returning officers and polling officials in some of the western electorates (in particular, Koroba-Lake Kopiago and Tari-Pori) that the funding for awareness was not released to the districts.

In contrast, the awareness that was provided by civil society groups was observed to be generally comprehensive. Where civil society groups or organisations conducted awareness they typically addressed topics such as civic and electoral awareness and good governance, as well as the risks of HIV and AIDS and the rights of women. They also described how the counting process worked and conducted mock elections.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Awareness in Bougainville was jointly conducted by the police and civil society, and was funded by ESP2. Awareness by the PNGEC was delegated to polling officials who were instructed to conduct awareness during the polling period. The provincial election manager (Mathias Pihei) was critical of the civil society involvement and felt that all available funds should have been allocated to the Provincial Election Office. Despite his concerns, a survey of 120 voters at six different locations in North, South, and Central Bougainville, revealed that 54 percent had attended LPV/civic awareness, that 50 percent had seen the new ballot-paper prior to the election, and that 39 percent had attended election-related HIV/AIDS awareness. The same survey revealed that 74

percent of respondents had seen or heard the PNGEC advertisements on radio, television, or in the print media.

In the months preceding the election, LPV and civic awareness activities were conducted in the Gazelle Open electorate by various civil society groups, including the YWCA, the East New Britain Plantation Welfare Association, and the East New Britain Fieldworkers' Association. Further awareness was conducted by the provincial administration on the eve of polling, and by polling officials on polling day.

No civil society awareness was conducted in the Ijivitari Open electorate. Although the election manager conducted awareness, the observers, who had themselves conducted awareness elsewhere in Northern (Oro) Province, felt that the trainers were poorly prepared and ill-equipped to conduct awareness. They noted that awareness sessions lasted approximately fifteen minutes, and that trainers were unable to answer people's questions. The observation team was also of the view that much of the PNGEC funding for awareness was misused (see Ijivitari team report). For example, the ARO for Tufi LLG did not conduct any awareness. Instead, he handed out leaflets and other printed material to dinghy operators moving around the electorate. This lack of awareness, especially in Tufi LLG, was reflected in the poor voter turnout on polling day. When enquiring about this, observers were told that the people 'chose to stay away rather than make fools of themselves'.

A survey of 180 voters in Port Moresby, which was conducted by the NCD observers, revealed that face-to-face awareness was not as successful as might otherwise be expected, given the logistical ease of conducting awareness in Port Moresby. Only 34 percent of respondents reported having attended any LPV or civic awareness prior to the elections, and only 27 percent reported having attended election-related HIV/AIDS awareness. Of those who attended LPV/civic awareness, some 50 percent had attended civil society-run awareness while the other 50 percent had attended awareness conducted by the PNGEC. That said, 97 percent of NCD respondents reported that they had seen or heard PNGEC advertisements of one kind or another.

The Highlands Region

Pre-polling and post-polling surveys that were conducted by observers reveal that the civil society awareness was particularly effective in the Highlands Region. For example, a survey of 260 Chimbu voters which was conducted in the Chuave electorate revealed that:

- 58 percent of voters were aware that there was a new electoral roll;
- 51 percent had attended LPV and civic awareness conducted by Meri I Kirap Sapotim and/or the Chimbu police — two groups that were funded by the Electoral Support Program; and
- 65 percent had attended civil society-led, election-related HIV/AIDS awareness.

Surveys that were conducted by observers in the Goroka Open electorate also revealed that voters were generally aware that there was a new electoral roll, that voting procedures had changed, and that gender segregated polling was to be employed in 2007. Many respondents also confirmed that they had attended LPV awareness,

although far fewer reported attending HIV/AIDS awareness. The emphasis in Goroka seems to have been on the formalities of voting and ‘getting it right’ in respect of LPV.

In Enga Province, a pre-poll survey of 140 intending voters revealed that 76 percent were aware that there was a new electoral roll and that 66 percent were aware that there was a new voting system. The same survey revealed that 78 percent of male respondents and 65 percent of female respondents had attended LPV or civic awareness, and that three times as many people had attended awareness conducted by civil society compared to the member of people who had attended awareness conducted by the PNGEC staff.

Survey results in Southern Highlands Province were even more striking. A pre-poll survey of 400 intending voters from six different provincial electorates revealed that:

- 75 percent knew about the new voting system;
- 61 percent had seen the new ballot-paper and felt that they knew how to vote properly; and
- 58 percent knew there was a new electoral roll.

The same survey revealed that 68 percent of respondents had attended LPV/civic awareness and 57 percent had attended election-related HIV/AIDS awareness. In both cases, the majority of this awareness had been conducted by civil society. Some 56 percent of people reported that they had attended civil society-run LPV/civic awareness, while only 11 percent reported that they attended awareness which was conducted by the PNGEC. Similarly, 54 percent of people reported that they had attended HIV/AIDS awareness which had been conducted by civil society, 10 percent reported that they had attended church-run awareness, and only eight percent reported attending awareness conducted by the National AIDS Council or the Provincial AIDS Committee.

A follow-up post-polling survey in Southern Highlands Province, in which another 400 people were surveyed, revealed that 77 percent of respondents had attended LPV/civic awareness prior to polling. Of those who were surveyed, 71 percent reported attending civil society awareness, while only 15 percent reported attending PNGEC-run awareness. Moreover, only 42 percent of respondents in Southern Highlands Province reported having seen or heard any of the PNGEC advertisements. There can be no doubt that civil society awareness had a far greater reach and was far more effective in the province than either the PNGEC awareness or the PNGEC’s extensive media campaign.

Despite the extensive civil society awareness campaign, 48 percent of respondents in Southern Highlands Province reported that they found the new voting system confusing, while 57 percent reported that they needed assistance when voting. This suggests that ongoing awareness is needed.

Recommendation

- ***Electoral and civic awareness and voter education involving civil society needs to continue and should be given priority.*** This will generate and foster demand for good clean elections and build on the good governance gains made during the 2007 National General Elections. Where necessary, civil society groups undertaking such awareness should be supported with training and funds.

Pre-Polling

This section draws upon observations made in Section 9 of the Observer Journal. Observers were asked about the insertion of polling teams and security personnel, and whether there was sufficient air and land transport as well as fuel to ensure that they were inserted on time. Observers were also asked to observe and report on the training that was provided to polling officials, and about the delivery and supply of essential election materials.

The findings of individual observer teams varied considerably in respect of pre-polling administration. For example, the NCD teams reported that electoral administration was much improved, being better than the 2002 National General Elections and the 2006 NCD by-election. Observations from other parts of the country — particularly the Highlands Region — were nowhere near as positive. Only six of the 18 observer teams (NCD Provincial, Port Moresby South, Goroka Open, Wabag Open, Mt. Hagen Open, and Gazelle Open) reported that essential election supplies including candidate posters, ballot-papers, ballot-box seals, and so on were received on time, in advance of polling. The remaining teams reported delays with regard to the release of funds and the delivery of essential materials.

Throughout the country, observer teams confirmed that HIV/AIDS awareness materials (posters and information booklets), condoms, and gloves were not amongst the materials that were distributed to the polling teams.

The Highlands Region

Observers in Eastern Highlands, Western Highlands, and Enga Provinces reported that essential election supplies arrived well in advance of polling. However, electoral officials in Chimbu, reported delays in the release of funds and the receipt of essential supplies. To remedy this, two senior officials travelled to Port Moresby well in advance and packed and shipped their own election supplies (Standish, personal communication 2007).

Observers in Southern Highlands Province also reported problems with funding and materials. Funds that should have been released prior to polling were not received until after the polling had been completed (see Koroba-Lake Kapiago and Kagua-Erave team reports). The returning officer for Koroba-Lake Kapiago did not receive pre-polling funds until two days after the commencement of polling, and then received less than half of the expected funds. The documentation accompanying the 'advance' indicated that K99 869 should have been received. However, it can be confirmed that only K43 500 was received. The advance was meant to cover pre-polling expenses, including the purchase of fuel to insert polling teams, the hiring of drivers and security, polling team advances, and incidental allowances for polling officials.

In the absence of these funds, the PNGDF arranged for, and funded, the insertion and extraction of the polling teams. The funding shortfall also resulted in reduced payments to polling officials, which, in turn, gave rise to a great deal of discontent. As a result, the majority of returning officers withheld their returns and refused to attend the count. Similar observations were noted in Kagua-Erave, where the security forces were again relied upon to transport ballot-boxes and polling teams. We understand that

the delays in the release of funds were, in part, because of the late appropriation from the Department of Treasury.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Problems and delays of various kinds were reported by the Bougainville Provincial team and the Southern region observer teams. Reports received from the provincial election manager and the provincial returning officer for Bougainville suggest that key election materials, including the forms needed for polling and counting, were not received by the provincial election office (see Bougainville Provincial report). They also reported that the materials which were received arrived very late, having been wrongly dispatched to Rabaul, instead of Buka, and that this caused delays with the distribution of materials to the districts. Delays in the release of funding were also experienced, and the movement of polling officials and security personnel was hampered by a lack of fuel, as well as a shortage of air and sea transport.

The Ijivitari team similarly reported a range of logistical problems — the candidates' posters and other election-related materials did not arrive until two days before polling and there was a shortage of air and land transport. Observers noted that three teams were still in Popondetta town, waiting to be deployed, one week into the polling schedule. In Abau, the transport of polling officials and security personnel was also delayed because of the late payment of transport providers.

In contrast, the Gazelle team reported that ballot-papers and other election-related materials were smoothly dispatched to the districts a week prior to polling, and were issued to polling teams on the first day of polling. The observers reported no delays in polling, and noted that polling officials and security personnel were inserted without incident.

Recommendation

- ***Effective mechanisms for the timely release of the necessary funds need to be established.*** This will ensure that critical operational and logistical matters are finalised well in advance of polling, that essential materials are delivered on time, and scheduled activities, such as awareness and the insertion of polling teams, occur according to plan.

Training

The training of polling officials was not consistent across the 18 electorates which were observed. Lists of polling officials were finalised early in the NCD, Bougainville, Mt. Hagen, and Eastern Highlands, and reasonably comprehensive training was provided. However, in Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces, polling officials were appointed on the eve of polling, or on polling day itself, and the training offered was observed to be inadequate.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

In the NCD, polling officials were appointed early, and were trained over a three-day period, from 25 to 27 June 2007. Comprehensive training was also conducted for candidates, scrutineers, judges, and lawyers, and these were observed to be well-attended. On Bougainville, lists of polling officials were also finalised early, and polling officials were notified of their roles a fortnight prior to the commencement of the polling period. They then undertook two days of comprehensive training.

Polling officials in the NCD and Bougainville appeared generally cognisant of their roles, and were observed to perform well on polling day. In contrast, polling officials and scrutineers in the Ijivitari Open electorate were critical of the limited training which they received, and remained confused about LPV.

The Highlands Region

As with polling officials in the NCD, those in Mt. Hagen were also given three days training at Mt. Hagen Secondary School. Their training was conducted in Tok Pisin, and was well-received. The training in Goroka was also conducted in Tok Pisin, and was observed to be comprehensive. The training started a week prior to polling — when lists of polling officials were confirmed — and continued morning and afternoon throughout the week, with separate sessions for presiding officers, other polling officials, counting officials, and scrutineers.

In contrast, the training in Enga Province was conducted in English, and was far less comprehensive. Their polling officials received only a half-day of training. In Koroba-Lake Kapiago, the lists of polling officials were finalised on the eve of the polling. Only presiding officers were offered training, and this was very cursory. At Koroba Station, the training lasted for only 20 minutes, and there was no opportunity for questions. At Kapiago, polling officials were not provided with any training, and they were critical of this. Training manuals were not used during the training session at Koroba, and were not issued to polling officials anywhere in the Koroba-Lake Kapiago electorate.

In Kagua-Erave, the training for presiding officers and polling officials was also perfunctory and inadequate. The training manual was used, but was read out in English. Observers were critical of this, and noted that many of the polling officials — whose grasp of English appeared quite limited — would have struggled with the technical language. Moreover, the observers noted that the ARO for the Alia LLG gave mixed messages to the polling official he trained, in that he emphasised the need for integrity, but at the same time, referred to taking bribes as ‘normal custom’, and therefore acceptable.

Recommendation

- ***Training needs to be given priority and budgeted for between now and the 2012, National Elections and PNGEC training manuals need to be revised and updated in view of the recent legislative amendments and the policy changes, such as gender segregated polling.*** Quality assurance checks need also be put in place to ensure that polling officials receive proper training, prior to polling.

SECTION 3: POLLING AND COUNTING

Polling

This section of the report is based on Sections 10 and 11 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were asked to record their polling day observations and to complete a voter time survey. Specific questions included in Section 10 concerned the layout of the polling station, the time it opened, the size and composition of the security presence, the conduct of polling, and the nature of any irregularities and/or electoral offences that were witnessed.

Polling proceeded peacefully in each of the electorates that were observed, although the conduct of polling varied greatly around the country. Observers in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions reported that polling was generally well-organised and managed, and that polling places were set up in the recommended manner. However, gender-segregated polling was not observed, except in the NCD, Ijivitari, and Madang.

By contrast, observers reported a range of problems with voting in the Highlands Region, particularly Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces. One-day polling proved unsuccessful, except in urban areas. Inclement weather and a shortage of vehicles and air transport meant that polling in Southern Highlands Province was delayed for several days in some areas. This had flow-on effects across the rest of the Highlands Region. It also meant that the security forces were spread very thinly in many areas, which may have contributed to some of the irregularities and malpractices that were witnessed. Significant irregularities were identified in each of the Highlands provinces, particularly in relation to the conduct of polling. In addition, many voters reported experiencing intimidation, and many felt that the 2007 General Elections were worse than the 2002 Elections, despite widespread agreement that the security situation was much improved.

Despite disregard for the electoral laws in the Highlands Region, and with the exception of complaints about the electoral roll and the lack of LPV awareness voters seemed quite satisfied with the polling. Voters in the Highlands Region expressed the view that the elections had ‘gone well’, and were ‘peaceful’ and ‘transparent’. Many also expressed the view that the elections were ‘really democratic’, in that all clan members (including children) had been able to vote, and because they had been able to vote (as often as they liked) ‘without the need for guns’. Ironically, they felt that the large security presence had made these things possible.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Polling in the NCD, and the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions was remarkably well-organised and well-managed. For the most part, polling stations opened on time, and few disturbances and irregularities were noted. Gender-segregated polling was successfully employed in the NCD, but not in the Islands Region. On Bougainville, there was only a single voting compartment. In the Gazelle, there were two, but gender-segregated polling did not eventuate. Instead, the separate compartments were used to complete the open and provincial ballot-papers.

In Ijivitari, polling stations were well laid out, which allowed privacy for voters and adequate scrutiny of the process for transparency purposes. However, polling was

delayed at most polling stations (for up to an hour) because of dissatisfaction with the state of the new electoral roll, and in some cases, the late deployment of polling officials and security personnel (see the discussion of problems encountered during the pre-polling period). Gender-segregated polling took place and was well-received by women. The voter turnout by women was better than in past elections.

In Abau Open, few polling stations opened on time, although most were described as reasonably well laid out. There were two voting compartments, voting was not gender segregated, and voters were not afforded a secret ballot. A single ballot-box was used for both the open and provincial ballot-papers. Observers reported that polling officials consistently applied and checked for ink on voters' fingers. In Madang, polling was similarly delayed (by two to three hours in most cases), but proceeded smoothly at most locations. Polling was also observed to take place at gazetted locations. Separate polling compartments were provided for men and women and two ballot-boxes were provided – one for the open seat and one for the provincial seat.

The Highlands Region

Polling in the Highlands Region — as might be expected from past elections — proved far more problematic. One-day polling proved unworkable because of poor planning and infrastructure, the late release of funds, and a lack of vehicles and air transport, all of which had flow-on effects across the region.

Polling in Southern Highlands Province had been scheduled to take place on 30 June 2007. It started on that day in most areas, but was delayed for several days in some LLGs and/or wards. In the western end of the province (Koroba-Lake Kopiago), some polling teams were not inserted until 2 July, while in the eastern end (Kagua-Erave), some teams were not inserted until 4 July. These delays also meant that the security forces were spread very thinly in many areas, and in some cases, had to be redeployed before the completion of polling. This happened in Koroba where the additional police, who arrived very late on the eve of polling, were redeployed prior to the completion of polling, so that they could get to Enga Province on time for the polling there.

In Kagua-Erave, various administrative problems with ballot-boxes and ballot-papers were observed:

- three wards did not receive ward rolls or ballot-papers;
- five wards received ward rolls, but no ballot-papers;
- one ward received a ward roll containing only four names – all four people actually live in the Imbonggu electorate;
- one ward received a ward roll containing only three names, despite having an estimated resident population of 500 people; and
- two wards did not vote at all because their ballot-boxes and ballot-papers could not be delivered before the polling period lapsed.

In addition, ten ballot-boxes that were assigned to the Kuare LLG, in the Kagua-Erave electorate, were sent to Ialiabu-Pangia because of long-standing confusion over the electoral boundaries. This particular error led to the ARO for Kuare and his driver being assaulted (see Kagua-Erave team report).

Other problems that were noted in Southern Highlands Province included the relocation of polling stations from their gazetted locations (see Koroba-Lake Kapiago report) and the movement of polling stations from their historical locations. For example, the Kagua-Erave team reported that the polling places for several wards were moved from their historical locations and gazetted in new locations. However, this information was not circulated within the electorate. The team also noted that a number of polling stations appeared to have been located in such a way as to hinder people's efforts to vote.

In Enga and Chimbu Provinces, delays to polling were also experienced, and in both provinces, it took a full week for polling to be completed. Significant delays in polling were also experienced in the more remote areas of Eastern Highlands Province because of transport and weather problems.

One-day polling only worked in urban areas and around the provincial headquarters, such as Goroka Open and Mt. Hagen Open. In view of these observations, the process for conducting elections, especially in the Highlands Region and those areas that rely on air transport, on a rolling one-day basis, needs to be rethought. Consideration could be given to mobile polling teams, at the LLG level, backed up by a section-strength (ten person) security attachment.

In terms of the conduct of polling, a wide array of voting practices was noted in each of the Highlands provinces. In Enga Province, people tended to vote in family groups, with ballot-papers issued en-masse to family heads (see Wabag team report). However, in some parts, line-up voting was also employed, such that names were not called, just marked off when people entered the polling place. Similar practices were noted at polling stations throughout Eastern Highlands Province, including Goroka Open, and in Southern Highlands and Chimbu Provinces.

In some places, particularly Chimbu Province, *man-meri* voting and 'next' voting were employed. In these cases, names were not called, but rather the gender of registered voters in the order that they appeared, or when one person had finished, the polling officials simply called out 'next' (see Chuave Open, Goroka Open, Eastern Highlands Provincial, and Koroba-Lake Kapiago team reports). In other cases, the roll was completely disregarded, serving only as the basis to issue a certain number of ballot-papers. This occurred in the more remote parts of Eastern Highlands Province and much of Southern Highlands Province, with several observers noting that polling officials in many Highlands polling booths did not check the roll at all. Controlled voting, enforced with guns, was also reported in one Wabag ward, and in the more remote parts of Eastern Highlands Province (Eastern Highlands Provincial report).

Very few observers in the Highlands Region reported the proper use of the indelible ink, with most reporting that it was not used at all, or was used randomly (see Koroba-Lake Kapiago, Goroka, Chuave, and Wabag Open team reports).

Gender-segregated polling – although made an official PNGEC policy in 2007 – was not attempted or entertained in Southern Highlands or Enga Provinces, but was observed in Goroka, Mt. Hagen, and Chimbu. In each case, it was generally well-received.

Recommendations

- ***A further review of polling schedules is recommended, with the aim of reducing time and overall costs.*** Consideration should be given to alternative approaches in high risk areas, such as the Highlands Region, including the use of mobile polling teams, with each backed up by a section-strength PNGDF security attachment, and with a single ballot-box per LLG. This would not only enhance the secrecy of the voting and undermine the growing trend towards money politics, but could also be more effective in terms of financial, security, and human resources.
- ***One-day polling in Highlands provinces should be abandoned as it is unworkable. Instead, polling in each of the Highlands provinces should be staggered over several days.*** This will allow for a more concentrated security presence, and will allow time for security personnel to move between districts.

The New Ballot-Paper

The 2006 electoral reforms resulted in candidate photographs being removed from the ballot-paper and the introduction of separate candidate posters. This meant that the manner in which people voted in 2007 was significantly different from any previous election. Rather than marking their ballot-papers with an X, as they had in the previous general elections, or with 1, 2, and 3, as they had done in the LPV by-elections, voters were required to write the three two-digit code numbers assigned to their chosen candidates, and/or the names of their preferred candidates on both the provincial and open electorate ballot-papers.

Voting was slow, especially when voters marked their own papers. For example, observers in Ijivitari reported that individual voters took three to five minutes to mark their ballot-papers, while observers in Mt. Hagen noted that voters took five to six minutes. When voting was conducted properly, only six people got through in a half-hour period. This was consistent with observations in Koroba. Where voting was assisted by polling officials, police, campaign managers, candidates' scrutineers, or family members, voting was faster.

The voting process was complicated because the open and provincial ballot-papers were very similar in appearance, and were differentiated only by a pale blue or pale pink band at the bottom of the ballot-paper. Voters found it difficult to differentiate between them, and this was used by presiding officers to justify the high levels of assistance in many areas. Many informal votes that were identified in counting rooms across the country arose because voters mixed up the forms. Many wrote their open seat preferences on the provincial ballot-paper, and vice versa. There may well have been many more papers marked in error than were identified as informal — especially in cases where voters chose to only write the candidates' numbers.

Voters and polling officials around the country were universally critical of the new ballot-papers. Many voters called for the reintegration of photographs on the ballot-papers, while others insisted that bolder colours should be used, or that the ballot-papers should be markedly different in size or shape.

Recommendation

- ***The provincial and open ballot-papers should be redesigned so that they are more easily distinguishable from each other.*** This could be achieved in a number of ways – by using bolder colours, or changing the size or layout of one or other of the ballot-papers. Such changes would most likely reduce the number of informal votes and reduce the counting time.

Assisted Voting

Across the country, observers reported a high level of assisted voting. It could be argued that LPV encourages, or necessitates, assistance — especially in those areas where literacy is low.

The Highlands Region

In the Highlands Region, most voters were assisted by polling officials, police, campaign managers, candidates' scrutineers, or family members. Observers reported that this assistance was often forced upon the voters. That said, post-polling surveys which were conducted in Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces indicate that approximately 50 percent of all voters found the new voting system confusing, and that almost 60 percent (57 percent in Southern Highlands, and 58 percent in Enga) needed assistance to complete the new ballot-paper. Detailed observations made by the Goroka Open team leader, Dr. Goru Hane Nou, at four different polling stations, revealed that just over 50 percent of men voted with assistance, approximately 65 percent of women voted with assistance, and that the assistance in more than 90 percent of cases for both men and women was forced.

In Enga Province, people tended to vote in family groups. Very few women were observed to cast their own vote (see Wabag Open report). Completed ballot-papers were often 'checked' as well, before being deposited in the ballot-box. Where 'assistance' was given, the voters wishes were not always adhered to. In Southern Highlands Province, observers witnessed several instances where presiding officers marked ballot-papers in a manner that was contrary to the voters' wishes.

Observers in Southern Highlands Province also noted that polling officials at several polling stations had premarked the first preference prior to issuing ballot-papers. It is difficult to ascertain just how widespread this practice was, but observers in counting rooms around the country observed that many ballot-papers in various boxes were completed by more than one person. For example, the first preference was marked in one pen – the same pen with which the presiding officer had signed the ballot-paper — while the second and third preferences were marked in a different coloured pen, and/or different handwriting.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Although it was most pronounced in the Highlands Region, assisted voting was also noted as problematic in parts of the NCD, and in Ijivitari. The Ijivitari team specifically noted that 75 percent of all voters needed assistance.

The high levels of assisted voting that were witnessed throughout the country translated into a very low informal vote. In the Highlands Region, where the vast majority of voting was assisted, the informal vote amounted to approximately one percent. The informal vote tended to be highest in urban areas, where literacy is also the highest (six percent in the NCD Provincial). This is not altogether surprising. Observers noted that people in urban areas were far less likely to have assistance forced upon them, and were afforded greater opportunity to cast their own votes. In the Gazelle Peninsula, where education levels and literacy are high, no voter intimidation was observed. In this case, informal votes accounted for 4.4 percent of the votes cast. In the Ijivitari Open electorate, informal votes accounted for 5.5 percent of the votes cast.

Voting Irregularities

Cheating and voting irregularities were reported across the country, but were certainly most widespread and most pronounced in the Highlands Region.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Outside the Highlands Region, voting irregularities, such as underage voting, and multiple voting were observed to be isolated rather than the norm.

The Highlands Region

Underage voting (up to 40 percent of voters at some polling places – see Mt. Hagen team report), multiple voting (many individuals seen voting three to four times each)⁵, ‘line-up’ voting, serial voting (that is, voting at different polling stations), ‘outside’ voting (voters from neighbouring electorates), and proxy voting were all commonplace in the Highlands Region (see the Koroba-Lake Kapiago, Goroka Open, Eastern Highlands Provincial and Chimbu Provincial team reports). Voting took place publicly, and there was no secret ballot. The indelible ink, which indicated that a person had voted, was not used or was used randomly (see the Koroba-Lake Kapiago, Goroka, and Wabag Open team reports), and excess ballot-papers were used in many cases.

Observers in six of the nine Highlands electorates – Koroba-Lake Kapiago, Kagua-Erave, Southern Highlands Provincial, Eastern Highlands Provincial, Chuave Open, and Wabag Open — also witnessed bribery and intimidation on the part of candidates and their key supporters. Intimidation was commonplace, which was reflected in post-polling surveys in Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces. In a survey of 400 Southern Highlands provincial voters (200 men and 200 women), 73 men (37%) and 97 women (49%) reported that they experienced intimidation when casting their votes.

A similar proportion of male voters (38%) and female voters (58%) who participated in a post-polling survey in Enga Province also reported having experienced intimidation of some sort or another. The same post-polling surveys revealed that just over 40 percent of voters who were surveyed (41 percent in Southern Highlands Province and 43 percent in Enga Province) felt that the 2007 National General Elections were worse

⁵ In a post-polling survey of 400 voters (200 men and 200 women) that was conducted in six Southern Highlands provincial electorates, 76 men (38%) and 30 women (15%) admitted to having voted more than once.

than the 2002 Elections. Certainly, many voters in Southern Highlands Province felt that these elections had failed, as they had in 2002 (see Kagua-Erave team report).

‘Block’ voting was also observed throughout the Highlands Region – especially in open electorates. In some cases, this appears to have been the result of genuine group consensus (a group choosing to vote for their clan or local candidate), but in other areas it resulted from coercion, intimidation, or outright malpractice. In many wards in Southern Highlands, Enga, Chimbu, and Eastern Highlands Provinces, polling officials were observed to ‘do away’ with the pretext of individual voters casting their votes. This was particularly so in Enga Province. In many cases, people in this province voted in family groups, while in others, ballot-papers were simply filled out by scrutineers or candidates’ representatives. In some parts of Enga Province, the majority of people played no part in the voting process. Similar observations were made in parts of Southern Highlands Province, where ballot-papers were premarked or filled out by teams of young men or supporters.

Two key factors contributed to, and facilitated, the cheating, and malpractice, underage voting, double and multiple voting, serial voting and outside voting, which were observed on polling day. The first was the integrity of the new electoral roll in the Highlands Region, which included children, deceased people, people from neighbouring electorates, and several thousand duplicate entries. The second was the location and positioning of polling stations.

For example, there were seven polling places at Koroba Station — Teria 1, Teria 2, Pandu, Andiria 1, Andiria 2, Koroba Station, and Kereneba Part 2. These were all set up within five minutes walk of each other, and voters were observed moving backwards and forwards between them. An electoral official explained that three of these polling stations were moved from their gazetted locations to ‘make it easier for voters to move between polling stations’. At Pureni, in South Koroba LLG, four polling stations — Tumbite, Pubulumu 1, Pubulumu 2, and Tangimapu — were set up on Tumbite airstrip. Three of the four polling stations were moved from their gazetted locations on the grounds of alleged security threats.

Recommendation

- ***Where two or more wards are gazetted to poll at a single location, consideration should be given to amalgamating the ward rolls and creating a single polling place.*** This would limit the potential for multiple voting. Such an amalgamation should necessarily involve cross-checking and the removal of duplicates.

Security

The 2007 National General Elections were considerably less violent than recent general elections, which could be attributed mainly to the huge investment in security. In the Highlands Region, observers and voters alike believed that the improved security situation was directly attributable to the large security presence — particularly the PNGDF. To their credit, and that of the police and Correctional Service, the security personnel that were deployed during the elections were very well-disciplined.

Throughout the country, they were seen to be better behaved than in past elections. They were also observed to work very long hours, with little rest, and to conduct themselves professionally in the main. Their performance is to be highly commended.

Specifically, the security forces used mediation and community policing to quell disputes and diffuse potentially volatile situations, and were rarely seen to exercise any unnecessary force. Although it was not their role, they also stepped in to ensure the smooth running of the elections, by contributing to both awareness and logistics. In several sites, observers noted that the security forces not only contained potentially volatile situations, but it was only through their interventions that polling took place (see Kagua-Erave and Koroba-Lake Kopiago team reports; Fafungian 2008). The election would not have been as well-organised in such areas without their initiative.

The improved security situation was most evident in the Highlands Region, which was remarkably calm during the campaign, polling, and counting periods. One factor which contributed to the good security situation was the deployment of NATEL (National Election) forces, two weeks prior to polling. The early deployment of these troops meant, they were in a position to carry out detailed reconnaissance and attend to security threats well in advance of polling. Importantly, they also carry out election and security-related awareness, and this contributed to the good security situation that was observed on polling day.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Security arrangements around the country varied from province to province. In Ijivitari, each polling team was assigned ten security personnel — nine community-based constables who were led by a regular RPNGC police officer from Popondetta — all of whom were unarmed. In Abau, four unarmed police officers accompanied each polling team, while in Madang, security was provided by only one or two unarmed police. Observers in Lae reported that there were six security personnel assigned to each polling team. They described the conduct of the police and defence security personnel as exceptionally good, and observers in the NCD noted that incidents of double and multiple voting were quickly dealt with by these officers.

The Highlands Region

Polling in the Highlands Region was facilitated by a huge security presence. In Southern Highlands Province, when polling commenced, the Special Operations (SPO) security force, comprising 200 regular police and 150 PNGDF personnel, was boosted by 2 500 additional NATEL security personnel (2 000 police — mostly auxiliary and community police personnel — and 500 PNGDF personnel).

Despite the large security presence, one-day polling meant that the security personnel were still thinly spread, given that there were 862 polling stations, and that many security personnel remained in Mendi and other key distribution points in the districts. Unarmed police provided security at most polling stations, while the armed PNGDF provided security at more high-risk locations, and acted as response units. Observers reported the presence of one or two unarmed police at individual polling stations, although polling proceeded in several wards, without any polling security.

As noted earlier, the NATEL forces were required to move on to Enga Province. Delays in polling meant that the additional NATEL police were moved on, prior to the completion of polling in Southern Highlands Province. In Enga Province, 249 regular provincial police personnel, were boosted by 1 020 additional NATEL security personnel – most of whom arrived on the eve of polling, or on polling day because of polling delays in Southern Highlands Province. As in Southern Highlands Province, security was thinly spread, and in some locations polling proceeded in the absence of security personnel. The majority of the security forces who were deployed in Enga Province moved on to Western Highlands Province immediately after polling. Two hundred PNGDF and Mobile Squad personnel remained behind to secure the count.

In contrast to Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces, where security was thin on the ground at individual polling stations, Mt. Hagen Open observers reported that there were ten security personnel at each polling station. This was somewhat surprising, given that security was spread so thin in other parts of the Highlands Region. This may have been because the regular police force in Western Highlands Province is larger, or because a decision was made to concentrate the police personnel in and around the provincial headquarters.

In contrast, observers in Chimbu Province reported there were only between two and four security personnel at each polling station. Most were unarmed and lacked the capacity to prevent or discourage voting irregularities. The provincial police contingent in Chimbu Province was boosted by four armed response units (one PNGDF platoon of 35 men, and three RPNGC Mobile Squads of 90 men), and 768 additional polling security (Fafungian 2008). The armed response units stayed on after the polling to secure the count and respond to any post-election violence.

Polling in Eastern Highlands Province proceeded without additional security, because the NATEL security force that had been deployed to the province arrived several days late as a result of polling delays elsewhere in the Highlands Region. Consequently, polling security in Eastern Highlands Province was variable. Observers reported that polling security was very comprehensive in Goroka Town, which was where the armed police and PNGDF personnel were concentrated. They felt that security was lacking in the more remote districts.

Despite the overall good performance of the security personnel most were observed to be unwilling or incapable of intervening to deter voting irregularities. This was possibly because they were unarmed, and in many cases, poorly trained. Security personnel in the Highlands Region — most particularly the PNGDF contingent — reported that they had received no predeployment training. Many seemed unclear about their role, in general, and specifically about electoral processes and electoral offences. The handbook that was prepared for the police personnel was an excellent innovation (RPNGC 2007b).

Recommendations

- ***The role of the security forces should be clarified, and predeployment training should be provided for all security personnel, prior to the 2012 Elections.*** Police, Correctional Service, and Defence personnel who are assigned to polling places should be properly trained and made aware of what is expected of them in relation to electoral offences, so that they are seen to be making a significant contribution to electoral governance.
- ***A training package, specifically designed for security personnel, should be developed and rolled out to each of the services.*** Given the important role which they play at election time, and that elections are a whole-of-government exercise, the RPNGC, PNGDF, and CS personnel need specific, consistent training (as opposed to ad hoc training) on electoral procedures and electoral offences, guidance on when to intervene, and the extent of their special constable powers under a call out.
- ***As occurred in this election, PNGDF personnel who were deployed under a national call out should be deployed early (preferably a fortnight or month before polling) to each of the Highlands provinces.*** This will enable them to carry out necessary reconnaissance, and intelligence can be gathered in order to identify local flashpoints and take appropriate action.

Post-Polling

This section is based on Section 12 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were asked to record their post-polling observations. Specific questions included in Section 12 concerned the completion of individual polling station returns, the transportation of ballot-boxes back to secure distribution points, whether the returning officer or assistant returning officer maintained a register of unused ballot-papers, and whether any attempt was made to intercept ballot-boxes following the close of polling.

Post-polling arrangements around the country proved, for the most part, to be quite good, with observers reporting that ballot-boxes were transported under security escort and properly secured in preparation for counting.

However, problems were evident in Southern Highlands Province, where observers noted that returns were completed after the polling, as was polling-day documentation. Few returning officers and assistant returning officers were observed to keep a register of unused ballot-papers. There were also problems with the movement of ballot-boxes from Tari to Mendi (see Southern Highlands Provincial team report). The Hela people wanted their ballot-boxes counted in Tari and basically blockaded the Tari Police Station, where the boxes had been secured. As a result, the transportation of the ballot-boxes to the counting centre in Mendi was delayed ten days, and was only effected after an eleventh hour intervention on the part of the Deputy Electoral Commissioner who entered into an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Hela candidates.

Counting

This section is based on Section 14 of the Observer Journal, in which observers were asked to make a series of general observations about the counting. Topics covered included the nature and set-up of the counting centres, security at the counting centres, inter-agency coordination and communication, training, gender issues, and the conduct of the counting.

Counting was generally well-organised, but slow. As a result, the deadline for the return of writs needed to be extended by a week. For the most part, irregularities in counting were identified by the checks and balances that were employed. Observers in most electorates reported that individual ballot-box counts were checked against the returns, and serious anomalies were investigated and often gave rise to recounts.

In most provinces, counting took place at a central location — often the provincial headquarters. In most cases, security was tight, with both a heavy police and PNGDF presence. Except in a few cases, progressive tallies were displayed in the counting rooms around the country. Overall, observers were of the view that counting was open, transparent, and well-managed. However, anomalies were identified by individual observer teams.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

At a procedural level, counting in the Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions was generally well-organised, as evidenced by the individual team reports. Counting was conducted in an open and transparent manner. Used and unused ballot-papers were reconciled, individual ballot-box counts were reconciled against the ballots-papers that were issued and the presiding officers' returns, and checks and balances picked up ballot-papers that had been wrongly allocated in the first instance.

However, observers noted some problems with individual venues in Buka and Popondetta. On Bougainville, counting for the provincial seat took place at the Autonomous Bougainville Government headquarters in Buka. Observers reported that there were no public toilets or running water at the counting centre and that this caused problems for counting officials. Counting for all three seats in Northern (Oro) Province took place at the Popondetta Secondary School hall. The venue was too cramped, and scrutineers were often forced to stand outside, as there was no room for them within the counting room.

The results which were recorded by the NCD Provincial observer team show that Powes Parkop was declared before he obtained an absolute majority, and without the final distribution of preferences taking place. Parkop was declared with 43 533 votes after the fourth exclusion. At the time that he was declared, three candidates and 87 979 ballot-papers remained in the count, meaning that the absolute majority was 43 990 and that he was 457 votes short of the required number.

The Highlands Region

Counting in all of the Highlands provinces was centralised. Procedurally, it varied — within provinces and between them — but overall tended to be well-organised, with varying degrees of transparency. In Chimbu, ballot-papers were subject to the highest

level of scrutiny, with individual counting rooms set up in such a way that scrutineers could properly view the counting process, and in particular, the sorting process. Ballot-papers were checked for formality, and were sorted, rechecked, counted, and recounted before being tallied. Importantly, the open and provincial ballot-papers were consistently reconciled as well, which meant that the majority of errors were picked up during the primary count.

Counting in Eastern Highlands Province took place at the National Sports Institute. It was observed to be well-coordinated and took place in what observers described as an open and transparent manner. Progressive results were communicated to PNGEC headquarters in Port Moresby, released to the NBC and Media Centre, and constantly displayed and updated on a tally board for public scrutiny. Individual ballot-box counts were reconciled against the ballot-papers that were issued and the presiding officer's returns in the case of the Goroka Open seat, but not in respect of the provincial seat. The Eastern Highlands Provincial team noted that several presiding officers failed to provide returns, and this caused delays and disputes during the counting.

The results that were provided by the Eastern Highlands Provincial team also show that, despite a thorough two-day recheck count, figures reached during the elimination phase did not balance with those made earlier. Additional informal papers were identified, as were 1 438 additional ballot-papers that seemingly had not been counted in either the primary count or recheck count. A total of 3 848 previously counted and rechecked ballot-papers could not be located or accounted for during the elimination phase. Examples of anomalies were:

- at exclusion 28, some 264 extra votes appeared;
- at exclusion 22, some 472 previously counted votes assigned to Brian Waii could not be located;
- at exclusion 25, some 843 extra votes appeared;
- at exclusion 27, some 1 430 votes previously assigned to Tangil Iambakey Okuk could not be located; and
- at exclusion 32, some 1 035 votes previously assigned to Stanley Harry Gotaha could not be located.

Counting in Enga Province was centralised at the Wabag Primary School. Although the counting venue was easily secured and offered good protection from the elements, it proved to be too crowded and insecure. It was often impossible to move in the counting room, and at times scrutineers and observers were denied entry because of overcrowding.

The Mt. Hagen counting centre, which was located at Kimininga Police Barracks, was considered the least well-organised. Security checks were random and not universally enforced, and the open counting rooms were particularly makeshift, as they had no walls and consisted of little more than marquees and tarpaulins. No proper seating was provided and scrutineers were kept away from the proceedings. They would have found it difficult to see what was written on any of the individual ballot-papers. That said, observers in the Mt. Hagen Open counting room saw that ballot-papers were checked for formality, sorted, rechecked, and counted before being tallied.

Counting in Southern Highlands Province was centralised at Momei Oval, in Mendi, and was conducted outdoors in semi-permanent, purpose-built counting rooms. Procedural differences as well as differences, with respect to efficiency and accuracy, were noted in the various counting rooms. For example, the number of sorting tables varied from one counting room to the next, and while ballot-papers in some counting rooms were sorted and checked prior to being moved to the candidates' trays for counting, in some cases, they were sorted direct to individual candidates' trays where they were then subjected to a single count.

In some counting rooms, considerable effort was made to ensure that ballot-box counts balanced with the returns, but in others this did not happen consistently or happen at all. The Koroba-Lake Kapiago Open electorate was one electorate where ballot-box counts were not consistently balanced against returns. This came about because many of the presiding officers refused to attend the count, and/or withheld their returns because of complaints about the non-payment of their polling allowances.

The ongoing issue of taxes being deducted from polling allowances also caused delays to counting in Southern Highlands Province. This matter needs to be better addressed in future elections. Many of the polling officials who were employed in this election were not in regular employment, and so objected to having to pay tax at standard rates when their annual income was below the taxable minimum. Many were of the view that the tax had been deducted unlawfully, which resulted in complaints and caused lengthy delays in many counting rooms. If such payments cannot be made tax free, it would be prudent to include a statement about this when the training manuals are being revised. The issue could be addressed in training sessions to provide polling officials for 2012 with an explanation as to why tax will be deducted from their payments.

In terms of efficiency, the Kagua-Erave team report suggests that, if counting had been more efficient, the Kagua-Erave count could have been completed in half the time. Counting started late most days because of the slowness of admitting officials to the counting centre and the late arrival of ballot-boxes. Also, counting was regularly interrupted by scrutineers.

Interruptions by scrutineers were reported in all of the Highlands provinces. There were numerous claims that ballot-boxes should be disqualified and not counted, because they had been 'hijacked' or tampered with in some way. Complaints of this kind resulted in lengthy delays in many counting rooms, and there appeared little consistency about how these problems were dealt with by the returning officers.

Counting for the Southern Highlands Provincial seat proved to be the most problematic in that province. It was not run by the provincial returning officer, who was also the election manager, but by Charles Ipa, who was a public servant appointed 'to run the elections' by the provincial administration. His official role was stated to be that of provincial election coordinator. Although the results were initially posted on a tally board in the counting room, this ceased when it became evident that the results were not balancing.

Few checks and balances were employed in the Southern Highlands Provincial seat counting room, and little or no effort was made to balance results against returns from

individual polling stations. Similarly, little concern was shown when the number of Open Electorate ballot-papers didn't match the number of provincial ballot-papers. It is not known how often this occurred, because it has not been possible to obtain the full Southern Highlands Provincial results.

Counting for the Southern Highlands Provincial seat proved very slow and took a month to complete. The primary or first preference count commenced on 7 July 2007 and continued through 28 July 2007. Counting was then suspended following a court challenge by four of the provincial candidates — Hami Yawari, Bob Marley Undi Nandi, Dickson Pena Tasi, and Michael Nali. These candidates claimed that the ballot-boxes from the Hela Region had been tampered with and should not be counted, and that the MOU entered into by the deputy commissioner of the PNGEC should be declared null and void. Counting resumed at around midday on Saturday 4 August, with a recheck count. Although it had taken some three weeks to sort and count the first preferences, the recheck count, which involved the rechecking approximately 384 000 ballot-papers, was completed in less than five hours. Observers felt that the recheck was cursory and that few cross-checks were employed.

The elimination phase of the Southern Highlands Provincial seat count commenced at 5.15p.m. on 4 August 2007, and continued through the night and into the following day, with the declaration being made exactly 24 hours after the eliminations commenced. It was observed that the eliminations were rushed and that many mistakes were made, especially in relation to the last five eliminations. Specifically, observers noted that the distribution of preferences took place 'in a split second', and that there was no checking of the redistributed or exhausted ballot papers. Observers felt that many ballot-papers were wrongly allocated. In comparison, the elimination phase of the Tari-Pori Open seat count took five days to complete, and involved only 37 000 ballot-papers.

Recommendations

- ***Procedures need be established to ensure that presiding officers' returns are available in the counting room.*** This could be achieved by producing the returns in duplicate. The duplicate copy could be provided to the security commander on the ground, to ensure that returns can be produced, and votes cast balanced against the returns — even in the event that the presiding officers choose to withhold them.
- ***In the 2012 and other future elections, polling officials should be provided with a letter explaining why tax has been deducted from their payments.*** An explanation concerning taxes should also be included in the polling officials' training manual.

Training

As was the case with training for polling officials, there was much variability with respect to the training provided for counting officials.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Counting officials in the Islands and Momase Regions, and the NCD were provided with adequate training. On Bougainville, the training was conducted over two days, and observers reported that counting officials appeared well-versed with all aspects of the counting procedures. One day training was provided for counting officials in the NCD and in Madang Province.

In contrast, the Ijivitari team reported that counting officials received only two hours training, which proved to be insufficient. Specifically, they noted that no simulation exercises were conducted and that counting officials remained confused about procedural matters. Subsequent interviews with scrutineers revealed that their training was also limited, and that no information was provided about the general conduct of the count — more particularly, the elimination process. Observers stated that confusion on the part of counting officials and scrutineers led to unnecessary delays and accusations of foul play.

The Highlands Region

Observers in the Highlands Region described the training provided to counting officials as inadequate. The Eastern Highlands Provincial team reported that only 200 of the 700 counting officials received training, and those who did received only one hour of training prior to the commencement of the count. Observers in Chimbu Province, also felt that the training provided for the counting officials was inadequate. Some observers were asked to provide additional training for counting officials during the early phases of the count.

In Southern Highlands Province, counting officials and scrutineers were provided with training ranging from an hour to a day (depending on the counting room) immediately prior to the commencement of counting. Observers described the training as disorganised and noted that counting officials and scrutineers often appeared out of their depth and confused about procedural matters. As counting progressed, it also became evident that new counting officials were being appointed and admitted to some counting rooms, such as the Southern Highlands Provincial counting room. Those counting officials who were appointed after the commencement of the count did not receive any training and were observed to make many mistakes.

The Mt. Hagen observers were unable to comment on the training that was provided for counting officials as they were initially denied access to the counting centre. Although they were wearing official observers' passes, security personnel were unaware that a domestic observation was taking place.

Security

Security at counting centres across the country was described as tight, and an improvement on the 2002 Elections.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

In the NCD, Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions, 24-hours security was provided at each counting centre by armed police and/or defence force personnel. Only

those people with official IDs were permitted in the counting rooms. However, in Oro, police were observed to act outside their mandate, by trying to assume the role of mediators or counting officials when disputes arose between electoral officials and scrutineers (see Ijivitari team report).

The Highlands Region

Security at the counting centres in Eastern Highlands, Chimbu, Southern Highlands, and Enga Provinces was observed to be excellent. Only properly accredited and authorised personnel were allowed into these counting centres, and only after they were subjected to thorough security checks. In Chimbu Province, authorised personnel seeking to enter the counting centre were subjected to four separate checks, and all vehicles entering the sporting stadium precinct were stopped and searched. Searches in Enga and Southern Highlands Provinces saw large sums of money and completed ballot-papers intercepted. Security checks at the Western Highlands Provincial counting centre in Mt. Hagen proved to be the most relaxed. They were observed to be random and not universally enforced. This was the only Highlands counting centre where the police were in charge of the counting centre security.

The security situation deteriorated significantly in many provinces following the declarations, particularly after the withdrawal of the NATEL security forces. In Chimbu Province, post-election, tribal fighting was reported in all six districts (see Chimbu Provincial and Chuave Open team reports; Fafungian 2008), and 23 election-related deaths confirmed (Fafungian 2008). Ongoing security problems have also been reported in parts of Southern Highlands Province.

SECTION 4: ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING

Aspects of election administration and planning, including the new Electoral Roll, the new ballot-paper, pre-polling administration and logistics, awareness and security are considered elsewhere in this report. Consideration is given here to communications and interagency communication.

Communications

Communications proved to be problematic across much of the country — especially in the more remote areas where communications infrastructure is weakest. Observers consistently noted that electoral personnel — ROs, AROs, and POs outside the urban areas and larger towns — tended to be without communications. The security personnel had either field radios which allowed them to communicate with headquarters (in the case of the PNGDF), or handheld radios which could communicate over short distances (in the case of the RPNGC).

In the main, security personnel in the field experienced considerable difficulty communicating with those people who were coordinating the security operations in the provincial headquarters, and with the security personnel inserted with the polling teams. They relied on third parties relaying requests for helicopter support or security back-up. In the Highlands Region, electoral and security personnel were observed to rely heavily on mobile phones. However, there were major network outages during the polling and counting periods. This was particularly so in Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces, where the network repeatedly went down for days at a time.

The lack of radios as well as an effective joint communications strategy also meant that there was no communication between the election manager, returning officer, and assistant returning officers once they were in the electorate. Consequently, it was difficult for those in the field to get accurate information about the movement of ballot-boxes and ballot-papers, and air transport. The lack of communication was particularly evident at polling stations. For example, the Ijivitari team reported that there was no means of communication at any of the polling stations which were visited, and that polling officials were unable to seek advice and clarification, or ask for assistance when needed. Similar observations were made in Southern Highlands Province.

In contrast, communications at the counting centres around the country was very good. With few exceptions, the crowds that gathered outside counting centres were kept well informed at all times, with progressive tallies being broadcast throughout the day, and recorded on huge, purpose-built tally boards. Progressive tallies were also faxed to PNGEC headquarters in Port Moresby, on a regular basis.

Recommendation

- ***Electoral officials and security personnel who are deployed to remote districts require reliable and effective communication.*** These groups must be able to communicate with each other and the other agencies involved in running the elections as needed. As such, they should be provided with radios or satellite phones (according to context) that are in good working order.

Interagency Coordination

Interagency coordination is best assessed by the agencies involved. That said, the observer team noted that interagency coordination appeared greatly improved, although hampered to some extent by a lack of effective communications equipment.

The improved interagency coordination appeared to result from the adoption of a whole-of-government approach to the planning, staging, and conduct of the 2007 National General Elections. At the national level, the whole-of-government approach was evidenced by the establishment of the Inter-Departmental Election Committee (IDEC), which was chaired by the Registrar of Political Parties, and at the provincial level, by the establishment of Provincial Election Steering Committees, which were chaired by the provincial administrators.

However, the extent to which the Provincial Election Steering Committees proved to be effective varied greatly. Many were established very late in the election cycle. Several committees were viewed as partisan, and in at least four provinces, they attempted to influence personnel appointments, by seeking to remove key electoral personnel (returning officers and assistant returning officers and making their own appointments (see Chimbu Provincial and Southern Highlands Provincial team reports). This caused a great deal of confusion on the ground and hampered election preparations.

Recommendation

- ***Interagency structures should be formalised, and the roles of various stakeholders clarified.*** This should be especially in relation to who has the responsibility for recommending the appointment of returning officers and assistant returning officers.

Election Petitions

In the aftermath of the 2007 National General Elections, far fewer election petitions were filed than in recent elections. The 2007 Elections resulted in 55 electoral petitions being filed in the Court of Disputed Returns, as opposed to 89 following the 2002 Elections and 86 following the 1997 Elections (Nonggorr 2002:57). This suggests that there was some degree of increased satisfaction with election results on the part of candidates. Of the 55 petitions that were filed, approximately half have already been finalised.

SECTION 5: COMPARISON OF VOTING PRACTICES

Over the past decade, elections in the Highlands Region have become increasingly violent and chaotic (Haley 2002, 2004; Standish 2003, 2006; Gibbs 2006), so much so that the 2002 National General Elections were deemed to have failed in six of the nine Southern Highlands Province electorates. Compared with the 1997 and 2002 Elections, the 2007 National General Elections were more successful. The 2007 Elections were more peaceful and generally free of threats, violence, and forceful intimidation. Men and women voted independently and in many cases voted for the candidates of their choice.

As noted in Section 2, approximately two-thirds of the candidates who were elected to national parliament in 2002 received less than 20 percent of the votes under the first-past-the-post system. The 2002 Elections also saw the mean percentage of the votes required to win a seat fall from 18 percent (in 1997) to 16 percent (Reilly 2006:189). It was expected that LPV would ‘require candidates to widen their support base’ (Standish 2006:197), and ‘promote the election of more broadly supported candidates’ (Reilly 2006:189). It is arguably too early to judge whether this will necessarily be the case, as it will largely depend on whether:

- LPV attracts fewer candidates or gives rise to a proliferation of candidates; and
- voters choose to make their votes count.

The early indications are positive. Overall candidate numbers dropped slightly in 2007, but significantly in several electorates which had experienced an LPV by-election. For example, 23 candidates contested the 2006 NCD by-election, but only seven candidates contested the 2007 National General Elections. In Koroba-Lake Kopyago Open-electorate, candidate numbers were down on the 2002 Elections (19 candidates) and the 2006 by-election (20 candidates). Only 17 candidates contested the seat in the 2007 Elections.

A preliminary analysis of the available results also suggests that there were critical differences in how people in the different electorates used preferences. In at least five of the electorates which had experienced an LPV by-election, preferences seem to have been utilised far more strategically and effectively than they had in the previous by-elections.⁶ For example, in the Koroba-Lake Kopyago Open electorate, 68 percent of the formal votes remained live at the completion of the final count, while 85 percent were still live immediately prior to the final exclusion. Similarly, in the Chimbu Provincial seat, 64 percent of formal votes remained active at the completion of the final count, while 77 percent were live prior to the final count (Standish 2007:10). In the Yangoru-Saussia Open Electorate, 63 percent of votes remained live at the declaration, while 76 percent were still live just before the final elimination.

In contrast, the LPV by-elections had typically seen 60 percent of allowable votes exhausted (Standish 2006). In one case, a candidate won with a lower overall mandate than the previous MP who had been elected under the previous first-past-the-post

⁶ Prior to the 2007 National General Elections, there were 10 LPV by-elections. At the time of finalising this report, comparative results were not available for two of the Open seats – Anglimp-South Waghi and Moresby North-East.

system (Haley 2006). Clearly, voters with previous LPV experience chose to ‘make their vote count’. They allocated their preferences to strong candidates with a track record and/or wide appeal, not to minor local candidates. This has seen more widely representative candidates elected – something for which LPV advocates had hoped.

In electorates that had not experienced an LPV by-election, a large member of votes were exhausted.⁷ For example, at the end of the final count in the Ijivitari Open electorate, 63 percent of votes had been exhausted, and although the winner, David Arore, had secured an ‘absolute majority’ — more than 50 percent of the live votes — he had secured only 19 percent of the allowable votes cast. Similarly, at the declaration for the Goroka Open, 57 percent of the 54 452 allowable ballot-papers had been exhausted, with the newly elected MP, Thompson Harokaqveh, managing to secure only 24 percent of the allowable votes. These results are similar to those from the earlier LPV by-elections which had typically seen the majority of the initially allowable votes exhausted.

As positive as these early indicators are, it will ‘take at least a full general election (or two)’ before we can fully assess the achievements (or otherwise) of the 2002 Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections (Standish 2006:198). In Melanesia, countervailing principles can apply. For example, groups might knowingly choose to throw their votes away or keep them local in order to block or diminish the likelihood of a traditional rival being elected (Standish 2007: 144).

A thorough assessment of the election will also depend upon the availability of results for analysis and scrutiny. At the time of finalising this report, the full results for all 109 electorates were not available.

In the absence of the full results, some commentators have hailed LPV as a success. The increased mandates of winning candidates and the low informal vote are said to indicate that LPV was well-understood. While it is true that the candidates who were elected under LPV have a wider popular mandate than those elected in 2002 (see Appendix A), very few, even with the benefit of preferences, managed to secure 50 percent of the total allowable votes. The low informal vote can be attributed to the high level of assisted voting that was witnessed around the country, rather than an understanding of LPV and how it should work.

Although definitive conclusions about LPV cannot be made until more full sets of results are available and analysed, it is possible to make some initial observations concerning mandates, based on a preliminary analysis of the available results. The preliminary analysis suggests that, after the allocation of preferences, the mandates of winning candidates broadly doubled. In respect of the 32 seats for which the results have been obtained:

- less than one-third (10 out of 32) of the successful candidates managed to secure more than 20 percent of the first preferences or primary count; and

⁷ These observations were based on the results that were available. The PNG Electoral Commission has not, for various reasons, been able to provide full results for all 109 electorates, or for all electorates considered as part of this observation. A fuller analysis of the results when they become publicly available will verify whether or not these observations hold true for the whole country.

- the median percentage of first preferences gained by winning candidates was 17 percent.

These findings are consistent with the 2002 Election results, where two-thirds of candidates were elected with less than 20 percent of the votes, and the median percentage of the vote required to win a seat was 16 percent (Reilly 2006:189).

After the distribution of preferences, winning candidates in the 32 seats gained:

- a median percentage of 35 percent of the total allowable votes; and
- a mean or average percentage of 34 percent of the allowable votes.

It was also found that, in 25 of the 32 seats (78 percent of cases), the winning candidates secured less than 40 percent of the allowable votes. Broadly speaking, successful candidates in the 2007 Elections had the support of approximately one-third of voters in their respective electorates. Even with the widened support base, LPV guaranteed that they were elected by a minority — albeit an increased minority — of their constituents.

SECTION 6: GENDER AND HIV/AIDS

Gender

Some 101 women contested the 2007 National General Elections (Islands (8), Momase (22), Southern (45), and the Highlands (26)), as opposed to 66 in the 2002 Elections. On both occasions, only Dame Carol Kidu, the member for Port Moresby South, was successful.

It had been argued that LPV would increase the possibility of women being elected, and would give female voters more choice and more freedom to exercise their choice. Increased representation by women did not occur, although observers noted that voter turnout by women was greatly improved – especially in the troublesome Highlands provinces.

Despite the financial incentives in the OLIPPAC to encourage political parties to field female candidates — with a refund of 75 percent of party expenses available if a female candidate receives 10 percent of the votes — women evidently found it more difficult than their male counterparts to secure party endorsement. Of 2 658 male candidates who contested the election, 1 245 (47%) were endorsed, whereas, only 36 (36%) of the female candidates secured endorsement. Even when they were endorsed, female candidates appeared to receive less support from their respective parties. For example, two of the three female candidates who contested the Kerema Open seat had party endorsement and support, but neither was given campaign posters by their political parties (Sepoe 2008). These findings show that the issue of female representation requires further attention and investigation.

In addition to Dame Carol Kidu, the results show that several female candidates polled strongly in the 2007 Elections:

- Julie Soso Akeke, the only female candidate to contest the Eastern Highlands Provincial seat, came sixth in a field of 35. There is some confusion about how many votes she actually received. Prior to exclusion she was recorded as having received 34 428 votes, which represented 9.9 percent of the formal votes. However, when her votes were redistributed, an extra 261 votes were counted, which suggests that she had received 34 689 votes. This meant that she has secured just over 10 percent of the formal votes that were cast.
- Mary Kamang, the only female candidate to contest the Madang Provincial seat, came fourth in a field of 23 candidates. She secured 11 339 first preference votes, which is 7.4 percent of allowable votes. At exclusion, she had 22 720 votes, which is 14.9 percent of allowable votes.
- Josephine Morova was one of three women to contest the Kerema Open seat. She came fourth in a field of 51 candidates. At the completion of the first preference count, she had secured 1 448 votes, which is 4.7 percent of the allowable votes, and was in fifth place. At elimination, she had secured 3 614 votes, which is 11.8 percent of allowable votes.
- Maureen Ambo was one of two women to contest the Ijivitari Open seat. She came fourth in a field of 38 candidates. She secured 1 913 first preferences,

which is 6.7 percent of allowable ballots, and was in fifth place at the end of the primary count. At elimination, she had secured 3 610 votes, which is 12.7 percent of allowable votes.

- Donna Hall, the only female candidate to contest the Bulolo Open seat, came third in a field of 34 candidates. At elimination, she had secured 5 740 votes, which is 17 percent of allowable votes.
- Janet Sape, the only female candidate to contest the NCD Provincial seat, came third in a field of seven candidates. At the completion of the first preference count, she had secured 10 307 votes, which is 11.6 percent of the allowable votes. At the declaration, she had secured 12 411 votes, which is 13.9 percent of allowable votes.

Of these six female candidates, four had party endorsement — Morova was endorsed by the United Party, Ambo by the National Alliance, Hall by the New Generation Party, and Sape by the People's Action Party. Analysis of the full results, including individual ballot-box counts, when they become available, will offer some further insights into the performance of these candidates.

Observations from around the country suggest that very few candidates explicitly discussed gender issues or sought to secure women's votes. However, some strong assertions by women concerning their rights and opinions were observed during the campaigning and polling periods. Those candidates who specifically addressed women's issues, included Dr. Puka Temu (Abau Open), Joseph Warai and Janet Koarima (Tari-Pori Open), and Mary Kamang (Madang Provincial).

Across the country, observers noted that women tended to play mainly supporting roles during the campaign period — cooking food, providing hospitality, and entertaining guests. The extent to which women were engaged as polling and counting officials varied from province to province, and electorate to electorate. Other specific observations in respect of women are also covered.

The Islands, Momase, and Southern Regions

Observers in the Islands Region reported that, although most of the security personnel were men, women accounted for half of all polling and counting officials. In the Ijivitari Open seat, observers felt that voter turnout on the part of women was better than in previous elections, and that gender-segregated polling had allowed women to vote freely, without being harassed, or forced to the end of the line. Women in the Abau Open Electorate were also observed to vote freely, although there was no gender segregated polling. However, most of the polling officials were men.

The Highlands Region

The introduction of separate voting compartments, which was intended to allow gender segregated voting for women, was a mixed success in the Highlands Region. It did not occur in Enga or Southern Highlands Provinces, but was observed in parts of Chimbu, Eastern Highlands, and Western Highlands Provinces. Observers in Mt. Hagen noted that gender-segregated polling was employed at many polling stations and was generally well-received. Women were generally free to vote without intimidation, were reasonably well-represented in polling teams, and accounted for approximately one-

third of all polling officials. Women were also reasonably well-represented in polling and counting teams in Eastern Highlands and Chimbu Provinces, and were observed to turn out in force on polling day.

In Chimbu Province, a female assistant returning officer, Mirian Riyong, was appointed for the first time ever, as were several presiding officers. Women were also well-represented as assistant polling officers and polling clerks, and by all accounts, were much better represented than in previous general elections or recent by-elections. A count showed that 10 out of 40 counting officials in the Karamui-Nomane counting room were women, 13 out of 50 counting officials in the Kundiawa-Gembol counting room were women, and 18 out of 32 counting officials in the Chimbu Provincial counting room were women.

Women were not so well-represented in polling teams in Southern Highlands Province. However, observers reported a mood of optimism amongst female voters and noted that women turned out in force on polling day. Women were reasonably well-represented as counting officials in Southern Highlands Province, where they accounted for 15 to 30 percent of officials in each counting room.

Recommendations

- ***Further research concerning how to encourage greater numbers of women candidates is needed, as are enabling mechanisms which would see an increase in the number of women entering Parliament.*** Election models that are employed in other countries should be examined for their suitability in a Papua New Guinean context.
- ***The gender-segregated polling procedures that were trialled in this election should be retained.*** Staff should be trained and made fully cognisant of these procedures, and if necessary, they should be legislatively proscribed.

HIV/AIDS

The 2007 National General Elections revealed that HIV/AIDS is not a pressing electoral issue. What voters want and desire from their political leaders are basic services, such as roads, schools, medical supplies, and police and magisterial services, not policy statements and prevention strategies.

As already documented, the HIV/AIDS epidemic did not figure in campaigning in either the 2002 General Elections or the 2003 Supplementary Elections (Haley 2008). The 2007 National General Elections were therefore the first in which HIV and AIDS entered the electoral stage, and candidates took different stances on the issue. Most candidates did not discuss the issues at all, and very few candidates around the country mentioned HIV/AIDS when campaigning. Those who explicitly raised the issue included Dr. Puka Temu (Abau Open), Sam Aloï (Madang Open), Joseph Warai and Janet Koarima (Tari-Pori Open), Petrus Thomas (Koroba-Lake Kapiago), Maryanne Amu and Bart Philemon (Lae Open), Fr. Paul Kanda (Enga Provincial), and Jacob Sekewa (Southern Highlands Provincial).

Research and observations made during the 2007 Elections show that elections provide a context for heightened sexual activity (Gibbs and Mondu 2008; Southern Highlands Provincial team report), which, in turn, increased the likelihood of HIV transmission. It is difficult to know how much unprotected premarital and extramarital sex took place during the elections, or how much transactional sex took place. Gibbs and Mondu (2008) have shown that birth rates in Enga Province in the first three months of 2003 — nine months after the 2002 General Elections — were significantly higher than in the preceding year, and sexually transmitted infection rates in Enga Province spiked in the three months following the 2007 National General Elections.

Observers elsewhere in the Highlands Region also noted behaviour which might well contribute to the spread of HIV. The Goroka Open team observed that campaign houses were prevalent, were centred around political singsings (which throughout much of the Highlands Region takes the same form as traditional courting songs), feasting, and drinking, and that men and women were equally represented. They also observed that young girls accounted for approximately 30 percent of the women who frequented the campaign houses. An interview with Thompson Harokaqveh (who is the newly elected member for Goroka Open) (see Goroka Open team report) revealed that 500-600 people slept in his main campaign house, at Kama, each night of the campaign period.

The Chuave team also noted persistent rumours that young women were being used as 'bait' to lure votes, and five losing candidates have alleged that the sitting MP, Jim Nomane, used sex, along with money, pigs, and chickens, to bribe people to vote for him (see Chuave team report). They also noted that young females accounted for some 25 percent of all the night-time attendees at campaign houses.

Individual voters were observed to have greater access to cash, and were more mobile than in past elections. This meant that they were better positioned to seek out transactional sex and/or premarital and extramarital sexual relations. Observers in Southern Highlands Province reported that campaign houses and discos featured significantly, and that both were popular meeting places. Observers noted the presence of sex workers, as well as young girls and married women. They reported the use of cannabis, the consumption of free food and alcohol, and evidence of transactional sex along with political campaigning and strategising. It was also observed that many establishments did not charge women a gate fee, and that there seemed to be less surveillance of women's sexual activity during the election period. This is consistent with detailed findings in respect of campaign houses in Wabag (Gibbs and Mondu 2008).

Although it is not a core function of the PNGEC, elections do provide the opportunity to conduct HIV/AIDS awareness in areas that are generally beyond the reach of the State and lack the formal infrastructure (because of the breakdown of essential services) through which awareness messages might ordinarily be channelled. For this reason, election-related HIV/AIDS awareness should continue to be combined with electoral and civic awareness.

Election-related HIV/AIDS awareness is also important, as experiences from Africa have shown that HIV/AIDS impacts on the costs of running elections, because by-elections, brought about through the deaths of incumbent MPs, are increasingly commonplace.

Recommendation

- ***Awareness about HIV/AIDS should continue to be carried out in conjunction with any future electoral and civic awareness.*** Much of the behaviour that was noted in this election, especially that associated with campaign houses, increased the likelihood of HIV transmission.

SECTION 7: OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The 2007 National General Elections were better managed and more peaceful than the 2002 Elections. Specifically, there were appreciable gains with respect to electoral administration – so much so that the elections ran smoothly in many provinces, in particular, the New Guinea Islands Region. Nevertheless, there is still room for further improvement. The Electoral Roll needs further verification and cleansing, training needs to be prioritised, and financial management still needs to be improved, to ensure that funds are available when needed, and that essential election supplies reach all provinces on time.

Electoral fraud and malpractice continue to be problematic in the Highlands Region, and are, in part, caused by the poor state of the new Electoral Roll. These issues will require attention in the lead-up to the 2012 National General Elections.

Despite the difficulties that were experienced, and the fraud and malpractice that was seen to occur (most notably in the Highlands Region), voters throughout the country seemed generally satisfied with the way the elections had proceeded, and with their first experience of LPV. In the most troubled areas, such as the Southern Highlands Province, voters were genuinely heartened because they actually got to vote (many had been denied this democratic right in 1997 and 2002) and by the general lack of election-related violence.

Perhaps most importantly, LPV appears to have resulted in the election of MPs who have more representative mandates. The available results indicate that the MPs in the current Parliament received one-third of the allowable votes. It is also worth noting that, for the 32 seats for which we have results, 22 of the winning candidates led from the outset, and in only six cases did eliminations change the first-past-the-post result.⁸

⁸ The results for four of the electorates were incomplete and lacked the first preference results. As a consequence, we do not know whether the winning candidate led from the outset or not.

SECTION 8: LOOKING TO 2012

First and foremost, it should not be assumed that, because the 2007 National General Elections were for the mostly peaceful, the 2012 National General Elections will be similar. Having now been exposed to LPV, candidates and voters in some parts of the country, especially the Highlands Region, are saying that they won't allow accommodative campaigning in the future. This gives cause for concern and alerts us to the fact there is no room for complacency on the security front.

Accurate electoral rolls are the administrative basis for free and fair elections. As such, problems with the new Electoral Roll need to be addressed as a matter of urgency, if the 2012 National General Elections are to have integrity. More accurate rolls will also give rise to less costly elections.

Once again, one-day polling in the Highlands Region proved impossible to achieve. Recognising that it took a full week to complete polling in at least three of the Highlands provinces, it could well be a better strategy to stage future elections in the Highlands Region over several days in each province. Alternatively, other polling modes, such as the use of mobile polling teams, could be considered. This would reduce the total number of polling officials that would be needed, make training easier, and ensure that the security forces were utilised more effectively.

Finally, civic awareness should continue and be expanded in order to generate, and foster, demand for good elections. Among other things, such awareness should seek to educate voters about the electoral roll, the function that it serves, and the differences between the electoral roll and the National Census. It should also seek to educate voters about electoral laws and electoral offences, as well as voters' rights and responsibilities. Such awareness will only work, if it is combined with the confidence and conviction that other parts of the electoral process will work. For this reason, every effort should be made to ensure that efficient, honest, and reliable staff are engaged to conduct the 2012 National General Elections and that they are properly trained and supported.

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APPENDIX A: RESULTS SUMMARY

Table 3: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates with Prior LPV Experience (Highlands)

Table 4: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates with Prior LPV Experience (Southern and Momase)

Table 5: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates with Prior LPV Experience (Islands)

Table 6: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates without Prior LPV Experience (Southern, Islands, and Momase)

Table 7: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates without Prior LPV Experience (Momase)

Table 8: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates without Prior LPV Experience (Highlands)

Table 9: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Provincial Electorates with LPV Experience (Highlands, Southern, and Islands)

Table 10: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Provincial Electorates without LPV Experience (Highlands, Momase, and Islands)

Table 3: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates with Prior LPV Experience

Electorate	Chuave Open	Koroba-Lake Kopiago	Wabag Open	Anglimp - South Waghi
Region	Highlands	Highlands	Highlands	Highlands
Total Allowable Ballot-Papers – 2007 Election	30 611	44 473	44 340	
No. of Candidates	29	17	19	
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	17 269	30 066	34 196	
% Remaining Live at Declaration	56%	68%	77%	
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	13 342	14 407	10 144	<i>RESULTS</i>
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	44%	32%	23%	<i>NOT</i>
Papers Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	20 388	37 603	40 344	<i>AVAILABLE</i>
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	67%	85%	91%	
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	16% (1st)	18% (1st)	34% (1st)	
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	32%	37%	45%	
Total Allowable Papers – LPV By-Election	32 691	40 842	53 418	105 948
No. of Candidates	24	20	19	30
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	12 310	22 913	48 415	4 2018
% Remaining Live at Declaration	38%	56%	91%	40%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	20 381	17 929	5 003	63 930
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	62%	44%	9%	60%
Total Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion		28 366		55 347
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion		69%		52%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	13% (2nd)	12% (3rd)	38% (1st)	9% (3rd)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	20%	30%	48%	22%

Table 4: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates with Prior LPV Experience

Electorate	Moresby North-East Open	Yangoru-Saussia Open	Abau Open
Region	Southern	Momase	Southern
Total Allowable Ballot-Papers – 2007 Election		26 332	22 035
No. of Candidates		15	12
Total Remaining Live at Declaration		16 549	19 395
% Remaining Live at Declaration		63%	88%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	<i>RESULTS</i>	9 783	2 640
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	<i>NOT</i>	37%	12%
Papers Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	<i>AVAILABLE</i>	19 932	21 065
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion		76%	96%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count		25% (1st)	43% (1st)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot		33%	49%
Total Allowable Papers – LPV By-Election	29 265	23 802	18 195
No. of Candidates	22	18	6
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	16 361	13 756	18 195
% Remaining Live at Declaration	56%	58%	100%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	12 904	10 046	NIL
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	44%	42%	0%
Total Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion			18 195
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion			100%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	16% (1st)	19% (1st)	49% (1st)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	28%	30%	50%

Table 5: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates without Prior LPV Experience

Electorate	South Bougainville	Central Bougainville	North Bougainville
Region	Islands	Islands	Islands
Total Allowable Ballot-Papers – 2007	17 551	11 676	24 160
No. of Candidates	8	12	11
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	12 675	8 065	17 942
% Remaining Live at Declaration	72%	69%	74%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	4 876	3 611	6 218
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	28%	31%	26%
Papers Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	16 012	9 615	21 315
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	91%	82%	88%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	26% (1st)	14% (2nd)	31% (1st)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	36%	37%	41%

Table 6: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates without Prior LPV Experience

Electorate	Ijivitari Open	Kerema Open	Talasea Open	Kandrian/ Glouster	Wewak Open
Region	Southern	Southern	Islands	Islands	Momase
Total Allowable Ballot-Papers - 2007	28 506	30 539	46 627	21 826	28 963
Number of Candidates	38	51	32	16	43
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	10 419	11 428	22 575	14 211	10 745
% Remaining Live at Declaration	37%	37%	48%	65%	37%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	18 087	19 111	24 052	7 615	18 218
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	63%	63%	52%	35%	63%
Total Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	14 217	16 225	29 340	17 453	14 823
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	50%	53%	63%	80%	51%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	9% (2nd)	12% (1st)	14% (1st)	14% (2nd)	10% (1st)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	19%	19%	24%	33%	19%

Table 7: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates without Prior LPV Experience

Electorate	Madang Open	Usino – Bundi Open	Bulolo Open	Vanimo Green River	Lae Open
Region	Momase	Momase	Momase	Momase	Momase
Total Allowable Ballot-Papers - 2007	35 117	21 229	33 713	20 886	23 679
No. of Candidates	44	36	34	29	25
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	15 751	8 486	17 393	14 451	16 595
% Remaining Live at Declaration	45%	40%	52%	69%	70%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	19 366	12 743	16 320	6 435	11 911
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	55%	60%	48%	31%	42%
Total Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	18 682	10 742	21 954	16 690	18 261
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	53%	51%	65%	80%	77%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	13% (1st)	Not Known⁹	Not Known	Not Known	Not Known
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	24%	25%	26%	36%	36%

⁹ The Usino-Bundi, Bulolo, Vanimo-Green River, and Lae Open results supplied to us were incomplete, as they did not show the first preference count figures.

Table 8: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Open Electorates without Prior LPV Experience

Electorate	Goroka Open	Imbongu Open	Nipa-Kutubu	Kompiani-Ambum	Tari-Pori Open	Mt Hagen Open
Region	Highlands	Highlands	Highlands	Highlands	Highlands	Highlands
Total Allowable Ballot-Papers - 2007	54 452	46 497	63 771	36 106	37 263	73 043
No. of Candidates	40	20	21	35	28	12
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	23 225	25 590	37 015	18 450	22 261	73 043
% Remaining Live at Declaration	43%	55%	58%	51%	60%	100%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	31 227	20 907	26 756	17 656	15 002	Nil
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	57%	45%	42%	49%	40%	0%
Total Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	Not Known¹⁰	31 993	47 622	23 345	27 482	73 043
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	Not Known	69%	75%	65%	74%	100%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	9% (2nd)	13% (1st)	18% (1st)	16% (1st)	17% (1st)	52% (1st)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	24%	28%	30%	32%	35%	52%

¹⁰ The Goroka Open results that we were supplied with were incomplete, as we did not receive the full data concerning all the eliminations.

Table 9: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Provincial Electorates with LPV Experience

Electorate	Chimbu Provincial	NCD Provincial	Bougainville Provincial
Region	Highlands	Southern	Islands
Total Allowable Ballot-Papers – 2007 Election	21 8881	89 090	52 404
No. of Candidates	19	7	8
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	14 1115	87 979	43 972
% Remaining Live at Declaration	64%	99%¹¹ (85%+)	84%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	77 766	1 111	8 432
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	36%	1%	16%
Total Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	168 434	88 019	50 709
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	77%	99%	97%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref Count	18% (1st)	41% (1st)	27% (1st)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	39%	49%	46%
Total Allowable Papers – LPV By- Election	341 060	63 028	31 464
Number of Candidates	31	23	6
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	144 482	41 342	29 330
% Remaining Live at Declaration	42%	66%	93%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	196 578	21 686	2 134
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	58%	34%	7%
Total Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion		48 740	
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion		77%	
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	13% (1st)	23% (1st)	38% (1st)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	21%	38%	55%

¹¹ This figure should be treated with some caution, in that Powes Parkop was declared without having attained an absolute majority.

Table 10: Exhausted-Live Comparison: Provincial Electorates without LPV Experience

Electorate	Eastern Highlands Provincial	Southern Highlands Provincial	Western Highlands Provincial	Madang Provincial	West New Britain Provincial
Region	Highlands	Highlands	Highlands	Momase	Islands
Total Allowable Ballot-Papers - 2007	346 446¹²	38 3921	41 3502	15 2260	68 078
No. Candidates	35	18	26	23	20
Total Remaining Live at Declaration	25 6014	32 1360	27 9267	95 168	49 369
% Remaining Live at Declaration	74%	84%	68%	63%	73%
Total Exhausted Ballot-Papers	90 432	62 561	134 235	57 092	18 718
% Exhausted Ballot-Papers	26%	16%	32%	37%	27%
Total Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	280 183	361 076	323 827	116 702	56 488
% Still Live Prior to Final Exclusion	81%	94%	78%	77%	83%
Winning Candidate's % of 1 st Pref. Count	22% (1st)	36% (1st)	17% (2nd)	20% (1st)	16% (2nd)
Winning Candidate's % of Allowable Ballot	38%	52%	34%	37%	37%

¹² This is the total of allowable ballot-papers at the start of the elimination count. It should theoretically remain the same throughout, if the ballot-papers have been properly counted and rechecked. In this case, the figure kept changing because, as the eliminations progressed, an additional 1 438 papers appeared, while 3 848 previously counted and checked ballot-papers disappeared and could not be located. The figures used here are those supplied to the Eastern Highlands Provincial Observer Team at the count.